

THE MIDDLE EAST *Journal*

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
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CYPRUS

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CYPRUS: REVOLUTION AND RESOLUTION

Roy P. Fairfield

*Enosis is dead! "Zito anexartisis!"*¹

THE Cyprus settlement in London last February had most far-reaching implications. For people on the island the agreement terminated four years of civil strife, a conflict which took 601 British and Cypriot lives, wounded 1260,² and caused untold hardship among the approximately 530,000 residents. It also signalled the return of Archbishop Makarios, whose exile had become symbolic of the colonial status his countrymen were fighting. But the treaty was also hailed by the rest of the free world.

Although Lord Beaverbrook's newspapers shouted "sell-out," even the most pro-Empire Tories in the House of Commons welcomed the end of the pesky problem. NATO countries from France to Turkey breathed more easily, since the impasse threatened Western unity. And the settlement finally removed the United States from an embarrassing position. Since the struggle engaged three of our allies, we were free to do little more than urge "quiet diplomacy." Even when we abstained from voting on self-determination resolutions at the United Nations, ardent Greek *enosists* accused us of disloyalty and bombed our libraries in Athens and Salonika. However much the Cyprus issue gained adherents for Greek

1. As the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* pointed out (March 5, 1959) this slogan "Long live independence," was the first sign of E.O.K.A.'s acceptance of the London agreement.

2. *The Athens Messenger*, (Athens, Ohio), March 12, 1959, an AP release.

◆ ROY P. FAIRFIELD is Associate Professor of Government at Ohio University. He was Fulbright Professor of History at Athens College, 1953-54.

politicians, more sober heads realized that it diverted attention from badly delayed public works programs. Arab nations, neither supporters of British colonial policies nor forgetful of the Suez campaign, could hardly be enthusiastic about a situation which might touch off a Middle East conflagration. As for the Israelis, Eliezer Livneh made their position clear in the *Jerusalem Post* last July 11:

Israel has every reason to wish and to hope that the Greco-Turkish sore should be healed as quickly as possible. There is probably no nation in the world more deeply interested in the renewal of the friendship between these two countries.

This friendship is an important factor for the balance of the Middle East.

Thus, the creation of the Republic of Cyprus eliminated a tinder box.

But Cyprus still faces many problems. And it is a matter of conjecture as to how well she will weather the storms which usually accompany new-born independence. Both the unknowns and the variables are many, but certain straws are already flying.

II

The London agreements consisted of nine documents, three of them outlining fundamentals: "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus," "Treaty of Guarantee" between Cyprus on the one hand, Greece, Turkey and Britain on the other, and a "Treaty of Alliance" among Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.³ Details pertaining to these arrangements are currently being worked out by three groups: The Joint Commission on Cyprus is drafting a constitution; the Transitional Committee in Cyprus will reorganize governmental machinery; and the Joint Committee in London will prepare final treaties to incorporate the conclusions reached in February. These groups are representative, and their work is designed to effect the transfer of sovereignty by February 19, 1960.

Speculation pertaining to Cyprus' future should begin with the salient features of the basic agreements. Regarding the organization of the government:

1. Cyprus will be a Republic with a Greek president and a Turkish vice president, each to be elected by universal suffrage by his respective community and serve five years. Both men, "separately and conjointly," will have two kinds of veto power: a) absolute, and b) suspensory. In the first instance they may negate decisions and laws made by the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives concerning foreign affairs, defense, and security *except* those pertaining to Cypriot participation in international organizations or alliances to which Turkey and Greece belong. They may, for example, veto items regarding the granting of bases

3. Details pertaining to the agreement are derived mainly from *The Economist* (London), February 28, 1959, p. 767.

and other facilities to allied nations, importing of munitions and establishment of regulations for the armed forces. In the second instance, they may suspend legislation by returning laws and resolutions to the House of Representatives for reconsideration. If the House maintains its original decisions, however, the president and vice president must promulgate them.

The two executives will be assisted by a Council of Ministers comprised of seven Greeks and three Turks appointed by the president and vice president respectively. Decisions will be made by absolute majority, and a Turkish Cypriot must always serve as minister of foreign affairs, defense, or finance. The Civil Service will be comprised of 70 per cent Greeks, 30 per cent Turks.

2. The legislature will be unicameral, consisting of a House of Representatives whose membership will be 70 per cent Greek and 30 per cent Turkish. They will have the authority to pass on all matters except those specifically reserved to the Communal Chambers and will use the simple majority system. Turkish and Greek will be the official languages, all laws to be promulgated in both tongues.

The two Communal Chambers will represent Greek and Turkish residents in matters pertaining to religion, education, culture, and personal status. In the five largest towns, Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol, Larnaka and Paphos, the Turks will have separate municipalities, Greco-Turkish co-ordinating councils resolving questions of mutual concern. This arrangement will be reviewed in four years to determine whether or not it is feasible.

3. The judiciary will consist of a Supreme Constitutional Court, to arbitrate on conflicts arising between the House of Representatives and the Communal Chambers or decisions which the president and vice-president believe to be discriminatory, and a High Court of Justice. The former will consist of one Greek, one Turk, and a neutral appointed jointly by president and vice president; the latter will have two Greeks, one Turk, and a neutral with two votes.

4. The Cyprus army will number 2000 (60 per cent Greek and 40 per cent Turkish), while the civilian police will consist of an equal number represented in a 70-to-30 ratio.

The second major decision made in London consisted of a Treaty of Guarantee by which Cyprus agrees "not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever." What is more, Greece, Turkey and Britain not only guarantee Cypriot independence, territorial integrity and security, but they also undertake the responsibility of insuring that Cyprus will neither seek union with

another country (presumably Greece) nor attempt partition (to satisfy Turkey). If efforts to prohibit the latter types of activity prove fruitless, then each of the three powers reserve "the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs established by the present treaty." Cyprus, Greece and Turkey also agree to respect the integrity of the areas remaining under British sovereignty.

Finally, the Treaty of Alliance among the several powers provides that they will coordinate their common defenses. Not only will the British maintain two large bases on the southern side of the island, use Famagusta harbor and other communication facilities, but Cyprus, Greece and Turkey agree to set up a tripartite headquarters in Cyprus. The Greeks will send 950 officers and men, Turkey 650. Command at headquarters will rotate among the three powers on a year-to-year basis, while Greek and Turkish officers expect to train the 2000-man Cyprus army. This portion of the treaty also contains another significant clause: the British agree to recognize the fundamental human rights of the various island communities as well as the private interests of the public services.

Such is the agreement terminating the eighty-year Cypriot struggle for union with Greece. It remains to be seen what each of the parties gave up and where the roots of conflict still exist.

III

Each of the several countries might argue that it yielded most, but any objective appraisal would probably split the honors between Britain and Greece. The English assumed *de facto* power over Cyprus in 1878, *de jure* in 1914. These conditions were built into the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923; consequently, few denied the English the legal right to govern the island. Last February, then, the British relinquished another portion of their empire. Surely it would be difficult to condone all actions by the respective English governors during the past few years, or for that matter over the past several decades. Their authoritarian hand in censoring newspapers and radio broadcasts, pushing suspect revolutionists about at gun butt (especially in last October's round-up)⁴ and their enforcement of martial law—all irritated the Cypriots. But the British performed many constructive services, too. They overhauled the antiquated Turkish tax and tithe system, trained a large number of Cypriots as civil servants and, since World War II, expended many millions of pounds for public works and capital investment. Even the most prejudiced Cypriots have admitted that the island's standard of living is higher than that on the Greek main-

4. Cf. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, October 30 and December 11, 1958.

land. It may be argued, then, that the British are leaving a constructive legacy.⁵

In a sense, however, the British are retaining much of their cake even while consuming it at the tables of international diplomacy. Although the island has been a significant factor in East-West relations since the Russians started pushing the shaky Ottoman Empire in the last century, Cyprus' strategic value for modern warfare was not appreciated fully by the West until the Germans occupied Crete in World War II. Since then, British evacuation of India, Iraq, Palestine, and Suez has left them only a narrow Middle East beachhead—on Cyprus. This they are retaining. And, of course, along with the American bases and nuclear launching sites in Greece and the Greek and Turkish armies, the two British bases and other military privileges comprise the Eastern NATO anchorage.

At the London peace table Greece gave up the right to support *enosis*, legally. But this relinquished privilege cannot be divorced from the century-old Greek cause known as the *megali idea*, the reunion of Greek peoples from Epirus to Cyprus, from Crete to Istanbul, under one flag. It is a well-known fact that Kemal Pasha and an aroused Turkish people put an end to the Greek campaign to recapture Anatolia in 1921. The exchange of populations in Thrace and the absorption of a million refugees in a Greek population of only a few million are details also associated with modern Greek life. As Panayiotis Pipinelis pointed out recently, these events seem to have settled the question of Greek boundaries during the Twenties and Thirties.⁶ Following World War II, however, Rhodes and other Dodecanese Islands were "returned," inspiring new hopes for realization of the Greater Greece. The recent struggle for *enosis* was a significant part of that movement.

It may require many years and much research to ascertain whether or not the Greeks have lost much, psychologically, economically, or politically, in giving up the *megali idea*. Looking in from the outside, the loss would not appear to be great; but those familiar with inside Greece are well aware of Greek nationalism and the intensity of Greek politics. Giving up *enosis* will be a bitter pill for many to swallow. And yet, as the Independent Conservative newspaper *Kathimerini* pointed out shortly after the London agreement, "The Cyprus settlement will not only allow

5. For details pertaining to this phenomenon and other aspects of modern Cyprus, cf. Sir George Hill's *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, England, 1952), Vol. IV. There is some debate whether finances for public works were British or reserves from taxes levied in Cyprus. How one views the matter depends upon his sources and/or national origin. The fact remains that British authorities did decide to improve conditions, a policy consistent with that practiced elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Perhaps it was another case, however, of "too little and too late."

6. Panayiotis Pipinelis, "The Greco-Turkish Feud Revived," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXXVII (January, 1959), pp. 306-316.

the Cypriots to lay the foundations of a better economic and cultural future, but will also enable Greece to move faster along the road of her own domestic rehabilitation."⁷

Civil strife in Cyprus has also disturbed Turkey. Much concerned lest the island fall into enemy hands, the Turkish government has used many arguments (Greek political instability, communist influence on the island, etc.) against *enosis*. To some degree, the issue also became entangled with domestic fiscal difficulties. Last summer, not only was the height of Turkish-Greek hostilities reached on Cyprus, but Turkey was talking partition. Extremists cried, "*Ya taksim ya olum*," (Partition or Death!)⁸ And thus, the London conference modified this position greatly. Turkey relinquished claims to the island, won her plea that the Turkish minority receive a significant part in the new governmental structure. Furthermore, Turkey will serve jointly with Greece and Britain to insure Cyprus' territorial integrity and military security. In short, she seems to have sacrificed little, saved face, and won Western approval for having cooperated in shoring up NATO.

As for the Cypriots: we may best study their gains and losses, the strengths and weaknesses of their political organization, and their position in the East-Middle East-West power struggle by looking at a series of major questions.

IV

1. Will the new political arrangement work?

A most cursory glance at the outline of the new constitution reveals a rather complex and ponderous system of checks and balances: a Cypriot Greek president and a Cypriot Turkish vice-president; 70 per cent of the House of Representatives Greek, 30 per cent Turkish; seven Greeks on the Council of Ministers and three Turks; 60 per cent of the army Greeks, 40 per cent Turkish; a Greek here, a Turk there, and so on. In short, the Republic is federated along ethnic rather than territorial lines. And, while 80 per cent of the population is Greek in its ethnic origin, it may be observed that this majority will never have more than 70 per cent representation in any governmental group. True, the president will be Greek, but his Turkish assistant will have final veto power.⁹ Since new democratic nations rarely reflect that knack of operating federal governments which is most conducive to internal harmony, one wonders what will result if early executive and legislative decisions split along ethnic lines.

7. Quoted in the *Athens News* (Athens, Greece), February 21, 1951.

8. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, June 26, 1958; *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 21, 1959.

9. In one sense this arrangement is similar to the concurrent power set-up which John C. Calhoun proposed to solve North-South tensions prior to the Civil War.

Then, of course, the presence of a communist minority cannot be underestimated in any appraisal of the political situation. Comprising some 30,000 members, the group is closely identified with the Pancyprian Labor Federation, and is mostly Greek in composition. Since World War II, it has been a most effective stumbling block to internal harmony, principally because it attempted to identify itself with, and capture the leadership of, the *enosis* movement. In 1947-48, for example, the communists were relatively successful in scuttling British proposals for constitutional reforms. The communist revolution in Greece merely delineated more clearly the dimensions of the difficulty. Both British and Turkish governments argued that they were reluctant to support the *enosis* movement since the communist group might deprive the Turkish Cypriots of their rights. Furthermore, since the Greek government under General Papagos (1952-56) was violently anti-communist, the British and Turks wondered if union with Greece might not precipitate another bloody civil war. Even during the most recent struggle, highlighted by Colonel Grivas' guerilla nationalism, Greek Cypriots often fought Greek Cypriots. Left and Right simply did not get along. When the smoke has cleared from the first elections, it remains to be seen how many communists are represented in the legislative assembly. It would be a supreme stroke of irony if the Turkish minority, already in possession of a weightier voice than their numerical representation would justify, turned out to possess the balance of power. This could happen if the Greek Left and Right tangled on crucial issues.¹⁰ And there is little reason to conclude that the Cypriot Greek is less ardent about politics than his ethnic brother on the mainland.

This intricate system of checks and balances will also require considerable tolerance and understanding in other phases of administration. Turkish Cypriots may have to put aside their sensitivities if arrested by Greek gendarmes—and vice versa. Members of the community will have to learn to respect decisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court when it arbitrates conflicts of authority between the House and the Communal Chambers, especially since it is often difficult to isolate religious, educational, or cultural questions from problems which are political, social, and economic. In fact this dichotomy of jurisdiction could prove a major stumbling block to the Greek Cypriots whose heritage links the functions of church and state. Then, too, whether or not there be

10. One obtains some perspective of the communist "line" in observing the Chinese reaction to the Cyprus settlement. Renmin Ribau, a "Commentator" writing about Tito, remarked, "... the Tito clique came out to applaud the London agreement, which was in fact a pact for enslaving the Cypriot people, saying that it has brought them possibilities of peace, improvement in livelihood and the independent determination of their own destiny." "The Tito Clique Shamed, Gets Angry," *Peking Review* (Peking, China), Vol. II (March 24, 1959), p. 13.

any truth to rumors that the Turkish Cypriots are seeking a grant from Turkey,¹¹ such reports can only serve as divisive factors until the Cypriots achieve a sense of national identity.

2. Will the Greeks desist in their *enosis* claims or desist in attempting to influence Cyprus politics?

No sooner had the government presented the agreement to the Greek Parliament in February than the opposition party introduced a resolution to censure it. Their arguments: the agreement gave the veto power to the Turks; the settlement violated the Lausanne Treaty; the Greeks would be at the mercy of British troops; and, the agreement would increase Turkish-Greek friction. The opposition lost the resolution, but even some of the more moderate ministers such as Panayiotis Pipinelis agreed that the last argument had merit.¹² Foreshadowing of possible difficulties, however, may be found in press comments. *Avghi*, a communist-front paper, remarked,

The vassals have signed the enslavement accord, not the nation. The Cyprus question may have closed for the colonists, but it has not closed either for the Greek or for the Cypriot people. The struggle for freedom continues.

The slave merchants of Washington, London and Ankara put their pistols on the round table of London, near their documents. The Government of enslavement stood at their side. The "Trustees of the Cypriots," Messrs. Karamanlis and Averoff, openly undertook the role of grave-diggers . . .¹³

Eleftheria, center independent, said, "The 'independence' of Cyprus, as born in Zurich and completed in London, is a morally unacceptable, politically stupid, and nationally dangerous solution."¹⁴ Other opposition groups promised to set up political parties in Cyprus, while the government-sponsored newspapers and radio hailed Prime Minister Karamanlis as a great statesman. Leftists on the island talked about the "sell-out to the West."

It is difficult to predict how well the Cypriots can overcome the dire effects of such pulling and tugging from the mainland. If their legislature reflects too many shades of the political spectrum, surely trouble looms for the new government.

3. And what of the Turks in Turkey? Will the anti-government forces desist in their advocacy of partition?

For the most part, Turkish press response was favorably disposed toward the London agreement; nevertheless, newspapermen taunted those who had cried "Partition or Death." One observer wondered what right Makarios had to act as though he were president. Another thought that

11. *The New York Times*, March 15, 1959.

12. *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 26, 1959.

13. Quoted in *The Athens News*, February 21, 1959.

14. *Ibid.*

Ankara officials might have been pressured by Americans.¹⁵ Ethnic relations between Cyprus and Turkey being what they are, it is not idle to speculate about the effect of continued influences from the mainland.

4. Can Turkish-Greek animosity on the island be minimized?

Although these peoples have lived together relatively peacefully for many decades, the recent E.O.K.A. reign of terror, the Turkish struggle for political representation, and the many community maladjustments served to open a traditional wound. Discussions of partition, coils of barbed wire and death-bearing bullets merely exacerbated a situation which has been potentially dangerous during much of the past century. Nor could the Turkish Cypriots be expected to cheer proposals sending them back to the mainland, settling them on an Aegean Island, or re-locating them in one area of their home island. And, despite the relatively favorable political settlement on their behalf, no doubt many in the Turkish minority feel that their future is insecure. They hailed the agreement with a strike. Turkish teachers resigned, and 2000 children demonstrated quietly. Some of the latter carried placards reading, "We will not accept a murderer for our president"¹⁶—which leads us to the probable choice of Makarios as first president.

5. What kind of president will Archbishop Makarios become?

It remains to be seen whether he and Colonel (now General) Grivas can cool the tiny band of hotter heads which tied up 30,000-odd British soldiers for four years, cool the ardor of a people who have known little else but strife for 3000 years¹⁷ and extirpate the tradition of violence associated with E.O.K.A. George Grivas has returned to the mainland, won a hero's welcome, and received a gold medal from the Athenian Academy.¹⁸ His followers have turned over their guns (many of them American and unused) and crude bombs to the authorities for incorporation into the new Republic's arsenal. But this does not guarantee that the underground will dissolve. Makarios, so heroic as a symbol of unity and sacrifice, so clever at the conference table, so articulate in discussing violence, will no doubt find it more difficult to reconcile religious and political principles when groping with everyday problems. His power, rooted in clerical authority and associated with the *millet* system which Cypriots have known for centuries, is bound to be subject to communist-oriented attack. He may have to "work miracles" to make the diverse segments of the Greek community see the value of constructive co-existence. He will have to learn to work well with Dr. Fazil Kuchuk,

15. *Ulus* (Ankara, Turkey), March 3, 1959.

16. *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 21, 1959.

17. Cf. Philip Newman, *A Short History of Cyprus* (London, 1953).

18. *The Nashville Tennessean*, March 29, 1959.

Turkish Cypriot leader and probable first vice president. Otherwise the ethnic peace may be short.

Most observers agree that the spiritual-political leader has color, is extremely intelligent, and knows the value of drama in a culture which expects pageantry from its leaders. Upon his return to Cyprus, for example, a crowd estimated at 200,000 greeted him as he rode in a cream-colored Jaguar through a blizzard of blue and white paper flags. They chanted "Ma-ka-ri-os Ma-ka-ri-os" for him, much as the Athenians chanted "Ah-o-kah Ah-o-kah" for Colonel Grivas and the bells of St. John's Cathedral in Nicosia's Archbishop Square rang out to herald his triumphant return. In his widely broadcast homecoming speech, which moved Greeks to tears from Famagusta to Ithaca, he said,

Our struggle for liberation is graced by numberless heroes led by General George Grivas, the legendary Dighenis whose name is written on the most glorious pages of the history of Cyprus . . . Let us not forget that freedom is not just a privilege and a right, it is also a heavy responsibility and a supreme duty. Let us hold out the honest hand of friendship and co-operation to all. Especially let us co-operate wholeheartedly and sincerely with our friends in the Turkish community."¹⁹

If Makarios can direct traditional Greek nationalism into creative channels, the Cyprus Republic will have every chance to succeed. If not, the current peace may be short-lived.

6. Can Cyprus "make a go" of self government in view of her economic backwardness?

Although this is a problem in itself, perhaps it is *à propos* to observe various economic facts. Principally, the island produces grapes, olives, wheat, and barley. She also mines copper, iron pyrites, and asbestos in modest quantities. But still Cyprus is not self-sustaining. The British have balanced the payments from other sources many times during the past two decades. Furthermore, recent private and military construction projects have employed many Cypriots and sent wages and the standard of living skyward. These projects having been completed, unemployment is currently on the increase.²⁰ Thus many problems and potential problems remain: The shock of declining income must be cushioned, especially since many important elements of organized labor are communist-led. New capital must be located in Britain, the United States or the international market, for Greece and Turkey are in no position to offer large-scale assistance. As for the tradition-laden problem of collecting taxes, the Cypriots may be more disposed to pay taxes to themselves than they were to the Sultan and British. Then, too, the British will require substantial

19. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 5, 1959.

20. *The New York Times*, April 12, 1959.

amounts of labor for their naval and air installations. This in itself could help materially in balancing payments. Likewise, the tourist trade. Now that civil strife has ceased, travel agencies and hotel men are conferring with governmental authorities regarding ways and means to restore this source of income.

Cyprus must also choose whether or not to join the British Commonwealth. Quite objectively, it would seem that the Cypriots have more pounds to gain than pride to lose in taking such a step. And yet, while negotiations were still underway in mid-February, it was reported in London that transfers of money from Cyprus were taking place as a hedge against the possibility of leaving the sterling area.²¹ This raises further questions about relationships with the British.

7. Many problems relate to the anti-British attitudes, fostered and festered during the past five years. It is difficult to foresee how these can be modified if the left-wing Athenian press continues to talk about colonial overlords, if the Cypriots feel beholden to the British for financial assistance, or if the agreements pertaining to the air and naval bases run afoul of technical difficulties.

The British have agreed to respect the fundamental human rights which the Cypriots should enjoy in their own homeland, but "incidents" are almost inevitable as Americans have learned from experience in lands throughout the world. On the Greek mainland itself, the author remembers incidents in which American servicemen encountered conflicts between their sovereign rights, established by treaty, and Greek civil law. And few of us will forget the facts and implications of the Girard case in Japan.

Then, too, the British jets flying over the island with impunity are likely to serve as a daily reminder of the colonial period, of the island's "dual sovereignty." If the planes are used for NATO purposes alone, perhaps their presence will be comforting. Should the British decide, however, to launch a Suez-like campaign from Cyprus, exposing the population to retaliation, both people and government will surely be infuriated. Certainly the Arab world flanking Cyprus on two sides would not feel comfortable if a Western-Soviet struggle over Iraq or Jordan were to emanate from the island. The Cypriots might find themselves in a precarious position if dragged into a brush fire for which they had no stomach. Furthermore, Britain's presence may also influence Cyprus policies when the new republic joins the United Nations. Even if the Cyprus government wishes to remain neutral on a crucial issue, it may not be able

21. *The London Times*, February 15, 1959.

to do so without exacerbating British feelings or weakening Western unity.

8. Finally, there remains a problem pivoting about the probability that Cyprus will develop a unique national identity.

More than 80 per cent of the Cypriots are Greek in ethnic origin. What is more, they are educated like the Greeks on the mainland. They use Greek books, idolize Greek heroes, ancient, Byzantine, and modern; they worship like the Greeks, celebrate the same religious and national holidays. As Winston Churchill remarked in 1954, "The Greekness of the Cypriots is . . . indisputable. . . . No person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling." And he might have added, Greek in his drinking and eating habits.

Although the new Cyprus flag must be "neutral in color and design," it will require more than a banner to develop a unique national character, especially since the two Communal Chambers would seem to perpetuate the ethnic experiences of the two communities. All conditions considered, it is somewhat incredible to expect diffusion of Turkish and Greek culture to take place much more rapidly under the Cypriot flag than under the British. In short, though the free world may fervently wish the Cyprus Republic success, it is relatively safe to predict that most Cypriots will continue to look toward Greece for cultural, religious, and political inspiration and support.

V

One or two further conclusions may be drawn from the Cyprus case.

First off, it would appear rash for any English official to make further absolute pronouncements regarding "the liquidation of the British Empire." It may be remembered that five years ago Henry Hopkinson, Minister of State for the Colonies, made a "classic" statement about Cyprus, remarking that ". . . there are certain territories in the Commonwealth, which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent."²² Much as the free world may admire the British for their stubborn adherence to a go-slow policy in preparing colonies for independence, Western unity is often jeopardized, as in the Cyprus case, when political reality does not coincide with political ideals. In all fairness, it should be observed that the British tried persistently to find a moderate constitutional solution to the Cyprus problem; but in an atmosphere where no moderation existed. Naturally, the Greeks and Turks cannot be absolved of responsibility, but one wonders if the Kremlin keeps score as long as the pot of chaos boils. The final settlement did not contain any strikingly new factors, items which could not have been

22. Quoted in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, December 4, 1958.

worked into an agreement four years ago. And yet, perhaps the Greeks needed to purge the violence from their claims; perhaps the Turks needed an issue to unite them domestically; perhaps the British needed the struggle to justify the rightness of their rear-guard action. Who is to say? Or, as one of the author's colleagues remarked, "Maybe 601 killed and 1260 wounded was a small price to pay for the results obtained."

It is interesting to note that the Cyprus agreement resulted from the traditional pattern of "quiet diplomacy" despite Greece's effort to try the case before the world court of public opinion. For five straight years, Greece attempted to obtain a United Nations resolution favoring self-determination, but failed to muster sufficient votes. In one respect, however, this floodlight of publicity and the NATO alliance did produce results. Paul-Henri Spaak, NATO Secretary General, used his good offices to urge conferences, such as those in which agreement eventually culminated. The dispute certainly proved to the NATO powers that in a delicate Cold War situation, they can hardly afford the luxury of internecine quarrels. Such schisms merely benefit the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the case reveals that the aspirations of colonial peoples for self-determination and the strategic requirements of the free world are not *necessarily* incompatible. Both issues seem to have been resolved in the London agreement. Nor was this lesson wasted. David Ben Gurion was quick to cite the possible parallel between the Cyprus and the Israeli-Arab conflict.²³ One might suggest it as a possible pattern for solving the Algerian impasse, the India-Pakistan quarrel, and other comparable situations.

VI

Quite beyond the confines of political analysis, a letter, dated March 1, has arrived from Ithaca in response to the author's request for a personal reaction to the Cyprus settlement. The communication reflects dimensions of the problem not found in public statements. In part, the Ithacan friend said,

The Government newspapers consider the London Accord a triumph, while the opposition speakers (especially the Liberal Venizelos) call it a failure, asserting that under such conditions Turkey acquires new rights on the Island which she had given up 36 years ago in the Lausanne Pact. Moreover, the Veto power almost subjugates Greeks to Turks, the Opposition thinks. They criticize the government of sacrificing Cyprus on the account of more general interest of the Western Peoples. . . It seems that they accuse and criticize many things in a vague manner but they do not say what better could be done.

The people of Ithaca feel exactly the same way. They sit in groups outside the 'Cafenia' in a glorious sunshine that we happen to enjoy the past few days, and discuss the matter according to each one's idea, but with less excitement and

23. Editorial, "The Lessons of Cyprus," *America*, Vol. C, (March 7, 1959), p. 652.

sharpness than many of the rest of the Greeks, owing perhaps to their natural peacefulness, or maybe because the majority are on the Caramanlis side. Or perhaps owing to some of the inherited cunning of Ulysses, they give more attention to what Prem. Tsatsos said: that Greece has lost what she could not win, under the circumstances, and has won most of what she could get—than the others do.

To my poor opinion two things are essential and deeply felt by every single Greek soul all over the world today. One is very bitter indeed, but the other one is too sweet. That which embitters them is to see Cyprus whom they wanted united with 'Mother Greece' . . . co-operating with Turkey against whom we keep an eternal hatred in our hearts for untold hardships . . . for so many centuries . . . And that which sweetens our pain and fills our heart with joy today is that no matter how satisfactory or unsatisfactory the London Agreement is, at least there will be an end to the slaughter and bloodshed in the Island. . . .

She goes on to express her reaction to Makarios' speech, terminating the letter as follows:

. . . as I was listening to the radio and heard the people rejoice and the continuing loud applauding etc., my mind flew to the poor mothers of Caralis, Dimitrious and the rest of the same fate, and the title of an old 1st World War picture which I had seen more than 25 years ago in Peking, China, with Victor McLaglen as the hero . . . : 'What Price Glory?'²⁴

A Greek watching an American movie in China. . . . Perhaps the Cyprus settlement carries this kind of symbolic meaning in a world complexly variegated, whose parts are infinitely inter-related. As Cyprus citizens attempt to modify a 3000-year heritage of blood, sweat and fears, possibly they will disprove the dictum of a German critic: "He who would become and remain a great power in the East must hold Cyprus in his hand."²⁵

24. Letter, Mrs. Litsa Skiotis to Roy P. Fairfield, March 1, 1959.

25. Quoted by Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 613.

CYPRUS: THE "COPRA-BOAT" ECONOMY

A. J. Meyer

There's another little baby Queen Victoria has got,
Another little colony, although she's got a lot,
Another little island, very wet and very hot,
Whatever will we do with little Cyprus?

One idea is to make it happy with British income tax,
And another is to send a "Woolwich Infant"
With some powder and some balls,
And if they're good we'll send a minor Canon of St. Paul's,
To blow the wicked up in little Cyprus.

Whatever will we do with little Cyprus . . .¹

THESE lines, from an English music hall tune of the 1890's, describe vividly the British government's frustration with events in Cyprus from 1955 to the granting of independence in 1959. The mixture of Greek Cypriot demands for union with Greece, the Atlantic Alliance's strategic military involvements in the eastern Mediterranean, the anti-Greek revival in Turkey, EOKA terrorism, communal outbreaks between the island's Greek and Turkish communities, and mounting tension between mainland Greeks and Turks left a legacy which the Republic of Cyprus will find troublesome indeed.

But disregarding the island's political contortions, Cyprus stands today as a sobering economic artifact—far removed from the models envisioned by economists for the underdeveloped areas. More important, it differs greatly from the pattern sought by thoughtful Westerners as fruit of an enduring East-West relationship. The structure of its economy, and its recent economic history, stand as warning to nearby Middle Eastern countries, many of them equipped with similar resources, populations, and other ingredients for economic growth.

Put more concretely, Cyprus today lives from a "copra-boat" economy; like the coconut-producing islands in the Pacific, it is almost totally dependent upon outside elements for survival. Seventy-five years

1. The author is indebted to Mr. A. C. Sedgwick for the quotation.

♦ A. J. MEYER is Associate Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University.
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of rule by a Western nation, in this instance Britain, has not set off the self-generating economic revolutions which developed Britain, America, and northern Europe. Without income from copper ore, military expenditures, tourism, and emigrant remittances, Cyprus would be economically desolate. Its economy offers an admirable capsule example of a Middle Eastern country striving to mount the launching pad of lasting economic expansion. Yet despite Western tutelage and a ten-year boom, it has so far proved incapable of the effort. The failure, while not entirely the fault of the West, is distinctly not in the West's good interests in the mid-twentieth century.²

Elaboration of this thesis can best be begun by recounting the dreary details of demography. In 1900 there were about 237,000 Cypriots on the island, today there are 544,000. Population has increased by natural means at a growing rate, beginning at about one percent in the early years and, under stimulus of malaria control, clean water supplies, and better public-health medicine (the island's death rate is only seven per 1000—it was 17 per 1000 as recently as 1930), rising to just under two per cent in recent years. As elsewhere in the Middle East, all figures in this department lead upward. By the turn of the century, if things go on like this, Cyprus will contain a million people—a fact best appreciated by those resident on Manhattan island or on aircraft carriers.

There is not enough land. Despite substantial acreage improvements wrought by British Crown Colony agriculturists—land under cultivation increased forty per cent between 1930 and 1946—the island has run out of cultivable soil, and today there are less than 1.5 acres per Cypriot. Each year the ratio worsens. Only 46,000 of the island's 940,000 cultivable acres are pump-irrigable, because of severe water shortages.

Worse, yet, the land is not very good. Eroded, mined by destructive farming practices, possessed of a porous substructure which drains most of the winter rainfall into the sea, the island's wheatland yields an average of only fifteen bushels per acre. Terraced hillsides produce olives and grapes, the oil and juices of which are barely competitive with the second-grade output of Greece and Italy. Carobs and oranges alone are economically viable crops, and each year the island earns a substantial return from exporting the pods and fruit to England.

Nor is the weather on Cyprus conducive to really productive agriculture. Lying tantalizingly close (within eyeshot on clear days) to the eastern Mediterranean weather belt, where Sahara winds intersect with continental cold air masses to create 35-40 inches of rainfall yearly, most

2. Material in this essay has come from data provided the author by staff members of the Crown Colony Secretariat in Nicosia and by businessmen throughout the island of Cyprus.

of Cyprus gets only 15 inches of moisture, all of it in midwinter, and experiences severe rainfall shortages at least once in five years. Summers are hot and dry, and from May to September desiccating winds cut soil humidity, oxidize fertilizers, erode the land, and generally impede agricultural output.

The folkways of Cypriot farmers further inhibit agricultural prosperity. By clinging tenaciously to premedieval two-field agriculture (which keeps half the island's wheatland fallow each year) and by refusing to grow cereals and animals on the same acreage, the Cypriot farmer, while increasing his numbers, has declined to embrace the simplest changes upon which soil improvement and diversified farming rest.

Cypriot farmers, the eighty per cent of them who are Greek Christians and the twenty per cent who are Turkish Muslims, have embraced Islamic inheritance practices with equally tenacious enthusiasm. The result is the standard Middle Eastern pattern of overfragmented holdings. Today the average Cypriot farm family owns 15 acres (half of which lies fallow each year), spread over an average of 12½ widely separated plots; it takes half the farmer's working day to walk between them. With each male death in rural Cyprus the situation worsens. Lacking a major cash crop such as cotton, overconcentrated holdings and sharecropping have not developed in Cyprus. The pattern remains one of minute subsistence holdings.

Under these circumstances, rural Cyprus has kept afloat on two life-rafts. One is the move of rural Cypriots to the island's six district towns and the resultant emigration of at least 3000 yearly abroad, mostly to England. This practice had begun in earnest by 1921, at which time the island's rural population touched 250,000. Today, rural Cyprus contains about the same number, and the burgeoning district towns and overseas Cypriot communities have drained off the increase. Another is the grain subsidy, a World War II practice which has since become a permanent fixture. The Crown Colony paid Cypriot farmers (in mid-1958) \$115 per ton for wheat which it could import for about \$80 per ton. The total amount of the grain subsidy rose steadily after 1945. In 1957 it exceeded \$2 million.

During the 1920's and 1930's, emigration to England and Commonwealth countries unquestionably was Cyprus' most effective safety valve. Like nearby eastern Mediterranean Levantines, Cypriots seemingly possess strong family and village loyalties. And their departures—for Soho and Kensington, where many became tradesmen, waiters, and restaurateurs—not only eased population pressure but established a significant flow of emigrant remittances back to the island. By 1957 capital move-

ments to Cyprus from overseas emigrants totaled almost \$10 million—\$20 for every man, woman, and child on the island.

Before 1940, industry showed scant response to the increasing urban population, except in small-scale service ventures, mostly transport repair shops and the like, and in the manufacture of beverages, hard and soft. Bottling plants for flavored soda water and brandy and wines sprang up throughout the island. The two decades before 1940 served, as one observer put it, "as a warm-up period for the Cyprus beverage industry's 'finest hour,' 1957, when, in 12 months, it enveigled Cypriots to gulp down 12 cases, 144 bottles, of carbonated water per capita—plus an untold quantity of wine and cognac." Prewar expansion of other domestic-owned industry was negligible.

The one exception to the rule was copper mining. During the 1920's and 1930's the island's copper mines acquired a momentum lost in the third millennium before Christ. Working the original Mavrovouni mine of antiquity, the Mudd interests (a Los Angeles firm of mine operators and investors) developed in these years a stake originally negotiated in 1905. Faced with low copper prices before 1940, and the need to install an expensive plant on the island for reduction of cupreous and iron pyrites, the Cyprus Mines Corporation devoted most of its earnings before World War II to plant and mine development. Its payments to shareholders and to the Crown Colony in these years were modest, and its main effect on the island's economy was as generator of employment for 500 to 1500 Cypriots, as a model of safe, efficient mine operation, and as a potential generator of large income once copper prices improved. Like extractive industries generally in the underdeveloped world, it was an island within an island so far as the local economy was concerned.

World War II and its aftermath affected Cyprus much as it did the rest of the Middle East. Allied troops with money to spend moved in, base installations meant jobs and higher income levels generally, shipping shortages and factory bombings in England created vast demand, much of it pent up throughout the war. The result was an extraordinary expansion, particularly in manufacturing and construction enterprise. Unemployment after 1950 dropped to virtually nothing, investment levels soared and the Cyprus economy registered extraordinary expansion—fed by World War II savings, the Arab-Israeli War, the Korean débâcle, soaring world copper prices, five years of trouble over Suez, and Cyprus' growing importance to Britain's strategic aims in the eastern Mediterranean.

The extent of expansion in manufacturing, almost all of it since World War II, is evident from a summary (see Table 1) of the island's 1954-55 Industrial Census.

TABLE I
Summary of Industry on Cyprus, 1954-55

Industry	No. of establishments	No. of persons employed	Gross output (£)	Net output (£)
ALL INDUSTRIES	13,707	49,527	32,701,886	16,928,195
Mining and quarrying	355	6,716	9,681,070	8,465,918
Manufacturing	11,328	26,293	16,072,812	4,694,811
Food Manufacturing	1,286	3,560	6,149,109	719,776
Beverage industries	258	1,361	1,993,868	674,400
Tobacco manufacturing	7	377	1,711,856	224,809
Textile and clothing manufacturing	6,694	11,634	2,498,404	1,076,977
Wood manufacturing	830	2,101	907,393	395,616
Printing, publishing, and allied industries	86	734	392,670	222,991
Nonmetallic mineral products	305	1,606	622,798	351,815
Metal products	637	1,657	570,635	363,035
Transport equipment	421	1,438	378,332	280,542
Other manufactures	804	1,825	847,747	384,850
Construction*	2,006	15,611	6,330,118	3,220,196
Public Utilities	18	907	617,886	547,270

Source: Government of Cyprus, Census of Industry (Nicosia, 1956)

*The figures for construction do not include the activities of H. M. Services, either direct or through large contractors.

The figures given in Table 2 of net output per employee in industrial pursuits in 1950 and 1954 are likewise indicative of the extent of expansion besetting the Cyprus economy. As may be seen in these figures, the island's two major industries are mining and construction. Together they account for three quarters of the island's net output, employ almost half its industrial labor force, yet account for only a fifth of the number of industrial establishments. Half the island's industrial workers are employed in establishments of less than ten workers, and working proprietors make up about a quarter of the industrial labor force. Together the statistics denote an industrial development which could hardly be termed revolutionary but which, for Cyprus, was indeed substantial.

Expanded output and earnings from copper ore and cupreous and iron pyrites were the most striking elements in the island's postwar industrial expansion. By 1950 Cyprus was exporting mineral products worth more than \$30 million yearly—mostly to western Europe—and the principal producer of these, the Cyprus Mines Corporation, was paying annual tax-royalties which in some years exceeded \$9 million. Spurred by 50c a pound for copper—an unheard-of price during the 1930's—CMC

TABLE 2
Cyprus' Net Annual Output per Industrial Employee
(dollars)

Industry	1950	1954
Mining and quarrying	764	1,261
Food manufacturing	247	202
Beverage industries	552	490
Tobacco manufacturing	446	590
Textile and clothing manufacturing	—	92
Wood manufacturing	98	188
Printing and publishing	328	304
Nonmetallic mineral plants	179	218
Metal products	—	220
Transport equipment	168	196
Other manufactures	—	210
Construction	148	206
Public utilities	379	630
Average for manufacturing ^a	—	178
Average for all industries	—	343

Source: Government of Cyprus, Census of Industry (Nicosia, 1956)

^aExcluding mining, construction, and public utilities.

and the island's other mining companies (some Greek, some British-owned) together gradually came to employ more than 6000 workers and to pay about a third of the Crown Colony's operating budget.

During the decade 1946 to 1956 the Crown Colony Secretariat installed a ten-year development plan which spent about \$30 million on social overhead improvements. These funds went for an electricity grid, improved highways and communications facilities, better drinking water in the villages, improved public-health medicine, and a highly effective malaria eradication venture. Despite its essentially uncoordinated nature—it was an eclectic proposition advanced by Secretariat department heads—the plan added measurably to the island's economic infrastructure and served as vehicle for much private enterprise activity in the decade.

While the 1946-1956 ten-year plan went ahead, United Kingdom Treasury transfers to the island mushroomed with the growing importance of Cyprus to the British military establishment. Net capital transfer totals are given in Table 3. Approximately 50 per cent was spent on work projects (construction materials, labor, machinery), 15 per cent on civilian pay (to British workers and Cypriots), 25 per cent on soldiers' pay for spending on the island, and 10 per cent for direct service expenditure. These funds complemented the public outlays of the ten-year plan and provided motive force for expansion of industry and construction.

TABLE 3
Net Capital Transfers from the United Kingdom Treasury to Cyprus

Year	Millions of dollars	Millions of pounds
1950	4.0	1.45
1951	6.6	2.36
1952	11.6	4.16
1953	12.1	4.33
1954	18.8	6.73
1955	56.2	20.10
1956	56.8	20.31
1957	58.2	20.80

Source: Government of Cyprus, Financial Secretariat.

As elsewhere in the underdeveloped world, construction showed the most rapid increase. From negligible figures prior to World War II, building came to employ almost 20,000 men by 1958. Approximately two thirds of these were workers directly or indirectly (like a subcontractor's staff) employed on airbase or other British military projects. The remaining third worked for local contractors building civilian housing in the six district towns—most of it calculated for rental to British service families or to Cypriots with incomes expanded from association with the military establishment.

Tourism likewise grew after World War II. Blessed with a set of minor ruins covering the standard Middle Eastern time chart from Neolithic to Ottoman times, Cyprus offered a pleasant climate to the rubble-probing Englishman, philhellene pondering which beach spawned the Goddess of Love, or the litterateur contemplating Othello's castle at Famagusta. The mountains of the Troodos range offered sanctum to honeymooning Israelis and vacationing Arabs, escaping the eastern shore summer heat in a country made cheap by British-enforced price control. By 1955, before political troubles canceled tourism entirely, travelers left almost \$6 million yearly on the island.

Under the combined stimulus of a wave of capital transfers from abroad, which reached \$80 million yearly by 1955 (\$56 million from the United Kingdom Treasury, \$9 million from tax-royalty on copper sales, \$9 million from emigrant remittances, \$6 million from tourism), Cyprus amassed an impressive set of statistics of economic growth. These figures, partially derivative from the \$150 per Cypriot pumped into the economy each year from outside and partially attributable to the island's capitalist inclinations, afford a distinctly cheery appearance.

Cyprus' national income grew, between 1950 and 1957, from about \$98 million to more than \$212 million. In current prices this meant more

than a doubling of the per capita income—from about \$175 in the former year to almost \$380 in the latter. During the interval, however, prices rose 54 per cent and population increased at an average rate of 1¼ per cent yearly. The island's net advance in national income, expressed in per capita terms, averaged out, therefore, to about five per cent yearly after 1950. By any standards—American, European, or Asian—the rate of increase has been impressive.

So, too, are figures related to savings and investment. Gross investment in 1950, for example, totaled almost \$15 million, 17 per cent of national income. By 1957 the figure reached \$55 million, about 25 per cent of national income. These rates, high by any standards, exceed even those of most Western nations. On the basis of crude capital-output ratio measurements, investment levels have been adequate to advance per capita incomes at extraordinary rates.

Cyprus has in recent years run a substantial deficit in its international trade balance. This totals \$40 million to \$60 million yearly—a figure which each year is redressed by the United Kingdom Treasury transfers discussed above. Economists pay little attention to the figures. First of all, the deficit is essentially a record of the cost of maintaining the British military force on the island and does not represent an actual difference between what Cypriots buy and sell abroad. And second, because of sterling area controls, the unfavorable exchange ratios besetting countries with chronic balance of payments difficulties (like Turkey and Israel) have not come to Cyprus. Even the political disturbances have been insufficient to upset the Cyprus pound in Zurich, Beirut, and Tangier. The island's balance of payments for 1956 and 1957 is contained in Table 4.

The Cyprus pound indeed has remained stable throughout the past decade and has fluctuated in world markets only to the extent of shifts in the value of the sterling pound. Unlike other sterling area members, some of whom have carried out devaluation since 1949, the sterling backing of the Cyprus pound has been added to consistently for ten years. In mid-1958 the Cyprus currency issue was backed by 104 per cent sterling, and it has withstood apparent balance of payments deficits and political troubles most adequately.

The foregoing paragraphs would seem to contradict the gloomy prophesy contained at the outset of this essay. They bear out the theme of unqualified optimism accompanying most statements on the island's economy.³ What, then, is the basis for pessimism regarding Cyprus' future? Reasons follow:

3. See, for example, "Economy of Cyprus Flourishing Despite Years of Insurrection" (*New York Times*, 16 December 1957); *Cyprus Economic Review* (Nicosia, 1950-1957).

First, despite ten years of expansion, the island's national income still shows the customary lopsided distribution common to underdeveloped areas. Per capita incomes earned from farming in Cyprus still average about \$150—less than half the annual incomes produced in mining, industry, and the distributive trades. Yet half the island's populace is rural and essentially dependent on agriculture for a living. Increases, moreover, in rural income have lagged far behind those in urban occupations. The Cypriot farmer is simply not a candidate to buy increased output from industrial plants.

TABLE 4
Cyprus' Balance of Payments, 1956 and 1957
(millions of pounds)

	1956		1957 ^a	
	Receipts	Payments	Receipts	Payments
Goods and services:				
Merchandise (adjusted) ^b	22.21	34.22	18.97	39.46
Nonmonetary gold	^c	^c	^c	^c
Foreign travel	1.23	1.08	1.10	1.50
Transport and insurance	1.32	5.61	1.35	6.45
Investment income	0.96	9.41	0.95	7.39
Government transactions	20.31	0.04	16.00	0.04
Miscellaneous	0.76	1.00	0.96	1.00
Total	46.79	51.36	39.33	55.84
Donations:				
Private	3.10	0.45	3.10	0.45
Official	0.75	^c	4.80	^c
Total	3.85	0.45	7.90	0.45
Capital:				
Private	1.85	1.99	1.37	0.51
Official and banking	4.23	5.67	4.79	0.30
Total	6.08	7.66	6.16	0.81
Errors and omissions	2.75	0.00	3.71	0.00
Grand total	59.47	59.47	57.10	57.10

Source: *Cyprus Economic Review*, 1957 (Nicosia, 1958).

^aProvisional.

^b"Merchandise (adjusted)" differs from trade account figures because imports are adjusted by deducting freight and insurance charges and exports by deducting ships' stores. These items are included in "Transport and insurance."

^cNegligible amount.

Nor can the Cypriot farmer squeeze enough from his meager output to invest in soil improvement or the other avenues to really increased production. His main investment, to date, has been to let half his land lie

fallow each year. (Conservationists estimate that nature requires roughly two hundred years to replace an inch of topsoil under this system.) He cannot, for many reasons, make the transition into heavier investment and more diversified agriculture.

Breakdown of the island's figures of investment is illustrative. In 1957 (a typical year), only 13 per cent of investment funds flowed into agriculture and mining. The remainder was divided almost equally between machinery purchased abroad (much of which was transport machinery) and investment in housing and buildings. While Cyprus invests therefore at an extraordinarily high percentage of national income (20-25 per cent), a fact to delight those who play with capital-output ratios, probably too much goes into housing and trucks and spare parts and factory machinery brought abroad. And too little goes into mining and agriculture—the backbone of the island's economy.

Investment in housing is confined, moreover, almost exclusively to luxury flats and apartments in the six district towns. No funds flow into improving rural homes, and the urban housing is designed essentially for occupancy by foreigners or by upper-income Cypriots.

Even worse, the island's copper is running out. At present rates of extraction (almost a million tons of five per cent ore are currently being processed annually) Cyprus copper producers will be forced to work low-grade ore within five years. Proved reserves do not point to further seams remotely comparable to the Mavrovouni mine. While forecasts of tax-royalty income from copper exports are approximations at best, it is not unreasonable to expect these incomes to halve (particularly in view of dropping world copper prices), from \$9 million to less than \$5 million in a few years.

Then, the British Government announced (prior to the Middle East troubles in the summer of 1958) its intention of cutting back its military expenditures on the island from an estimated \$56 million in 1957 to about \$45 million in 1958, with further reductions scheduled for future years. An inevitable accompaniment to this would be decreased investment in housing, rising unemployment as some of the 8,000-12,000 base workers became redundant, and lower incomes to service industries (automobile rental, beverage manufacture, entertainment) dependent on troops for sustenance. Unemployment reached 9,500 by mid-1959.

Next, no way has yet been found for Cypriot merchants to enter the East-West entrepôt trade. Skill at this has long kept nearby Lebanon solvent despite its meager resources, lack of industry, and overpopulation. Yet the ships sail by Cyprus, many within eyeshot, and Cypriots gain

negligible income from the cargoes. For their plight in this respect (as in most others) Cypriots blame Britain—for failing to build a really good deep-water port and free zone on the island and for enforcing sterling area exchange controls, which prevent the fast and elaborate transactions associated with East-West trade and its finance.

Colonial administrators on the other hand labeled the Cypriots' ineptness as entrepreneurs one reason for the island's exclusion from entrepôt trade. They pointed to the paucity of really well run enterprises, primitive bookkeeping techniques, payrolls packed with relatives, and the other elements of business in a preindustrial society as basic reasons for Cyprus' commercial isolation. The fact is, the Cypriot entrepreneur has probably gone about as far as he can, given the raw material costs and purchasing power available to him.

Finally, seventy-five years of rule by a Western nation failed to launch Cyprus into an interlocking agricultural and industrial revolution. Poor soil, overfragmentation, lack of investment, and Cypriot farmers' folkways join to make rural Cyprus incapable today of producing raw materials for urban industry or of buying factory goods. The island's industry lives essentially from selling to British forces or to Cypriots deriving income from HMG's base expenditures. Rural Cyprus lives from the grain subsidy and by exporting Cypriots.

The Colonial Office ten-year plan, in many ways an admirable effort, set out only to improve the island's power sources, communications, co-operatives, transport, and public health. These public investments, complemented by a monetary policy linking the Cyprus pound to sterling, undeniably made a vehicle for much of the decade's economic growth. But the plan did not succeed in altering investment directions from housing and transport machinery into agriculture and mining. Nor did it really attack problems resulting from overfragmentation of land. Neither did it result in a useful deep-water port—troop movements for the Suez landings, for example, were largely mounted from Malta. Finally, the plan did not enunciate a mining lease policy designed to encourage search for new ore bodies on the island. Exploration by copper concerns has, in view of the Secretariat's vagueness on future lease policy, been desultory for an entire decade.

Yet failure of the ten-year plan to flood Cyprus with enduring prosperity cannot be laid solely at the feet of the British Colonial Office. Co-ordinated economic planning, still admittedly in its infant stages and as yet essentially unproved, began in capitalist countries only after World War II. Cyprus first needed an adequate set of public utilities, and installation of these occupied the island's administrators and took most of its

excess revenues from 1946 to 1956. Postwar Britain was financially incapable, had it wanted to, of launching an American-type aid program. (as in Puerto Rico) for Cyprus. Following Commonwealth policy, each unit in the empire was expected to "pay its own way." Cyprus did this, and its copper revenues were spent on the island with a minimum of what, on Middle Eastern standards, would pass for "corruption."

The economy of Cyprus takes shape, therefore, as one pulled to unnaturally high levels by international disaster, yet increasingly dependent upon copper exports, military bases, emigrant remittances, and tourism—all essentially external in nature—for sustenance. From its pre-World War II status as "Cinderella of the British Empire," Cyprus has come to practice a form of inverse imperialism in which it exacts a high price indeed, from the West, for its geographic position, minerals, and family loyalties. Population pressure has long since overstrained the island's resources, and Cypriots' living standards undeniably have reached unnaturally high levels under stimulus of its peculiar role in the world. Meanwhile, the specter of dropping income from copper sales and military base outlays is a constant threat.

What should be done? Put in general terms, the answer seems disarmingly simple. First, ways must be found for Cyprus to continue to sell itself as home for Western military establishments, for the highest price possible. As a paratroop police station for troubles elsewhere in the Middle East, Cyprus is still distinctly useful to the Atlantic Alliance. Next, the island's government should enunciate a mining lease policy so attractive that widespread exploration would commence and continue. Third, construction of a deep-water port and a program to urge Cypriot merchants into the East-West trade should be tried as companion programs. Fourth, the emigration of Cypriots should be encouraged, and those who go should receive all stimulus to return often to keep family ties active and the flow of remittances high. Finally, tourism should be developed and expanded.

Implementation of the above measure probably can come only from a coordinated economic development plan, like Puerto Rico's, designed to help change the island's historic investment directions and ultimately the basic structure of its economy. Unless more funds go into Cyprus' main pillars of sustenance—agriculture, mining, tourism, nonconstruction industry—the island cannot hope to check the vicious circle of low purchasing power inhibiting increased output which afflicts it and most of the underdeveloped world today.

To achieve dramatic results, such a plan would doubtless require far greater resources, natural, human, and financial, than are currently avail-

able. Cypriots' mental attitudes would need to change radically—views toward agricultural production, business management, savings and investment, and the like. More land under irrigation and increased output from *all* land are essential. More funds for investment than those currently available—from private savings, taxes, and investment—must be found, probably through foreign aid.

Yet the best plan for Cyprus, with adequate funds, would still depend for lasting success on yet unknown breakthroughs in technology. When experiments in arid zone agriculture produce really effective low-rainfall grasses, the island can try mixed farming on a major scale. With cheap power from the sun, heavy water, or whatever makes sea water distillation practicable, Cyprus can increase its irrigated acreage and farm production immensely. But until discoveries such as these occur, there must be well defined limits on the island's potential for economic growth, and a plan would be a distinctly long-risk proposition.

Meanwhile the boom of the past decade is definitely running down. Since mid-1958, unemployment figures have risen, investment in really productive enterprise is microscopic, copper prices are down, British military expenditures have begun to slacken. Despite tutelage by a Western nation, substantial foreign exchange from copper exports, minimal "corruption" in the expenditure of public funds, and huge outlays by the British military establishment, Cyprus is still economically unviable and a ward of the West for its food and clothing. This result of seventy-five years' mixing of Western rule with Middle Eastern resources—natural and human—is distinctly sobering and, one hopes, *not* a microcosm of inevitable developments elsewhere in the Middle East.

THE FACE OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

as Reflected in the Cyprus Dispute

Frank Tachau

THE recently settled Cyprus dispute has reflected some of the basic difficulties of contemporary Turkish nationalism. In the first place, it has revived the problem of relations between the Turks of Anatolia and Turks outside the borders of the national state, still a powerful factor despite continued official disavowal of overt pan-Turkish irredentism. Second, the Cyprus dispute has illustrated the conflict between the official surrender of claims on former Ottoman territories and popular pressure to reclaim certain of those territories. Third, the island's proximity to the mainland and its command of the approaches to the ports of southern Anatolia persuaded the government to depart from its own ideology and to take an active part in the controversy. Fourth, official policies notwithstanding, the Cyprus dispute has once more demonstrated the unfortunate durability of such national feuds as that between the Greek and Turkish people. Further, the Istanbul riot of September 6, 1955, touched off in connection with the Cyprus dispute, shows that at least with regard to the non-Muslims of Istanbul, the attempts to assimilate minority groups in the Turkish Republic have not succeeded. Finally, and most important for Turkey, the Cyprus controversy generally and the Istanbul demonstration in particular have revealed a continuing gap between the educated few and the relatively uneducated mass of villagers and peasants. Let us examine these points in greater detail.

* * * * *

First of all, there appears to be no doubt regarding the ethnic character of the Turks of Cyprus. Unlike some of the elements involved in the Greek-Turkish exchange of populations of the 1920's, these seem to be more than mere Islamized natives. Their ancestors migrated to the island from Anatolia after the Turkish conquest of 1571, and their status as a separate community has been preserved ever since. They have refrained from intermarriage with their Orthodox neighbors. They have maintained the "purity" of the Turkish language, according to Sir

◆ FRANK TACHAU, presently a member of the faculty of Purdue University, spent the period September 1954-May 1956 carrying out research on a study of the ideas of Turkish Nationalism under grants from the Middle East Institute and the University of Ankara.

Harry Luke, "to an extent unequalled in any other part of the Osmanli-Turkish-speaking world before the language reform carried out by the Ankara Government under the Atatürk."¹ What is more, the Cypriot Turkish community looks to Ankara for political and cultural support quite as much as the Greek community looks to Athens. Indeed, there is apparently some migration of Turks from Cyprus to the mainland Republic, and the visitor to Turkey is apt to encounter a number of Turkish citizens of Cypriot origin. The evidence of identification between the Turks of Turkey and of Cyprus thus is substantial.

Secondly, the island once belonged to the Turkish Empire. It was wrested from the hands of the Venetians in the years 1570-1571 and was held for just over 300 years. The British under Disraeli took over in 1878 at a time when the once proud Ottoman Empire was being humbled by the superior might of modern Europe. The British takeover was justified as the price for protection of the Turk against further Russian encroachment. Turkey recognized the annexation as permanent in Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne concluded in 1923.²

Thirdly, Cyprus occupies a position of strategic importance to Turkey. Only forty miles of water separate the mainland Republic from the island at its nearest point. More important, however, is the fact that Cyprus is so situated as to command the routes of access to the ports of southern Turkey, which are the only ones that have remained relatively free of foreign domination. The Aegean islands, under Axis control during World War II, for example, commanded the approaches to the Dardanelles and, for that matter, the entire western Turkish coast, including the two major ports of Istanbul and Izmir.

Finally, the Cyprus issue involved relations between Turkey and Greece. Historically, these relations have not been good. Indeed, the birth of the present day Turkish Republic was attended by a long and vicious war between the Turks and Greeks. The resultant hostility was so bitter that an exchange of populations on an unprecedentedly large scale was thought necessary to prevent further bloodshed. Since that time approximately thirty-five years ago, relations between Greece and Turkey have appeared quite cordial on the surface. The "spirit of Atatürk and Venizelos," the two national leaders who initiated this period of formal friendship, is often cited as evidence of the feasibility of Greek-Turkish cooperation. So also is joint membership in NATO and the Balkan Pact. This spirit of friendship and cooperation has never,

1. Sir Harry Luke, *Cyprus, A Portrait and an Appreciation*. New York: Roy Publishers, 1957, p. 78.

2. *The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923*, Vol. II. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924, p. 966.

however, filtered down to the level of popular opinion, at least in Turkey. The average Turk, in conformity with his habit of classifying nations as either friends of Turkey or enemies of Turkey, continues to think of the Greeks as national enemies.

In a nutshell, then, the Turkish attitude regarding the Greek demand for *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) may be summed up as an unwillingness to see yet another strategic island, formerly under Turkish sovereignty, close to the shores of Turkey, and with a sizable Turkish minority, fall into the hands of a national enemy, Greece. Essentially, the Cyprus issue has involved for Turkey two elements: nationalism and security. Our main concern shall be with the former.

* * * * *

Turkish nationalism,³ or Turkism, was one of the earliest and most successful of the series of non-European anti-colonial nationalist movements which have become so familiar, especially since World War II. It first assumed prominence with the rise of the Young Turk régime early in the twentieth century. It was in part at least a reaction to the separatist national movements that were springing up among the so-called subject nationalities, especially in the Balkans. It was an attempt on the part of the Turks to resuscitate a dying Empire which they had created and within which they were still the dominant element. In addition, there were then as now large numbers of Turks in Russia, and it will be recalled that Russia, too, was at this time on the point of social and political collapse. For the Turks of Russia, then, Turkish nationalism represented a possible means of throwing off the Tsarist yoke. It is not surprising to note that in its first flush Turkish nationalism failed to draw a clear line at the boundary of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, pan-Turkism became ever more popular until, with the outbreak of the First World War—making Turkey and Russia enemies—it had become so prominent that even members of the Young Turks' Society of Union and Progress could be found among its advocates. But this ambition of uniting all the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia with those of the

3. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*. Second edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956, pp. 61-67. The conflict of ideas from which Turkish nationalism emerged may be traced in the writings of Ziya Gökalp, probably the most influential Turkish nationalist thinker of all time. The best study of Gökalp in English is Uriel Heyd's *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*. London: Luzac and Co., 1950; see also Niyazi Berkes, "Ziya Gökalp: His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, Autumn 1954, as well as his recently published *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*. New York: Columbia University Press. On pan-Turkism, see: G. Jäschke, "Der Turanismus der Jungtürken; zur oemanischen Aussenpolitik im Weltkriege," *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. XXIII, 1941; Tarık Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye' de Siyasî Partiler*, 1859-1952. Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1952; Akçuraoglu Yusuf, *Türk Yılı 1928*. Istanbul: Yeni Matbaası, 1928. An excellent recent work on the Young Turk movement is E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

Ottoman Empire was frustrated by the humiliating defeat which Turkey suffered in the War. This defeat also stripped the Empire of all territory beyond the Anatolian peninsula and a corner of eastern Thrace.

Of necessity, then, the Turkish nationalists at the end of World War I had to give up both their pan-Turkist ambitions and any claim to such of the former Ottoman territories as were inhabited by a majority of non-Turkish or non-Muslim people. This physical or geographical limitation of nationalist aspirations was first clearly formulated in the so-called Misak-ı Milli (National Pact) adopted by the short-lived Ottoman Parliament sitting in Istanbul in January of 1920.⁴ Later, Mustafa Kemal confirmed this limitation of nationalist demands when he declared: "Rather than increasing the number of our enemies and their coercion over us by chasing concepts which we cannot realize, let us withdraw to our natural and legitimate limits."⁵ Later still, the official doctrine was expressed as follows:

Although our nationalism loves all Turks . . . with a deep feeling of brotherhood, and although it desires with all its soul their wholesome development, yet it recognizes that its political activity must end at the borders of the Turkish Republic.⁶

There can be little doubt that in terms of practical political and diplomatic considerations, this limitation was accepted by Kemal's followers. In terms of ideals, however, there were reservations. Ziya Gökalp, for example, exhibited a considerable degree of hesitation. Once an ardent pan-Turkist, he now acknowledged the ideal of a limited national state as far as the real world was concerned. Nevertheless, he insisted on maintaining "Turanism" as a long-range ideal which, like the ideal of a completely communized society or the paradise of Islam, might never be realized.⁷

Such pan-Turkist sentiments may be found cropping up at various times during the history of the Republic, although the Government has been most careful to avoid official sanction of irredentism. On the other hand, the historic connection between the Anatolian Turks and the Turks of Central Asia has never been denied. Indeed, the Asiatic origin of the Turkish people was stressed in the history and language reforms of the 1930's. Moreover, "the policy which permits Turks all over the world who are not citizens of the Turkish Republic to acquire citizenship

4. Turkish text in *Tarih* (History), Vol. IV. Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934, pp. 45-46n. English version in H.W.V. Temperley, ed., *A History of the Peace Conference*. London: Frowde, Hodder & Stoughton, 1924, Vol. VI, pp. 605-06.

5. Speech in the Grand National Assembly (Parliament), Ankara, December 1, 1921, in *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, Vol. I. Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1945, pp. 195-96.

6. Gesellschaft zur Erforschung der türkischen Geschichte, *Geschichte der türkischen Republik*. Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1935, p. 226. This is a translation of the official *Tarih*, cited above.

7. Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*. Istanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1952, pp. 17-21. The work was first published in 1923.

on the basis of their ethnic and linguistic kinship, is a cardinal manifestation of the understanding that all Turks, including the Eastern Turks, are one national and cultural body."⁸ Thus, pan-Turkist sentiment has continued to permeate the atmosphere, though it has never enjoyed outright governmental sanction, and rarely even taken the form of a specific political program. It has remained in the form of a suffused feeling of kinship and brotherhood with Turks the world over.

One further aspect of Turkish nationalism remains to be examined. It will be recalled that at the end of World War I only Anatolia and Eastern Thrace were left to the Turks. The National Pact called for the maintenance of the integrity of this territory on the grounds that it was "inhabited by an Ottoman-Islamic majority united by religion, race, and origin."⁹ After the establishment of the Republic, this simple statement proved insufficient as a basis for national identity and homogeneity. The problem had two aspects. On the one hand, there were the still substantial non-Muslim minorities, especially the Greeks and Armenians of Istanbul, who were exempted from the compulsory exchange of populations. On the other hand, there were Muslim non-Turks who were fully as suspicious of Turkish rule as were the non-Muslim communities. The most prominent of these were the Kurds of eastern Anatolia. But there were also communities of Circassians, Laz, Bosnians, and Albanians scattered throughout the country. If these various Muslim and non-Muslim minorities were to be assimilated, it was clear that a purely ethnic criterion of national identification would not do. Such a criterion would include the Turks of Central Asia as members of the nation, but exclude the minority groups living in Anatolia. Accordingly, Kemal and his followers systematically rejected all ethnic or racial standards of nationalism. Instead, a more expedient and less extreme approach was adopted:

Every individual within the Turkish Republic who speaks Turkish, who is raised in the Turkish culture and who identifies himself with the Turkish ideal, is, regardless of religion, a Turk.¹⁰

The result over the years has been that those groups that have adopted the Turkish language and accepted the Kemalist reforms have been assimilated and accepted as full fledged members of the Turkish body politic.

8. Charles W. Hosler, *Turkism and the Soviets*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957, p. 170. Hosler stresses the political potentialities of pan-Turkist irredentism and appears to believe that there is a great deal of latent feeling along these lines in Turkey. *Ibid.*, chapter 5. With regard to policies concerning immigration of Turks, a large number of Turkish refugees from communist Bulgaria have been admitted in recent years as well as smaller numbers from other countries. See H. L. Kostanick, "Turkish Resettlement of Refugees from Bulgaria, 1950-1953," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. IX, No. 1, Winter 1955.

9. Temperley, Vol. VI, pp. 605-06.

10. *Geschichte der türkischen Republik*, p. 226.

Circassians and Laz would be examples of these groups. On the other hand, those groups which have not been successfully assimilated are also the ones that have maintained their own language or some other such distinctive feature. The Kurds again are the most prominent example of this type among the Muslims. Among the non-Muslims we have the familiar trio of the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. In their case, differences in language are reinforced by the difference in religion—still a strong identifying factor in Turkey despite thirty years of Kemalist secularism—as well as their heavy occupational concentration in business and the professions. It is these non-Muslim minorities that will again engage our attention in connection with the Cyprus issue.

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Turning again to the Cyprus dispute, we find that it demonstrates the disparity between the official version of Turkish nationalism under the Republic and the actual operative ideals and loyalties of the people.

The strategic argument was undoubtedly the Ankara government's strongest point in setting forth the Turkish interest in Cyprus. Not so for the people.¹¹ Time and again during my stay in Turkey, I was confronted by angry Turks heatedly trying to convince me that "Cyprus is Turkish." Their main argument was hardly ever of a strategic or military nature. If such considerations figured at all, they were invariably combined with, and usually overshadowed by, anti-Greek sentiment. I would hear countless stories of Greek atrocities against Turkish villagers in the bitter war of 1919-1923, followed with the assurance that the Turkish minority in Cyprus might expect similar treatment. My informants sometimes went so far as to assert that the Greeks still harbored ambitions for the re-establishment of the Eastern Roman Empire with its capital at Constantinople.¹²

Realistic or not, such sentiments are strongly reminiscent of an observation made some thirty-five years ago after the conclusion of the Greek-Turkish war in Anatolia. The Greek occupation of a portion of western Anatolia, it was then pointed out, seemed to represent a first step in the potential overrunning of all of Asia Minor by the Greek people, who had already replaced the Turks as the dominant element in other formerly Ottoman territories. From this point of view, the Turks faced

11. In what follows, my aim is merely to indicate the nature of Turkish opinion on the Cyprus question. Whatever distortions of fact there may be in the presentation, the purpose is to reflect as accurately as possible an attitude and an argument. This has been distilled from numerous conversations and disputations over innumerable cups of Turkish coffee during my sojourn in Turkey from 1954 to 1956.

12. All of these arguments are reflected in an interview of Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu by William Hillman of the North American Newspaper Alliance under the title *Cyprus and Turkey*, distributed by the Turkish Information Office of New York (no date).

a threat not alone to their political independence, but to their very survival as a nationality.¹³

Significantly, this same argument would often be brought up in answer to the principle of self-determination in connection with Cyprus. My Turkish friends would maintain that the majority of the population of Cyprus had once been Turkish, but that over the years since the British occupation, heavy migration from Greece combined with emigration of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey had given rise to the present Greek majority. Unreasonable as this argument sounds, it shows that fear for national survival may still be a factor in Turkish nationalism. Incidentally, it is also in this connection that the strategic argument, so heavily emphasized by the government, found its most common expression in the words and thoughts of the man in the street. Greek possession of islands scarcely a stone's throw off the Aegean coast was considered an affront to Turkish honor and dignity. The acquisition of yet another one—and this time with a sizable Turkish minority—was absolutely intolerable.

At least one more of the official arguments was often cited in the coffee house conversations. This was the argument that the Greeks had no business meddling in the affairs of Cyprus, simply because the island had never belonged to Greece. On the other hand, the whole world knew that Cyprus had been part of Turkey for fully three hundred years.

Finally, the coffee house strategists might throw a brickbat or two at their own government for failing to press the Turkish case on Cyprus with sufficient vigor. The government might be scored for giving the impression that the Turks were weak or "unmanly" and that Turkish opposition could be easily overcome by the old Balkan trick of "agitation." If one pressed for an explanation one might hear the conjecture that there was fear in official circles of the loss of American support, especially financial aid. Underlying this conjecture was the uneasy feeling that American public opinion had abandoned the staunch Turkish ally for the "weak-kneed" Greeks, giving rise to further frustration at the apparent inability to bring the Turkish case to America's attention. Finally, and perhaps somewhat paradoxically, the Menderes government might be blamed for permitting the riots in Istanbul and Izmir to get out of hand, thus giving Turkey a black eye in international circles.¹⁴

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It is clear, at any rate, that Turkish feelings about Cyprus were

13. Temperley, Vol. VI, Chapter 1, Part ii.

14. This last point was heard especially during December of 1955 when Menderes' grip on the reins of political power seemed to have slipped momentarily.

highly emotional. With some encouragement from the government and provocation from abroad—in the form of disturbing reports of rioting in Greece and terrorism on Cyprus, as well as indications that public opinion elsewhere seemed to favor the Greek case—public discussion of the Cyprus issue in the summer of 1955 became permeated with sentiments of anger and frustration.¹⁵ By the time Turkish interests in the dispute were formally recognized with the calling of the Tripartite Conference in London late in August, feeling within the country had reached fever pitch. It was in this atmosphere that serious rioting broke out in the cities of Istanbul and Izmir on September 6, 1955. This explosion of feeling was highly indicative not only of the nature of the Cyprus dispute, but of the character of the nationalist sentiments involved in it. Its fury surprised everyone, including, to all appearances at least, the government itself.

The immediate cause of the disturbance was an early evening report that the birthplace of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Salonica, Greece, had been bombed. Understandably, this news aroused considerable excitement. Although later indications were that some kind of demonstration had been prepared (though possibly not for that particular evening),¹⁶ there is no doubt that the Salonica incident transformed the atmosphere in a manner that could hardly have been expected. Significantly, it brought into play the greatest symbol of Turkish nationalism, the charismatic figure of Kemal Atatürk. In the initial stages of the demonstration, it seemed that high school and college youths were in the forefront. A vociferous and highly excited group began demonstrating in the main square of the city and quickly drew a sympathetic crowd. They brandished newspapers and Turkish flags and, except for the ominous circumstances, might have been mistaken for merely over-energetic teen-agers working off steam.

The crowd of demonstrators quickly changed character, however, and the youths became only one element in a huge mass. What seemed to have begun as a noisy demonstration of Turkish opinion on Cyprus

15. An indication of the nature of the atmosphere is given in an editorial by Falih Rifki Atay, noted newspaper publisher and a close associate of Atatürk. He referred to a rumor that the Greek terrorists on Cyprus intended to massacre the Turks of the island. Such a rumor, calling forth bitter memories of the hostilities and atrocities of an earlier day, was bound to arouse some emotion. See *Dünya* newspaper, September 8, 1955. I have found no mention elsewhere of any such planned massacre or even rumors to that effect, however.

16. This impression is corroborated by the account cabled from Geneva and appearing in the *New York Times* of September 17, 1955. The fact that several international conferences were then meeting or about to meet in Istanbul, with the result that a great many foreigners of varying degrees of importance (including an ex-Premier of France) were eye-witnesses of the riot, made it doubly embarrassing for the Turks. The account which follows is based upon my own personal observation of the riot with corroboration wherever possible from press reports and the accounts of friends and acquaintances.

turned into a destructive free-for-all. The leading element became the *lumpenproletariat*, the bootblacks, porters, *kâpîcis*, and mendicants—ex-villagers barely subsisting amidst the relative luxury and wealth of the city. They were armed with crowbars and battering rams rather than newspapers and flags.

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In order to clarify this development, it is necessary to point out certain factors which impinged on the riot. One was the widespread migration of villagers to the large cities, a phenomenon whose effects are noticeable to the most casual observer in places like Ankara and Istanbul. This migration has been facilitated by, among other things, vast improvements in transport, specifically highways. Many of these villagers come to the city with no assurances of a place to live or a place to work, often without even the necessary skills with which to seek employment. The result has been the creation of a series of urban slums of the worst kind. Whether the slum dwellers are better off eking out their existence by doing odd jobs in the city or barely making ends meet in the villages is a moot point. One point is clear, however: in the city the gulf between their standard of living and that of the business, professional, and official classes is brought home in no uncertain terms. Mahmut Makal, the youthful school teacher and social critic, has maintained that the itinerant peasant who comes to the city to earn money but who maintains contact with his village does not identify with the city dweller and so is not affected by the bright lights and relative luxury of the city.¹⁷ The Istanbul riot seems to demonstrate, however, that whether he identifies or not, the villager can be deeply affected by what he observes in the city.

Further, it should be recalled that in 1955 Turkey was already deep in the throes of the foreign exchange crisis with which she is still wrestling today. Imports had been severely cut back, and negotiations with the United States for a special loan had come to naught. At the same time, prices were climbing steadily, and the vast army of civil servants, living on relatively fixed incomes, were finding it more and more difficult to make ends meet. No doubt many of them could have been found in the streets of Istanbul on the night of September 6.

Finally, it is worth recalling that there are still sizable groups of unassimilated minorities in Istanbul, particularly Greeks, Armenians and Jews. Largely concentrated in business and the professions, these com-

17. Personal conversation, Ankara, April 28, 1956. Makal is a product of the teacher training system of the Republic. He has been extremely sceptical of social and economic progress, especially in the villages. Some of his writings created a sensation during the 1950 election campaign. For an English translation, see Mahmut Makal, *A Village in Anatolia*. London: Vallentine Mitchell and Co., Ltd., 1954.

munities account for a large share of the commerce and trade of the city, and many of them have fared well materially, in spite of occasional harassment.

What tied these three factors together and provided a unifying theme for the demonstration was the fact that it became possible to find a common mode of expression for all the frustrations and hostilities that had been engendered. The villager was able to vent his spleen on the goods symbolic of the wealth of the city dweller. The petty official and civil servant on fixed salary was able to express his indignation at the inflation which was pricing consumer goods out of his reach.¹⁸

Moreover, these feelings of hostility could be focussed on the non-Muslim minorities and, in particular, on the Greeks. Because of their prominence in the business and commerce of the city, the ex-villager identified them with the higher standard of life flaunted before his eyes. A feeling of unrighteous exploitation seemed to pervade the air. The idea that Turks were being exploited by non-Turks was easily arrived at by simple minds stirred to anger and given an opportunity to express their sentiments. The fixed-salary civil servant was fundamentally in the same boat, except that his frustration was perhaps of an even higher order. To the villager, the life of the city was apt to be new and strange. To the civil servant, it was not. He had all the aspirations of the Western urbanized man, but was being deprived of their realization by rising prices. On the other hand, non-Muslim businessmen were apparently more nearly able to keep up with the inflation. Moreover, they were in so many cases the very shopkeepers who dealt with the commodities in short supply and thus seemed to profit from the economic crisis. Consequently, once again the picture was one of seeming exploitation of Turks by non-Turks.

Finally, the Cyprus dispute had opened all the old sores of Turko-Greek hostility while the "attack" on Atatürk's home brought the symbol of Turkish nationalism into play.

Thus, each of the groups participating in the riot was able to evoke the spirit of nationalism in justification of its activities. Indeed, the one visible common denominator throughout the demonstration was the prevalence of Turkish flags and portraits of Atatürk. The presence or absence of one or both of these symbols on shops and buildings seemed to serve as a criterion which determined whether the place was Turkish or not; i.e., whether it should be attacked or not. Many minority shop owners could—and some did—save their fortunes in this manner. It is

18. Hoffman in the *New York Times*, September 17, 1955, noted that imported hardware and textiles, items in especially short supply, were prime targets of the demonstrators. It has also been suggested that there were some who used the occasion of the riot to settle old personal or financial scores.

doubtful perhaps whether those known to be Greek could have survived without loss under any circumstances, and conversely a number of Turkish-owned establishments were also attacked. These exceptions indicate the complex motivation of the rioters, but the fact remains that nationalist symbols were predominant throughout.

The indication is that nationalism, like so many other vague and abstract ideals, can mean many things to many men. If this were the only inference to be drawn, it would teach us nothing new. A more significant conclusion suggests itself, however, if we recall the picture of Turkish society held by Ziya Gökalp some forty years ago. To him, the greatest single problem for Turkey as a nation and a society was to bridge the vast gulf between the uneducated masses and the educated few. It was his hope that under Atatürk's Republic this chasm would be eliminated. In fact, a great deal has been done over the past thirty-five years. Nevertheless, the experience of September 6, 1955 shows that the gap persists. But there is a difference. In Gökalp's day the uneducated masses were largely inert and leaderless. Now they have acquired a voice, political consciousness, and symbols with which to express themselves. Speaking for the nation in moderate tones has therefore become a greatly complicated task for the Turkish Government.

Recent developments indicate that a concerted attempt is being made to overcome the worst effects of the Cyprus controversy and to re-establish an atmosphere of friendly cooperation between Greece and Turkey. For the sake of the free world as well as the new Republic of Cyprus one can only wish for the complete success of this venture. In the meantime, it is to be hoped that the unpleasant episode which we have analyzed here will spur the Turkish leaders to renewed efforts toward the solution of certain pressing domestic problems. Otherwise nationalism may again become a camouflage providing justification for the expression of serious social and economic grievances which cannot find release through existing political and social channels.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST ARAB PETROLEUM CONGRESS

Harley C. Stevens

IN any comment upon or assessment of the proceedings of the First Arab Petroleum Congress convened in Cairo earlier this year,¹ it is important to recognize and acknowledge that much depends on one's point of view; and that whether Arab or "Western" oil men, there are, in fact, substantial differences of opinion both with regard to policy and procedure not only between these two groups, but within them as well. Moreover, it is impossible to evaluate certain of the controversial issues that divide the interested parties without frankly discussing some of the attitudes assumed by one or the other of them in dealing with the problems and difficulties inherent in the rapid (and often violent) economic and social changes and in the slower political evolution taking place in the Middle East today.

For those forces, in themselves, play no small part in producing (and exacerbating) the tensions that exist—and would exist—in the area quite apart from the questions, for example, of whether the Arab producing countries are presently receiving a fair share of the profits from the oil discovered by others in their lands; or whether the existing concessions are unfair or outmoded and should therefore be revised; or whether the Arabs should be consulted and share in decisions as to price changes and the world-wide pricing systems as well as other major operating problems of the industry, and so on.

To say this is not to overlook the impact that the Western oil industry has produced on the Middle East; but it is to say that no one could have foreseen—indeed it would have been difficult to imagine—many of the results that have flowed from the great oil discoveries and the phenomenal developments that have taken place there in the past ten to fifteen years. And it is to suggest that for the Arabs constantly to belittle, if not to ignore, the extraordinary material benefits that have accrued to the local peoples, many not long removed from an oasis

1. Organized by the Secretariat General of the League of Arab States and held at Cairo (together with a Petroleum Exhibition), April, 1959. See Chronology in this issue, p. 284.

♦ HARLEY C. STEVENS was until recently vice president and special counsel of the American Independent Oil Company, and is a member of the Board of Governors of the Middle East Institute. He attended the First Arab Petroleum Congress in Cairo earlier this year.

economy or a precarious existence in the desert, may be fashionable but is neither fair nor realistic.

Yet, despite such visible gains in the shape of the new skills that have come to the Arab peoples, their greatly improved health and vastly better housing, their newly-found literacy, and the like, plus the massive plant and material improvements that have been created with the capital of others, all of which the producing countries will inherit, the Arab leaders tend always to blame the oil companies and the West for the hard fact that their economic independence can only come from a blend of financial, administrative and technical competence they have yet to attain. Neither this competence nor the political maturity and unity they are struggling to achieve can come through recrimination or berating imperialism, however candidly one may admit, as one must, that many present Arab difficulties find their source in past mistakes of the Western powers.

It is precisely because of all these considerations, that the fact the Petroleum Congress was assembled in Cairo should be a source of satisfaction to all sides. For the Arabs it represented a significant step toward realization of their hopes and labors these past years, the legitimate goal of which was active and constructive participation in the one great industry in the Middle East which holds the greatest promise, and which both producing and transit countries will one day inherit. For the oil companies, it offered an opportunity not only to join in discussions with the leaders of the Arab oil world with a measurable sense of common purpose, but also to suggest that the reality of abundant oil supplies in the world today must be carefully considered and evaluated by both sides.

Viewed in this light, it probably is not so important exactly what was said and done in Cairo, or what resolutions were or were not adopted. What is important is that it be recognized that the Arab engineers and technicians like Muhammad Salman and Mahmud Abu Zayd in Egypt, 'Abdallah Tariki in Saudi Arabia, and Nadhim Pachachi² of Iraq (who was absent from Cairo, of course) have been putting out suggestions and demands for some years which now make up a fairly consistent pattern of claims for fuller participation in the development of Arab oil, for new financial arrangements, and for contemporaneous oil activities in all phases of the business under Arab management.

It is of particular interest to note that none of these claims or demands, and none of these plans for entry into the oil business, call for nationalization. In fact, the shadow of Musaddiq seems to haunt these

2. See for example, "Iraqi Oil Policy," by Dr. Nadhim al-Pachachi. 1958. Translated from the Arabic by The Research and Translation Office, Beirut.

oil technocrats as they outline their more constructive proposals for a new deal in oil. Having thus abandoned nationalization as the route to riches and self-sufficiency, they have evolved a different program more in line with the realities of the international oil industry to accomplish their ultimate aims. One phase involves bringing to the younger Arab generation an intelligent awareness of the value and the relation of the Arab oil resources to their future, plus a wider technical and scientific education to prepare them to operate effectively in the oil business. Another contemplates continuing negotiation with both the oil companies that dominate the Middle East oil scene and with the oil consuming countries of Western Europe and their nationals. A third stage, somewhat further off it would appear, calls for cooperation with such major producing countries elsewhere, such as Venezuela, in order to stabilize prices and production.

The program of the Cairo Congress clearly reflected considerable planning along these three lines, with major emphasis on technical and educational subjects. The working papers given out to each participant covered the whole spectrum of oil activities: methods of exploration and prospecting; transport, refining and marketing; petroleum economics; legislation relating to concessions and operations; and the oil policies of the Arab States. With few exceptions, and for the first time, the papers were presented by the nationals of the Arab League countries and other Middle Eastern states. These posed many issues and faced the industry with the major questions in their minds.

The primary object was, it appeared, to show that the Arabs hope and intend to achieve a new deal in oil *via* the route of education and negotiation; and that they can already demonstrate considerable competence in several phases of the oil industry. Seen in this light, the importance of the Congress in Arab eyes and its very evident success, mark a new stage in Middle East economic affairs generally, and oil affairs in particular, that should be understood and appreciated in the West.

In spite of the fact that the Congress offered an opportunity to talk over these issues and questions in the minds of their hosts in a congenial atmosphere of considerable good will, it is still true to say that this very experience showed how difficult it is for the parties to communicate one with the other. Yet when one considers the fact, as one of the papers at the Congress pointed out, that there is as yet no agreed terminology in Arabic for many technical words used in the industry, it is perhaps not surprising that there is difficulty in establishing understanding on such intricate matters as the world oil structure, pricing, capital requirements, reinvestment of capital, distribution and the like.

Even so, it is plain that the Arabs, or at least their younger oil technocrats who are in the vanguard of Arab thought and action in oil affairs, have certain views and aims that are greatly at variance with those of the oil companies. Many simply do not accept either what the industry considers makes economic sense, or what it believes is fair, equitable and possible. In fact, some of them do not accept what one of them has called "the present politico-economic structure and behavior of the [Arab] oil producing states." But these are quite clearly matters about which it would be most perilous for the oil companies to express an opinion, let alone do anything about, even if they thought they ought or could do something useful.

All of this certainly means that the way of negotiation may be hard (it is always tedious), and that the Arabs, or some of them, may at one point or another, be tempted to abandon it, substituting therefore unilateral and arbitrary action which would emasculate, if not render meaningless, such oil concessions as might be involved. At least this possibility was suggested by an argument made in Cairo by an American lawyer, Mr. Frank Hendryx, formerly employed by an international oil company and presently legal advisor to the Saudi Directorate General of Petroleum and Mineral Affairs.

His paper, entitled "A Sovereign Nation's Legal Ability to Make and Abide by a Petroleum Concession Contract," stated there were in the American, British, and French law precedents for the unilateral alteration or nullification of part or all of an oil concession by the oil producing countries either through legislation or administrative decree, "so long as their actions are taken in good faith, that is, on behalf of a substantial public interest. . . ." The author went on to argue that if it appeared other nations similarly situated obtained greater benefits for their citizens, a unilateral contract alteration "may become, in principle, mandatory"; that the "financial interests (of a nation) must be included in the classification of matters of vital interest to a nation's citizens"; and that regardless of "any previous contractual commitment by the State not to alter the terms of an agreement, or not to alter them except under certain conditions [these provisions] would be unavailing to prevent its later alteration of that contract." When queried specifically as to whether this last statement applied to arbitration clauses usually found in concession agreements, Mr. Hendryx replied: "I really did not consider this aspect of the (concession) agreement but as the government has the right to cancel the agreement then, I believe, it can also alter or cancel the arbitration clause."

Needless to say, Mr. Hendryx's paper excited considerable comment

and speculation among the delegations, company officials, and others present in Cairo. Seen in retrospect, its only real virtue was in the spontaneous response it elicited, which did much to dispel the stiffness that earlier surrounded the sessions of the Congress and made it easier from then on to discuss other controversial items on the agenda, both from the floor and in informal gatherings where substantive questions now began freely to be discussed. In any event, Mr. Hendryx's paper received no favorable comment, but rather met with immediate and emphatic attack, with the most effective rebuttals coming from the Arab delegations themselves.

As for the legal bases of Mr. Hendryx's thesis, in view of repeated assertions in some quarters that no one could contradict the correctness of his argument which merely states established law, it must be said here that an examination of many of the cases on which he relies indicates quite clearly his conclusions are not supported by the decisions. Thus, for example, the United States cases he cites have almost exclusively to do, so far as they are applicable at all, with the exercise of the police power of the several states of the United States for the protection of the health, morality and safety of their citizens. They deal with such questions as whether a state may legally require a railroad to provide a grade crossing (it may); whether a state law prohibiting the sale of liquor is within the police power or an unlawful interference with private enterprise (the law was upheld); whether a state license might be required (it can be) for the sale of "ardent spirits" (in this case, gin); whether temporary emergency legislation restricting for two years the right of a landlord to repossess rented property upon the expiration of the original lease exceeded the police powers of the state (it was held not to); and like cases. None of them remotely supports Mr. Hendryx's assertion that the "financial interests" of the State fall within the category of contracts which may be thus affected by the police power. And none of them, including the British and French cases, proves this point.

It is true that under the power of "eminent domain," not mentioned by Mr. Hendryx, private property in the United States may be sequestered for necessary public use; but the crucial feature of this right is that it is always subject to judicial review and is accompanied by the obligation to pay adequate compensation—much of it in advance. Moreover, this power is an exceptional one, and its exercise carefully circumscribed. It is to be remembered here too that the ballot, the separation of powers, and in particular the position of the judiciary in the United States—all act as powerful limitations on the actions of both state and federal authorities. Furthermore, those who invest or enter into valid

contracts to be executed in the United States, do so with full knowledge of all the ground rules which the application of the Hendryx theory would deny and destroy.

However all this may be, what does strike one, or at least a Westerner, is that hard-headed and able Arab technocrats apparently see no contradiction between acquiescence in such a doctrine of unilateral alteration or abrogation of contracts with the proposal put before the Congress by 'Abdallah Tariki, himself the Director of Petroleum and Mineral Affairs of Saudi Arabia, to build an Arab pipeline from Qatar to the eastern Mediterranean costing between a quarter and a half billion dollars, to be financed, Tariki hopes and expects, by the great banking institutions of the West and its throughput underwritten by the oil companies. It is difficult, indeed, to see why either the banks or the oil companies should be willing under such circumstances to put up the money required or to commit the necessary oil to such a pipeline if built. For if, for example, the terms of a freely negotiated (and re-negotiated) oil concession contract such as that between Aramco and the Saudi Arab Government, do not bind each party equally, the basis for confident cooperation can hardly be expected to survive, and it would seem most unlikely that either the necessary commitments of capital or of crude oil would ever be made.

In their economic presentations, and particularly in the major paper prepared by Faruq al-Husayni, also of the Directorate General of Petroleum and Mineral Affairs in Saudi Arabia, the Arab delegates presented figures to bolster their argument for a larger share of the profits and, incidentally, more say in the operations of the oil companies. In essence, they sought to establish that the so-called 50-50 principle as presently applied is illusory; and that only by "full integration," i.e., by sharing "all the way" (to the pump), could it become a reality. There seems no point in elaborating on all this, or upon the rejoinder of the oil companies who dispute it.

What is clear, however, is that more urgent than the matter of a larger share in oil profits or how it is achieved, is the Arab insistence on a fuller voice in the operations of the industry and in its management. They are determined to have a larger share in its decision-making activities. In short, what really matters to the Arab nationalist of today is a wider and deeper participation in these oil affairs which affect their lives so profoundly. It is only by this means that they hope to hurdle the barrier which an advanced and alien industrial complex erected in their midst presents.

The presence of so many responsible Western oil men in Cairo was a

matter of surprise and gratification to the Arabs. It was also, it is believed, an acknowledgment of this problem, however indirect. Those who attended could not fail to realize that, in spite of the moderate tone of the final resolutions of the Congress, the pressure and determination of the Arabs to participate are real and undeniable. This underlies all the resolutions and all the bows toward specific projects presented at the Congress. However general and all embracing those final resolutions may appear, they do outline the broad objectives of Arab oil policy.

What then can be done to reconcile the legitimate rights and claims of the oil companies, the pioneers and discoverers of Middle East oil—with the burning needs and aspirations of the Arabs in this period of their development? Certainly mutual points of interest and economic advantage are recognized. And it would appear that even the most conservative companies in the area appreciate that another era of change in oil affairs is here. The Iraq Petroleum Company, for example, has initiated relinquishment of promising oil areas to the government of Iraq and the acceleration of oil royalties payable in kind. It is cooperating in the speed-up of the "Iraqization" of the company to satisfy nationalist demands. Iraqis sit on its Board of Directors and are taking their places in management. Similarly, Aramco voted five years ago to add two Saudi Arabs to its Board, although the Saudi Government, for reasons best known to itself, has only this year appointed these two members, one of them 'Abdallah Tariki mentioned above.

In the economic debate over prices—and particularly over sudden price changes which reduce oil income to the producing countries and disrupt their budgets without notice or their full appreciation of the reasons—it seems necessary that some better form of communication than now exists shall be devised to cushion the shock, at least. Here it would appear that the suggestions of certain enlightened oil executives to this effect should be put into practice. The facts of international oil marketing, particularly the competitive situation as it exists today, should be made plainer. Otherwise each drop in prices will be followed by demands for greater production, thus glutting the market further. One perceptive adviser to companies suggests letting the Arabs "hear the grunts" and share the headaches, rather than simply telling them of necessary changes which affect their entire economies.

Another avenue opens up inescapably if the companies wish to see real stability in this area of very uneven development. This is to encourage diversification, so that the Arabs themselves evolve healthier economies. The force of example is strong and, if new joint stock companies, such

as those envisioned by the MIDECA³ organization can be fostered, some of the overheated emphasis on oil may be dissipated.

Meanwhile the Arabs' idea of side-by-side oil operations which they shall initiate and manage seems a sensible one. With the acumen they show in business and the energy they are now disposed to put into it, they should be encouraged to go into the oil business, beginning with the necessary capital investment of their own, as has been done in Egypt and Iraq. The example of the Egyptian oil enterprises in particular seems to show that enthusiasm for national ventures has not overtaken recognition of economic realities.

Parallel Arab oil operations developing alongside those now in the area may be the soundest solution to the current restiveness of the growing body of technicians and entrepreneurs among the Arabs. To put it figuratively, multiplying the harbors need not reduce the sea; and they may make it safer for all.

3. Middle East Industrial Development Projects Corporation, established by an international group of private businesses and banks to promote industrial development in the Arab countries on a strictly non-governmental basis.

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER:

COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

The Quiet Time

July and August have traditionally been the months in which violence most commonly erupts in the Middle East. But 1959 has been, so far, an exception to the rule. Rarely in modern times has so much relative calm prevailed. Not that there has been a lack of the kind of incidents and "provocations" which in the past have produced a chain reaction of explosions. The particularly brutal murder of Na'im Mughabghab in Lebanon in July might have touched off such a reaction, as the murder of Nasib al-Matni did last year. The massacre of the Turcomans in Iraq might have led to further and worse bloodshed, but has not. The detention of the *Inge Toft* in the Suez Canal seemed likely for a while to lead to an "activist" reaction from Israel, but there, too, nothing more serious has resulted.

Perhaps the Lebanese are weary of internal strife. Perhaps it was the action of General Qasim in putting his personal prestige behind the protection of "our Turcoman brothers" which halted the descent into Avernus. The Israelis may well have more to say about the *Inge Toft* and the Canal shipping problem in general later, but, for the time being, the affair remains *in statu quo*.

On the positive side, the United Arab Republic and Jordan have reestablished diplomatic relations and President 'Abd al-Nasir and King Sa'ud are to meet fraternally in Cairo. There are a number of clouds that remain but, as of this writing, the quarter has been a remarkable one.

The Secretary General's Report

In the Document Section of the *Journal* below, there is reprinted in full the recommendations of Secretary General Hammarskjöld on the Palestine refugee problem. As is well-known, the agency which has, for almost ten years, been administering relief, UNRWA, was scheduled to be abolished in 1960. At its thirteenth ses-

sion last year, the General Assembly requested the Secretary General to give to the fourteenth session his proposals either for continuation of UNRWA or an alternative program. In the Report that follows, the Secretary General has done both. He has recommended the continuation of UNRWA as a relief measure—perhaps, progressively, giving the host countries more of a voice in its administration—and an economic program for the "reintegration" of the refugees into the productive life of the area. Mr. Hammarskjöld, in effect, avoids the entire political problem, though he mentions that it will have eventually to be solved. Both in its emphasis on economic reintegration and in its study of the potential of the various Arab countries and Israel to absorb the refugees into their economies, the Hammarskjöld plan, in its essence, is a revival of the efforts of John Blandford, former head of UNRWA. The Blandford plan has been brought up to date and the economic data revised to project growth.

As might have been expected, the plan has met with considerable opposition from the governments of the Arab States. At a meeting in the Lebanese mountain resort of Sofar, delegations from the Arab League states worked out a reply to Hammarskjöld during August. As of this writing, the statement has not been made public and will be presented to the Arab Foreign Ministers' conference at Casablanca in September. Reliable sources, however, have it that the reply will again reject the idea of resettlement of refugees outside their former homes in Israel, reiterate insistence upon their repatriation and accuse the Secretary General of going beyond his competence under the request to report on continuation of UNRWA. The continuation of the agency will be supported on the understanding that it is to continue humanitarian work and not to engage in political activity.

In the late summer of 1959, a political solu-

tion to the Palestine refugee problem, now in its twelfth year, seems as far away as ever.

Oil in Egypt

In Secretary General Hammarskjöld's Report mentioned above, he divided the countries of the Middle East into "oil producing" and "non-oil producing," partially for the purposes of estimating rates of capital formation over the next several years. In the sense that Egypt is not likely, within the time-range that Hammarskjöld set, to become one of the great exporters of oil such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq now are, or that Algeria and Libya seem about to be, the category remains valid. But a number of recent developments seem to make it probable that Egypt will, in the very near future, cease to be a net oil importer and will pass to the category of net exporter shortly thereafter.

Dr. 'Aziz Sidqi, Minister of Industry of the United Arab Republic, puts the latter date at 1962. "We have now reached the stage of self-sufficiency and are producing oil at the rate of 4,000,000 tons a year," he stated recently. £E 40,000,000 have been allocated to the development of oil industries under the current Five-Year Industrialization Program of the United Arab Republic.

Egypt's oil status began remarkably to change

with the events that followed the 1956-'57 crises. Two major companies now operate in the Egyptian oil fields. The state-owned General Petroleum Company's recent strikes in the Eastern Desert at Ras Bakr No. 12—production estimated at 60,000 tons per annum—and at Ras Bakr No. 13—310 tons per day on a test run—have not only added measurably to Egypt's proved reserves but have also given further confidence in their own oil technicians to Arab countries (see the article in this issue "Some reflections on the first Arab oil congress").

A refinery similar to that now operating at Suez is planned for the Ras Bakr field, along with the necessary road and port installations. Attention will be given next to exploration of al-Rahmi field, some forty kilometers to the north of Ras Bakr.

On the Sinai Peninsula, the Eastern Petroleum Company, in its majority Italian-Belgian owned, produced 1,800,000 tons of oil in 1958, of which about 1,120,000 tons were exported to Italy. Its latest strike, Sidri well No. 4, which came in on August 15, is expected to produce 200,000-350,000 tons per annum.

While these are modest figures by Middle Eastern standards (a test run on a new Libyan well south of Benghazi recently was at the rate of 17,000 barrels per day), the cumulative effect of the new discoveries will have important effects on the economy of the Egyptian Region.

Chronology

March 16, 1959-June 15, 1959

General

1959

Mar. 16: A memorial service was held in Cairo for the dead of the Mosul revolt against the government of Iraqi Premier al-Qasim.

UAR Vice-President 'Abd al-Hakim Amir declared in Cairo that the Iraqi Communists had deliberately provoked the Mosul uprising as an excuse to crush Iraqi nationalists, it was reported.

Mar. 18: A quarter-million people jammed Alexandria's Liberation Square to honor the Iraqi "martyrs" of the Mosul rebellion, according to reports.

It was reported from Damascus that President Nasir and President Shihab of Lebanon "had agreed to meet." The time and place were not disclosed.

Mar. 22: Syrian newspapers charged that an Iraqi plane attacked a car convoy taking Iraqi refugees to the Syrian frontier and wounded six Iraqis.

In a speech broadcast from Damascus, President Nasir claimed that Premier al-Qasim refused, when asked under the terms of a military agreement, to join with the United Arab Republic in a "decisive battle" against Israel late last year. In the same speech President Nasir for the first time spoke disparagingly of Soviet support in the Suez crisis of 1956.

Mar. 23: It was reported from Cairo that Presidents Nasir of the United Arab Republic and Shihab of Lebanon plan to meet later in the week to discuss joining the two countries in a loose federation similar to that of the UAR and Yemen.

Muslim leaders in Cairo called for a *jihad* against communism throughout the world.

Mar. 23: The Turkish Foreign Office expressed the desire that the Turkish and Iraqi governments would maintain friendly relations in spite of Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.

In a secret meeting along the Lebanon-Syria frontier, President Nasir of the UAR promised President Shihab of Lebanon that he would respect Lebanese independence in return for a broad reaffirmation of solidarity with the Arab cause by the Lebanese head. The two presidents also agreed to try to find solutions for the economic problems between their countries.

The Soviet Union announced that it will take steps to protect its southern frontiers and to counter the recent United States bilateral military pacts with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

Mar. 26: King Husayn of Jordan criticized President Nasir of the UAR for having opened the way for Soviet penetration of the Middle East and then shifting to a policy of anti-communism for which the Jordanian ruler previously had been attacked.

Former New York Governor Averell Harriman urged that the United States emphasize economic aid rather than military aid for India and Pakistan to narrow the rift between the two countries.

The halting of foreign-owned freighters attempting to carry Israeli cargoes through the Suez Canal was reported to be threatening the budding trade between Israel and Africa and the Far East.

Mar. 27: An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that Israel will continue to attempt to obtain a commitment from the UAR that foreign-owned vessels carrying Israeli cargoes will be assured passage through the Suez Canal.

The Arab foreign ministers' meeting scheduled for Beirut, Lebanon, to discuss the Iraqi-UAR dispute has been postponed until April 2 at Morocco's request.

Mar. 28: Iraq's Foreign Ministry has not indicated formally whether it will send a spokesman to the political meeting of the Arab League in Beirut, Lebanon.

Mar. 29: Fa'iq el-Samarra'i, who was expelled as Iraqi Ambassador to the UAR three days ago, accused the Baghdad Government of having killed former Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Jabbar Jumard.

Mar. 30: Morocco and Tunisia signed six conventions for cultural, economic and technical cooperation.

Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir urged the West not to strengthen President Nasir of the UAR in the vain hope of attracting him to the West.

Mar. 31: In Columbus, Georgia, King Husayn of Jordan cautioned Americans not to confuse Arab nationalism with "Nasserism."

Apr. 1: Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota urged that the United States place greater emphasis on the Middle East and fashion "adequate" policies for the area.

The Secretary General of the Arab League announced that Iraq had given "no positive response" as to whether it will send a representative to the political meeting of the League scheduled for April 2.

Premier Samir al-Rifa'i of Jordan warned the West against hasty conclusions about the political developments in Iraq.

Apr. 3: The UAR urged the Arab League to take collective measures against communism in Iraq.

Apr. 4: United States Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy gave an encouraging picture of the Western political position in the Middle East before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Apr. 5: A Cairo newspaper reported that the UAR was arranging for the return of experts lent to the Iraqi government.

The meeting of the Arab League Political Committee to mediate the quarrel between President Nasir and Premier al-Qasim is expected to adopt a non-

committal position on the dispute between the UAR and Iraq.

Apr. 6: It was reported in Baghdad that Iraq has protested that UAR planes have violated Iraqi air space.

The Political Committee of the Arab League began bargaining about a proposed resolution by Lebanon concerning the dispute between Iraq and the UAR.

Apr. 7: The Cairo radio reported that a revolt against the Qasim regime had started in northern Iraq and that Kurds from the Soviet Union were on their way to help quell the revolt.

The Arab League declined to commit itself on the questions of communism in the Arab world and the dispute between Iraq and the UAR.

Apr. 8: Britain has received no confirmation of disturbances in northern Iraq, it was reported.

It was reported from Cairo that members of the Shammar tribe near Mosul are waiting for a signal from their leader, Ahmad Ojale, before clashing with al-Qasim's supporters.

Apr. 9: Iraq reported that she will not be represented at an Arab League oil conference in Cairo April 16 because of the "hostile attitude" of the UAR.

Apr. 11: The Middle East News Agency reported that a second Soviet ship arrived at Port Sa'id with a large number of militarily-equipped Kurds bound for Iraq.

A Cairo newspaper reported that MIG jet fighters flown by Soviet pilots had arrived in Iraq to strengthen the air force.

Tass, the official Soviet news agency, confirmed reports that a Russian ship was carrying Kurds to Iraq, but it claimed that the people were repatriates and denied that any were carrying arms.

Apr. 14: Abba Eban, Israel's Ambassador to the United States, forecast failure for Nasir's attempt to establish "centralized domination" of the Middle East. He asserted that the key to the stability of the area lies in the strengthening of Israel.

The Middle East News Agency reported that a Jordanian patrol and Syrian villagers exchanged fire in southwest Syria.

Apr. 15: The Director General of the Petroleum Affairs Office in Saudi Arabia expressed the hope that the Arab oil conference will pave the way for a unified oil policy linking Middle Eastern and Caribbean production countries.

Apr. 16: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir again accused Arab communists of plotting with Soviet backing to split Syria and Egypt and establish a "Red Fertile Crescent" in the Middle East.

It was reported that the UAR had accepted a request by Libya to provide that country with modern arms.

Five Iraqis of the Yazidi tribe were killed in an attack on a UAR army post in northeastern Syria.

April 16-Apr. 22: The First Arab Petroleum Conference and the petroleum exhibition opened on April 16 in Cairo with the UAR, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the Yemen, Libya, the Sudan, Morocco, and Algeria attending. Venezuela and Iran sent observers,

but Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, and Tunisia refused the invitation. Representatives of oil companies, labor unions and public and private organizations raised the number of delegates attending to over 700. The conference was divided into three study groups: the first was concerned with petroleum economics and legislation; the second with oil exploration and production; and the third with refining, transportation and petrochemicals.

After the opening address delivered on behalf of President 'Abd al-Nasir, Muhammad Salman, Director of the Arab League Department of Oil Affairs invited the oil companies operating in the Middle East to delete from their texts provisions which make Arabs feel like victims of exploitation and prevent them from obtaining a fair share of the proper price for oil.

In the Hendryx paper presented before the first study group, the Legal Adviser to the Directorate General of Petroleum and Mineral Affairs in Saudi Arabia stated that oil producing countries had the right unilaterally to modify or eliminate provisions in existing petroleum concessions. This argument was attacked by representatives of both Arab governments and oil companies who feared the effect of such action in their business relationships with the rest of the world.

Emile Bustani, the head of the Lebanese delegation, put forward a proposal for the establishment of an Arab Development Bank to which Arab oil-producing countries and the companies operating in them should lend 5 per cent of their annual oil profits at a rate of 2½ per cent interest to be used on development projects in countries through which pipelines pass. The estimated \$100,000,000 per year would give transit countries a stake in the flow of oil and thereby ensure a stable oil policy and improve inter-Arab relations.

Saudi Arabia, in the Tariki proposal, presented a plan for a \$600,000,000 oil pipeline from Qatar to Tripoli, Lebanon.

Behind the scenes, the Venezuelan delegation urged cooperation between the Arab oil producers and Venezuela in the regulation of oil output and the maintenance of a high price level, it was reported.

In a statement at the closing session, the delegates agreed that the Arabs should have a share of the profits of transportation, refining and marketing as well as production. They recommended that special machinery be set up to coordinate at the national level the conservation, production, and exploration of petroleum to help maintain stable price levels.

Apr. 22: According to the Secretary General of the Baghdad Pact, the possibility of Communist domination in Iraq has put new life in the Pact Secretariat, now located in Ankara, Turkey.

In the text of the Soviet note to the United States on West Germany, Russia warned that the atomic arming of Turkey would result in a "bigger war menace in the Middle East."

Apr. 23: A UAR spokesman charged that Jordanian

troops had attacked a Syrian village and killed one policeman and wounded four Home Guardsmen.

It is believed by some Washington observers that the main effort of Soviet strategy is concentrated in the Middle East and that Russia is using the Berlin crisis as a diversion.

Apr. 24: The Jordanian Government charged that resistance forces of the UAR's Syrian region clashed with civilians near the border town of El Mafrak wounding two Jordanians and two Syrians.

Apr. 29: President Eisenhower indicated that the United States policy in the Middle East is to maintain friendly relations with all of the countries in the area.

May 6: The Egyptian press of the UAR criticized the appointment of Hazza 'Majali as the new Premier of Jordan.

May 10: Kyrillos VI was crowned as Pope of Alexandria and Patriarch of the Coptic Orthodox Church of 3,000,000 members. Because of a dispute over the manner of election of the new Patriarch, the church in Ethiopia may refuse to recognize his authority.

May 12: The Iranian Government authorities reported that a group of Kurds had crossed the frontier into Iran and sought asylum after fighting in Iraq.

The American Council for Judaism Philanthropic Fund gave \$25,000 to help Jewish refugees from Rumania and Egypt to settle in Europe instead of Israel. The Council also announced financial assistance to Arab refugees in Jordan.

May 20: It was reported from India that Premier Khrushchev stated recently that "the peoples of the UAR have no more sincere and true friend than the Soviet Union."

June 6: Jordan notified the United Nations of the tense border situation following the prohibition by Syria of all road and rail transport between the two countries.

June 7: The UAR protested against the alleged Turkish violations of Syrian air space.

June 8: It was reported that UAR security forces in northeastern Syria had arrested ten Turks for "illegal infiltration" into Syria.

June 9: The UAR Ambassador to the Sudan indicated that his government is ready to resume talks with the Sudanese over the distribution of the waters of the Nile River.

Aden

(See also Yemen)

1959

Apr. 23: The government announced that the weekly newspaper, *al-Nidbal*, an organ of the South Arabian League which advocates a union of the Aden Protectorate with the United Arab States, will be banned in Aden.

Apr. 30: It was announced that twenty opponents of the ruler of Upper Aulaqi had fled into the hills near the border of Yemen.

May 19: It was reported from Aden that a government delegation would begin negotiations with a delegation from Yemen on differences between the two states.

A strike of about 4,000 local employees of the British forces was settled after a pay increase and improved conditions of service were granted to the strikers.

June 1: A Yemeni delegation left Aden after attempts to begin talks on Aden-Yemen frontier problems failed. The Yemenis refused to sit with Protectorate chiefs who were ministers in the federal government because, they stated, such action would be tantamount to Yemen's recognizing the Federation.

June 6: Husayn ibn Ahmad al-Habibi, Minister of Interior in the Aden Federation, said in a broadcast that the Federation did not need Yemeni recognition. "The Yemeni attitude does not alter the fact that the Federation does exist and that the rulers are determined to achieve full independence and create a unified sovereign state in the Arab south," he said.

Afghanistan

1959

Apr. 27: A barter agreement between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union was renewed for another year. It provides in general for an exchange of Soviet manufactured goods for Afghan raw materials.

May 11: 'Abd al-Rahman Pazhwak, Afghan Representative to the UN, denied press reports that Soviet Army units had entered Afghanistan and taken up positions at Herat.

May 18: The Premier of Afghanistan, Sardar Muhammad Da'ud, arrived in Moscow for a state visit. He was welcomed by Premier Khrushchev.

May 29: A new agreement on economic and technical cooperation was signed in Moscow between Afghanistan and the USSR for the reconstruction of a road between Kushka and Kandahar.

Algeria

(See also Iraq, Pakistan, Tunisia)

1959

Mar. 20: Delegate-General Paul Delouvrier announced that France would set low consumer prices for natural gas piped from the Sahara to the populous coast of Algeria, and would construct a large steel plant in the city of Bône, as part of France's plan for industrializing Algeria.

Mar. 21: The French Army in Algeria announced that "two to three hundred" rebel soldiers had surrendered near the Tunisian border. The announcement also said that this was the first mass surrender of rebel forces. Farhat 'Abbas arrived in Tunis to confer with Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba.

Premier Debré announced in Paris that he would renew the French offer to negotiate with the rebel forces for a cease-fire in Algeria.

Mar. 22: The Algerian Provisional Government announced that a rebel delegation would visit Communist China at the request of Peking. The delegation would be "a military mission," the announcement said.

Premier Debré arrived in Algeria. He visited the city

of Constantine and told the Europeans there that there never would be a "separation of France and Algeria."

Mar. 24: The Algerian Provisional Government said that only thirty "traitors" had surrendered to the French on Mar. 21 when other rebel units were rounding them up for "punishment."

Mar. 26: An Algerian rebel military mission left Cairo for Peking to discuss the purchase of Communist arms supplies.

'Ali Khodja, a prominent Algerian Muslim and businessman, urged rebel leaders to negotiate with the French for a cease-fire.

Mar. 27: The French Army reported that 136 rebels had been killed and 62 taken prisoner in a battle near the village of Bou-Saada.

Mar. 29: The French Army announced that Colonel "Amirouche," a prominent rebel commander of about 5,000 troops in the mountains in Kabylia, had been killed in a battle with French forces.

Farhat 'Abbas said in Tunis that the French community taking shape in Algeria resembled "a prefabricated cage" and was incompatible with Algerian independence. He added, however, that a free and united North Africa would not be opposed to association with France "under certain circumstances."

Mar. 31: Abu al-Qasim Karim, Minister of War in the Algerian Provisional Government, issued a statement mourning the death of Colonel "Amirouche" and saying that "the revolution continues; it is producing scores of leaders just like him."

Farhat 'Abbas returned to Cairo after a ten-day visit in Tunis.

Apr. 6: French authorities in Algeria denied Tunisian charges that French tanks had penetrated Tunisian territory.

Apr. 7: Algerian terrorists attacked two Paris suburban police stations. One of the attackers was wounded and arrested.

Apr. 9: It was announced that the US would contribute \$150,000 for the relief of Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco.

Apr. 10: It was reported that French police arrested 465 Algerians in raids throughout continental France. The police reportedly described them as "nationalist agitators."

Apr. 11: It was announced that the flag of the Algerian Provisional Government would be displayed with those of nine independent African states at Carnegie Hall in New York during the celebration of African Freedom Day.

Apr. 12: The French seized 581 tons of arms and ammunition from a Czech ship in Algiers. They explained that the cargo was destined for the Algerian rebels.

Thirty-five Roman Catholic priests serving with the French Army in Algeria charged that the army is torturing Muslim rebels and summarily executing wounded insurgents.

A crowd of about 2,000 Europeans in Algiers staged an anti-de Gaulle demonstration and applauded a call for a "formula of replacement" of his government.

The demonstration was organized by a group called the "Popular Movement Thirteen."

Apr. 13: Farhat 'Abbas arrived in Karachi for talks with Pakistani President Ayub Khan.

Apr. 14: It was reported that French police arrested for questioning about 800 people suspected of terrorist activity. All but 30 were later released, the report said.

Apr. 15: The National Liberation Front in Tunis criticized the leaders of African states in the French Community for failing to support the nationalist cause in Algeria.

Farhat 'Abbas told reporters in Karachi that Pakistani President Ayub Khan had "assured him" of Pakistani support for Algerian independence.

Prime Minister Nehru said that India's "entire sympathy is with the Algerians" in their war for independence from France.

Apr. 16: The French announced that workers had begun to raze the Algiers Casbah, an ancient district of alleys housing about 80,000 Muslims on a hillside overlooking the bay of Algiers. It will be replaced over the years with modern apartment buildings, the announcement said.

Apr. 17: The French Army in Algeria reported that 1,600 rebels had been killed and 460 captured in a three-week offensive in the hills south of Oran.

Apr. 18: Three right-wing organizations, the French National Front, the Friends of the Young Nation, and the Nationalist Student Movement signed tracts in Algiers calling for "massive abstentions" in the municipal elections to be held on April 19.

Apr. 19: Municipal elections were held in Algeria's main cities and towns. Terrorist groups killed at least 8 persons, wounded 80, and kidnapped more than 20, it was reported. The report estimated that as many as 95 per cent of the registered voters in rural areas went to the polls, but that participation in the cities ranged from 35 to 65 per cent.

Apr. 20: Municipal elections began in the rural interior of Algeria.

It was reported that the right-wing extremists lost some support in the municipal elections to "liberal" candidates, who seek a compromise solution to the Algerian problem.

Apr. 21: Farhat 'Abbas arrived in Baghdad. He was welcomed by Iraqi Premier 'Abd al-Karim Qasim.

Delegate-General Paul Delouvrier arrived in Paris. He told a press conference that the municipal elections in Algeria showed a "more moderate" trend.

Apr. 23: Two French Army jeeps were blown up by rebel land mines. One officer was killed and several enlisted men wounded.

Apr. 24: Premier Debré arrived in Oran for a round of conferences with Algerian leaders. He reaffirmed France's determination to crush the Algerian revolt, it was reported.

Father Badré, Director of Roman Catholic chaplains in the French Army, condemned the torture and summary executions of Muslim rebels in Algeria as "gravely tarnishing the honor of the army and the nation."

- Former Premier Guy Mollet, leader of the French Socialist Party, denounced plans for a celebration of the first anniversary of the May 13, 1958 uprising in Algeria. He said the movement, which brought President de Gaulle to power, had threatened French unity.
- Apr. 27:** The French Cabinet issued a communique outlining progress in pacifying Algeria, and demanding that all persons "with common sense" get behind the de Gaulle policy for Algeria.
- Apr. 29:** Mawlay Merbah, Secretary-General of the Algerian National Movement, was arrested in Bonn. The police said he was arrested because he had tried to "become active" politically.
- Apr. 30:** 'Abd al-Qadir Chanderli, Algerian rebel spokesman at the UN, appealed to Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to "save one million Algerians from imminent danger of death" from famine or disease in French "resettlement centers."
- President de Gaulle in an interview described his policy for Algeria as one of "integration" with France. It was reported that this was the first time the President had used the word "integration" since coming to power.
- May 4:** The French Army reported that 2,000 rebels were executed by their commander during a three-month period in the Fall of 1958. The announcement also alleged that a "new purge" was underway in the rebel Army.
- Muhammad Yazid, Information Minister of the Algerian Provisional Government, warned the West that if they did not persuade France to work out a peace settlement for the Algerian war, the rebel government would "seek help from the Communists," it was reported.
- May 6:** 'Abd al-Qadir Chanderli, Algerian rebel spokesman at the UN, announced that the problem of Algeria would again be brought before the General Assembly this year.
- French authorities released two Italian ships that had been escorted into the port of Bône for cargo checks.
- Gen. Maurice Challe, French military commander in Algeria, warned the population against being provoked into "blind vengeance" by rebel acts of terror. He stated that he would not "tolerate reprisals" from any side.
- May 7:** President de Gaulle said in Paris that the pacification of Algeria was "in sight."
- May 11:** An anti-de Gaulle demonstration broke out in Algiers. Police dispersed a mob of about 500 extreme right-wing colons. The crowds shouted "de Gaulle to the gallows" and "the Army to power," it was reported.
- May 12:** Premier Debré, in a speech to the French nation, acclaimed the first anniversary of the May 13 uprising in Algeria. The Premier said it represented a "break with the past," and the beginning of the fraternization of the Algerian European and Muslim populations.
- May 13:** Algerian Muslims celebrated the first anniversary of the May 13 uprising by massing together on

the Forum in the city of Algiers. The large majority of Algerian Europeans boycotted the celebration in accordance with a right-wing directive to observe "a day of mourning," it was reported.

- May 14:** Abu al-Qasim Karim, a Vice-Premier of the Algerian Provisional Government, charged in Tunis that the French Army in Algeria was replacing its equipment with many items from the US. He said that transfer of equipment was "contrary to assurances given by the US State Department."

The State Department said that there were "no restrictions" on US military equipment once it was turned over to France. The Department added, however, that US military aid to France in recent years consisted mainly of "advanced weapons" useful for the defense of NATO, but not for operations in Algeria.

- May 18:** A three-man delegation of Algerian rebels headed by Vice-Premier Abu al-Qasim Karim met with King Muhammad V of Morocco. It was rumored in Rabat that the meeting concerned a possible conference between the King and President de Gaulle to seek peace in Algeria.

- May 19:** President de Gaulle reprieved the death sentences of eight Algerians.

It was reported that Algerian rebels killed 24 French soldiers in heavy fighting in southeast Algeria.

'Abd al-Hafidh Boussouf, Minister of Liaison and Communications in the Algerian Provisional Government, said in Rabat that the US had blocked shipments of arms to Algerian rebels that "certain countries were prepared to give us." The Minister declined to identify those countries.

The State Department said that it had "no idea" what rebel sources meant by their charge that the US had blocked arms shipments to Algerian rebel forces.

- May 20:** The Algerian rebels announced that an Algerian military mission seeking arms supplies from Communist China had been successful.

- May 22:** Seventeen members of an extreme right-wing organization called *Jeune Nation* have been warned by the Commander of the Military District of Algiers "to behave or risk being expelled from Algeria or drafted into the Army," it was reported.

- May 24:** Several Algerian Muslim and European candidates opened their campaigns for election to the Senate of the French Republic. The candidates lined up into conservative and liberal groupings, it was reported.

- May 26:** An Algerian rebel chieftain, identified only as "Salah," surrendered to the French near the Moroccan border, it was announced.

Nine African states—Liberia, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR—announced at the UN that they would hold a ministers' conference in Monrovia in August to consider the conflict in Algeria.

- May 27:** The French Cabinet approved of three bills designed to further Algeria's integration with France. The bills provided for the incorporation of Algeria's annual budget with that of France; the diminishing of any distinction between the currencies of Algeria

and France; and changes in Muslim law. The changes were not explained.

It was announced that King Muhammad V of Morocco "would probably meet" with President de Gaulle at the end of July in Paris to discuss the Algerian problem.

May 29: The Algerian rebels announced in Tunis that the only negotiations with France acceptable to them would be negotiations held on neutral territory.

May 31: Twenty Muslims and twelve Europeans were elected to the French Senate by 6,134 "grand electors" designated by the municipal council in each community throughout Algeria. It was reported that the "liberal" candidates won more seats than the conservatives.

The Protestant Church of France has offered President de Gaulle its support if the President would make a "just and fraternal peace" in Algeria.

June 1: The French Socialist Party condemned the integration of Algeria into France.

The French Army in Algeria announced that 1,057 nationalist insurgents had been killed, wounded, or taken prisoner in one week of military operations.

Farhat 'Abbas arrived in Amman where he was greeted by King Husayn.

June 4: Premier Debré in a speech before the French National Assembly cautioned France's allies that her alliances with them "could be thrown open to question" if the allies failed to show "solidarity with France" in Algeria.

June 9: Algerian rebels released three French civilian prisoners. Two of them were women.

June 10: The French Army announced that two camel caravans of arms for the Algerian rebels were captured by French "air commandos" in the Sahara.

June 11: The French National Assembly by a vote of 466 to 37 adopted two proposed bills integrating the budgets of France and Algeria and diminishing the distinction between the currencies of the two states. Opposition came from Socialists and Communists, it was reported.

June 12: Farhat 'Abbas said in Yugoslavia that French-rebel talks to end the fighting in Algeria could be held either in Yugoslavia or in Switzerland.

It was announced that the A. F. of L.-C. I. O. had donated \$2,500 for aid to the Algerian refugees.

Cyprus

(See also Turkey)

1959

Mar. 17: Col. George Grivas, leader of the Cypriote underground, arrived in Athens where he received a "hero's welcome," it was reported.

The British announced that all members of the EOKA still on the wanted list would be struck off under a general amnesty.

Mar. 18: The Greek Parliament conferred upon Col. Grivas the rank of Lieutenant General in the Greek Army.

Mar. 19: The British House of Commons approved with-

out a vote the plan for the independence of Cyprus.

Mar. 26: It was announced in Nicosia that Greek and Turkish Cypriote leaders had reached an agreement on the allocation of portfolios in the Cyprus Provisional Cabinet.

Mar. 27: Details on the Cabinet agreement were made public. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Justice, Commerce and Industry, Interior, Communications and Public Works, and Labor were allocated to the Greeks, while the Ministries of Defense, Health, and Agriculture went to the Turks. This Provisional Cabinet will work with the British Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, and members of the Executive Council, it was reported.

Mar. 29: More than ten persons were injured in a clash between about 300 Cypriotes and 100 British servicemen in the port of Limasol.

Mar. 30: The port of Limasol was declared off-limits to British service personnel.

Apr. 5: Governor Hugh Foot announced the following members of the Provisional Cabinet:

Foreign Affairs—Archbishop Makarios
Agriculture—Fazil Plumer
Commerce and Industry—Pachalis Pascalides
Communications—Antonios Georgiades
Defense—Osman Orek
Finance—Righinos Theocharous
Health—Dr. Noyazi Manyera
Interior—Tassos Papadopoulos
Justice—Glafcos Clerides
Labor—Polycarpus Georgiadis

Archbishop Makarios said in an interview that he had not decided whether or not Cyprus would remain within the British Commonwealth after it had attained independence.

Apr. 6: The Transitional Committee, consisting of Sir Hugh Foot, Archbishop Makarios, Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, and nine members of the Provisional Cabinet, held its first meeting.

Apr. 8: Turkish Cypriote leaders formally requested an evaluation of farmland owned or abandoned by Turks during the recent fighting in predominantly Greek areas. They announced that they hoped to sell this land to Greek Cypriotes and purchase land for those Turks in predominantly Turkish areas on the island.

Apr. 9: A new organization, the United Democratic Reform Front, consisting of former members of EOKA, was formed on Cyprus. The organization pledged support for Archbishop Makarios.

Apr. 10: Archbishop Makarios said in an interview that the four-year ban on the Communist Party in Cyprus "is likely to be lifted soon." He added that members of the Party and other left-wing elements would be asked to serve on the Advisory Council of 50 Greek Cypriotes being formed for the transitional period leading to Cypriote independence.

Apr. 11: The interim government of Cyprus adopted a law providing up to ten years imprisonment or heavy fines for the carrying or use of firearms.

Apr. 16: Nicolas Kranidiotis, former secretary to Archbishop Makarios, arrived in Athens as Liaison Officer between the projected government of Cyprus and Greece.

Apr. 17: Eight Greek Cypriotes were arrested following clashes with the British police in Paphos and Ktima. The clashes occurred after British police asked a Greek-Cypriote youth to remove from a wall the letters "EDMA," standing for the new United Democratic Reform Front.

Apr. 19: A British soldier was stabbed and another beaten by a group of Greek-Cypriote youths in Famagusta. Archbishop Makarios had earlier called for an end to all lawlessness on the island.

It was announced that Duncan Sandys, British Minister of Defense, would go to Cyprus to discuss the carrying out of the tripartite agreement on British bases on the island.

May 4: A riot broke out between Greek-Cypriote youths and Turkish-Cypriote policemen at a race track in Nicosia. Several were injured, it was reported.

May 7: Bishop Photios of Paphos abdicated following hostile demonstrations against him after his return to the island. The Bishop had left Cyprus three years ago after having been allegedly threatened by EOKA.

Greek Premier Karamanlis arrived in Ankara for discussions with the Turkish Premier on several problems between the two countries. It was reported that Cyprus ranked high on the list.

May 8: A participant in the Greek-Turkish conference in Ankara on Cyprus and other problems reported to the press that differences in carrying out the Cyprus agreement were "99 per cent resolved."

May 13: The following results of the Ankara conference on Cyprus were announced: Both the Greeks and Turks advocated bringing forward the date when Cyprus would be granted independence; both sides decided to accept for five years the principle of two separate communities—Greek and Turkish—in various Cyprus municipalities; both countries agreed to stand as one in dealing with the British in the status of British bases on the island; and both states will together appropriate \$15,000,000 for Cyprus and will support a grant or loan of \$100,000,000 from the IBRD or the US Development Loan Fund.

May 18: Gov. Hugh Foot said in an interview that there had been "progress at a good rate" in Cyprus, although the island had a long way to go before there would be full understanding and cooperation between the two communities.

May 30: About five thousand Greek-Cypriote delegates attended the first Congress of EDMA (United Democratic Reform Front), a right-wing political organization formed from members of the old EOKA underground movement. The meeting heard a recorded speech by Lt. Gen. George Grivas, it was reported.

May 31: The first Congress of EDMA ended. A political and social action program was adopted, but details were not disclosed.

Ethiopia and the Somalilands

(See also UAR)

1959

Mar. 18: The Ethiopian government announced that West Germany had granted her credits totaling \$7,143,000 for the purchase of West German machinery and capital goods.

Mar. 26: It was reported from Moscow that Emperor Haile Selassie had accepted a Soviet invitation to visit Russia this summer.

Mar. 31: A twenty-five man delegation of Somali chiefs and other leaders of the Ogaden Province in Ethiopia visited Addis Ababa to protest against the Greater Somalia scheme. They reportedly told Emperor Haile Selassie that the idea was "an attempt to seize Ethiopian lands, drag us into disguised slavery, and rob us of our fertile land."

Apr. 4: The government of Somalia appealed to the UN Children's Fund to provide emergency food for 250,000 mothers and children, victims of a "severe famine" in northern Somalia.

Apr. 21: Hasan Gouled, Premier of the Government Council in Djibouti, was elected the representative of French Somaliland to the French National Assembly. It was reported that he favors keeping the territory within the French Community.

May 9: It was reported from Addis Ababa that a Soviet automobile had entered the Ethiopian market for the first time.

May 24: It was announced that Emperor Haile Selassie will pay a state visit to President Nasir in Cairo from June 24 to June 29.

May 29: It was reported that a trade delegation from Italy would visit Ethiopia to discuss expanding trade relations between the two countries.

June 3: It was announced that Emperor Haile Selassie would pay a state visit to President Tito of Yugoslavia in late August.

June 14: Prince Sahle Selassie, youngest son of the Emperor, was married in Addis Ababa.

Iran

1959

Mar. 16: It was reported that Iran sent a protest to the Soviet Union for alleged violation of Iranian air space by Soviet planes. The protest stated that there had been 81 violations since December.

Mar. 30: It was announced in Teheran that a protest had been sent to Rumania for alleged press and radio attacks on Iran.

Apr. 7: Unidentified government and political sources publicly expressed concern about a possible anti-Iranian Kurdish movement in Iran, and expressed fear that Iraq and the Soviet Union may be aiding discontent among Kurdish tribesmen.

Apr. 26: Iran again protested to the Soviet Union about alleged violations of her northern air space. The latest protest warned Russia of "grave consequences" of such violations, it was reported.

May 1: The Shah arrived in England for an official three-day visit. He was greeted by Queen Elizabeth II and Prime Minister Macmillan.

May 8: In a speech in London, the Shah denied that a revolt against his régime was possible.

May 12: In a press interview in London, the Shah said that unofficial Soviet approaches offering to produce oil on favorable terms had been made to the Iranian government.

May 14: The Shah arrived in Denmark on a state visit.

May 17: It was announced that two employees of the Soviet Embassy in Teheran were arrested on a charge of distributing Communist propaganda leaflets. The announcement stated that they would be tried on espionage charges.

May 18: The Soviet Embassy protested the arrest of two of its employees who had been "distributing Tass press releases," it was reported.

May 28: The Soviet Union sent a note to Teheran protesting the arrest of two Soviet Embassy employees. The note charged that Iran was attempting "to create unendurable conditions for the work of the Soviet Embassy."

The Shah said in Paris that his country had no fear of the Soviet Union or of its anti-Iranian propaganda campaign, and would "rather die in honor" than accept Communist slavery.

May 29: The Shah arrived in the Netherlands for a state visit. He was greeted by Queen Juliana.

The World Bank, the Bank of America, the Chase Manhattan Bank, the First City Bank of New York, and the Irving Trust Company jointly granted a loan of \$72,000,000 to Iran for the construction and improvement of roads as part of the second Seven Year Development Plan.

June 3: It was reported that the Soviet Union had rejected an Iranian protest against alleged Soviet violations of Iranian air space. The Soviet note declared that "there had been not one violation of Iranian air space by Soviet aircraft."

June 4: The Shah returned to Teheran after a thirty-two-day visit to Europe.

June 11: Foreign Minister Ali Asgar Hekmat, Interior Minister Nadir Batnan Ghelitch, and Trade Minister Abbas Gholi Nisari resigned from the Iranian Cabinet. No reasons were given.

June 13: Three new Ministers were appointed to the Cabinet. They are:

Foreign Affairs—Dr. Djalal Abdoh

Interior—Rahmat Atabaki

Commerce—'Abd al-Husayn Etebar

Iraq

(See also General, UAR)

1959

Mar. 16: It was reported that 'Isam Rashid Huwaish, a nephew of Col. 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif, made an armed attack on the town of Ramsli, 60 miles west of Baghdad.

Iraq and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow an economic aid agreement under which Iraq will receive \$137,000,000 in Soviet economic assistance. The Iraqi delegation pledged that the two states would become "closer friends," it was reported.

Mar. 17: Gharbi Ahmad, Director-General of National Guidance, was replaced by Dhumun Ayub.

Mar. 18: It was reported that Muhammad Mahdi al-Kubbah, a member of the Sovereignty Council and head of the Istiqlal Party, was arrested.

Mar. 19: In a press conference in Baghdad, Dr. Ibrahim Kubbah announced that the following projects would be carried out with the new Soviet loan: a mill to produce 60,000 tons of steel a year; a factory to produce 30,000 agricultural implements a year; a broadcasting station with four 100-watt transmitters; a fertilizer factory; a factory to produce 110,000 tons of sulphuric acid and 65,000 tons of sulphur a year; a medicine factory; textile factories; a glass factory with an 83-ton output daily; and a factory to produce three million cans a year.

Mar. 21: A demonstration was held in Baghdad in support of Premier al-Qasim.

Mar. 23: Adnan Pachachi was appointed as Acting Permanent Representative of Iraq at the UN.

The government announced the closing of the town of Khanaqin and of villages surrounding it. The order declared it a "forbidden zone" into which no one may enter without special permission. No reason was given.

It was reported that Prime Minister Macmillan told President Eisenhower in Washington that Britain was willing to supply arms to the régime of Premier al-Qasim.

Mar. 24: Premier al-Qasim announced in Baghdad that Iraq had withdrawn from the Baghdad Pact. He also bid the press "ignore" President Nasir of the UAR.

A British Foreign Office spokesman said that Iraq's withdrawal from the Pact "formalized" what had been a fact since the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy last year.

Unidentified US officials told the press that Iraq's action may be interpreted as a "gesture to deprive Nasir of a political stick and to appease Iraq's Communists."

Leaders of the abortive revolt in northern Iraq went on trial for treason in Baghdad, it was reported.

Mar. 25: Demonstrators paraded before the US Embassy in Baghdad shouting their approval of Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.

It was reported from Baghdad that Premier al-Qasim had dismissed Salim Fakhri, reputed to be a pro-Communist, from his position as Director-General of Broadcasting, and had replaced him with Shunun Ayub.

A British Foreign Office spokesman said that Britain hoped to maintain good relations with Iraq despite the latter's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.

Mar. 26: Three US press correspondents—Larry Collins of *United Press International*, Winston Burdett, correspondent of CBS, and William McHale, correspondent for *Time-Life Magazine*, were expelled from Iraq. No

reason was given other than that they "have been here long enough."

Mar. 27: It was reported from Beirut that "the greatest purge in the Arab world" had swept Iraq, with Communists suppressing all opposition in a "ruthless drive for power."

Winston Burdett, ousted CBS correspondent, said in Beirut that Baghdad prisons were filled "until there is no more room in them for all the political detainees."

It was reported that the Communists in Iraq have presented Premier al-Qasim with several demands, among which are the demand that the "just verdicts" of the People's Court against members of the former régime be carried out, and that the people be armed in order to "defend effectively the safety of the Republic side by side with the brave army." The report was not confirmed.

Mar. 30: Unidentified "diplomatic sources" told the press that the NATO Council will consider the "serious situation in Iraq."

The government of Iraq announced that four Air Force officers, convicted of participating in the Mosul rebellion, had been executed.

The British Foreign Office announced that the Royal Air Force will withdraw all personnel from the Habbaniya air base "at an early date."

It was reported from Baghdad that nine members of the Iraqi Foreign Service, including the Iraqi Consul in New York and the Counselor of the Iraqi Embassy in Washington, had either been retired or suspended.

Apr. 5: Premier al-Qasim said at a press conference that he would carry out a "revolution" in the organization of his government this month, it was reported.

Apr. 6: Premier al-Qasim conferred for two hours with R. G. Seawright, chief British representative in Baghdad of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and other oil officials. It was announced that the meeting concerned "certain important questions" about oil and production in Iraq.

The first group of British servicemen and their families being withdrawn from the Habbaniya base in Iraq left the country.

Apr. 7: Premier al-Qasim promised a pardon to any member of the Shammar tribe who seeks it. This tribe was involved in the Mosul revolt.

The Iraq Petroleum Company announced in London that it was discussing plans with the Iraqi government to give up part of its concessions in Iraq.

It was reported that 855 Kurds sailed through the Suez Canal on their way to Iraq. Unidentified sources told the press that they "probably were followers" of the Kurdish Communist, Mustafa Barzani.

Dr. Ibrahim Kubbah, Minister of Economics, said in Baghdad that it was "absolutely untrue" that the Iraqi government was making any demands for nationalization of the oil industry.

Apr. 8: It was announced that the Iraqi government would arm a civilian militia, the Popular Resistance

Forces, "to enable them to carry out their duties."

The Cairo press reported that Kurds from the Soviet Union "had begun arriving in Baghdad."

Apr. 9: The US Embassy in Baghdad reported an announcement by the Iraqi government that the Kurds arriving in Iraq from the Soviet Union "were followers of Mustafa Barzani."

Apr. 10: It was reported from Paris that Premier Debré would meet with Prime Minister Macmillan in London to discuss, among other problems, the status of Western oil concessions in Iraq.

Apr. 12: A Soviet Committee for African-Asian solidarity arrived in Baghdad to attend a Congress of Iraqi Peace Partisans, it was reported.

Apr. 13: The Rev. Harold Davenport, last of four American Protestant missionaries expelled by the Iraqi government, left for Beirut.

Apr. 14: A Congress of Iraqi Peace Partisans opened in Baghdad. The Congress was addressed by Premier al-Qasim, who said that Iraq "was a country of peace partisans."

Apr. 15: Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, British Ambassador to Iraq, arrived in London for talks with the British Foreign Office.

Apr. 16: Richard P. Hunt, a correspondent for the *New York Times*, was refused admission into Iraq. No explanation was given.

It was reported that 'Awni Khalidi, former Secretary-General of the Baghdad Pact, resigned from the Iraqi Foreign Ministry.

Apr. 17: A procession of Iraqi Peace Partisans, in which Kurds were strongly represented, marched through Baghdad, it was reported.

It was reported from Cairo that the Iraqi government had asked a Western oil company to construct an \$800,000,000 oil pipeline from the Mosul fields to the Persian Gulf.

The British Foreign Office announced that a British airliner, carrying servicemen from London to Hong Kong, was forced to land in Baghdad. The flight had previously been cleared through formal channels, the announcement said.

Apr. 20: The Iraqi military prosecution demanded the death penalty for 17 officers charged with supporting the Mosul uprising.

It was reported from Baghdad that labor unrest and other disturbances had broken out in Iraq.

Apr. 22: It was reported from Baghdad that the Communist press "was waging a determined attack" on the Iraqi Foreign Ministry.

It was reported that "another wave" of arrests of Iraqi Army officers on charges of "plotting against the government" had taken place.

Apr. 23: Viscount Monckton, Chairman of the Iraq Petroleum Company, said in London that neither a threat of nationalization nor a change in the fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreement had arisen in his talks with the Iraqi government.

Apr. 26: Minister of Economy Ibrahim Kubbah said that Iraq and the IPC had agreed to increase the production

and exportation of Iraqi oil. "This will lead to a doubling of the amount of production within a period of not more than three years," he said.

Apr. 28: Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, was quoted as telling the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the situation in Iraq "was the most dangerous in the world today." Mr. Dulles reportedly said that the Communists were close "to a complete takeover," although Premier al-Qasim was "not considered" a Communist.

Two Baghdad newspapers said in editorial comments that Communists should be represented in Premier al-Qasim's Cabinet.

Apr. 29: A "manifesto," signed by the Central Bureau of the Iraqi Communist Party, was issued in Baghdad. It demanded full membership for Communists in the Iraqi government.

Apr. 30: A People's Court sentenced to death seven Iraqi officers for participating in the Mosul revolt.

May 1: Unidentified "US officials" said in Washington that American contractors and technicians in Iraq have been increasingly harassed and threatened in recent months, it was reported.

Premier al-Qasim declared in a speech that he was opposed to political party activity in Iraq at the present time. He said that "imperialism is presently trying to create splits by calling for the creation of parochial parties and other groupings. The purpose of this is to play one of us off against the other so that the foreigners can sit as spectators. But we shall frustrate imperialism."

May 5: US Ambassador to Iraq, John T. Jernegan, arrived in Washington for consultations with the State Department.

The Commander of Iraq's Civil Militia reportedly told the press in Baghdad that about "300 rebellious Kurdish tribesmen" were opposing the régime in north-eastern Iraq. The Commander also charged that they are getting money "from the Turks and Iranians."

May 6: It was announced that three Ministries—Economics, Development, and Communications and Works—will be eliminated, and that eight new Ministries will be created. They are: Planning, Trade, Oil, Housing and Public Works, Communications, Irrigation and Agriculture, Agrarian Reform, and Municipalities and Rural Affairs. It was also reported that a new Economic Planning Board, headed by Premier al-Qasim, will oversee Iraq's economic planning under the Ministry of Planning.

May 7: Iraqi authorities released an Italian airliner after detaining it for 27 hours for flying across Iraq "without specific authorization."

It was announced that the Iraqi Ministry of Health will requisition the mission of the American Seventh-day Adventists.

May 8: "Authoritative sources" in London told the press that Iraq had requested from Britain enough arms to "re-equip its entire army."

May 11: The British government announced that it had decided to sell "substantial arms" to Iraq including tanks and jet bombers.

Dr. Ibrahim Kubbah, Minister of Economy, said in an interview that "Communist participation in the government was demanded by the nature of the revolution," it was reported.

Premier al-Qasim was quoted as saying in Baghdad that Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact had strengthened her relations with Turkey and Iran.

May 12: It was reported that Dr. Muhammad al-Shawwaf, Minister of Health, had also urged the Premier to include Communists in his Cabinet.

May 14: Premier al-Qasim told the Iraqi Federation of Industry that he was "gradually bringing Iraq toward a democratic régime," and that he opposed the formation of political parties at present.

May 20: The non-Communist National Democratic Party announced that it would cease political activity in accordance with "a publicly expressed wish" of the Premier.

May 23: Premier al-Qasim said in a news conference that he was determined to stop the drive of the Communist Party for official recognition, and publicly rebuked the Party for continuing to push for recognition of its status as a party against his wish. He also declared that those who continued "putting obstacles" in his way would be "considered as having committed an act of conspiracy against the Government," it was reported.

The Political Bureau of the Communist Party issued a declaration that it would abandon its public campaign for seats in Premier al-Qasim's Cabinet.

May 24: Baghdad Radio broadcast a "warning" to Iraqi Communists not to "obstruct the course of the Iraqi revolution," it was reported from Beirut.

May 25: Refugee Kurds from Iraq told the press in Turkey that "6,000 of their tribe" are opposing the forces of Premier al-Qasim and their own "leftist" tribesmen in Iraq.

May 26: The Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hashim Jawwad, in what was described as a "restatement of foreign policy" over the Baghdad Radio, said that Iraq "aimed at keeping clear of participating in the cold war through non-alignment with any of the existing blocs in the international level."

May 30: In a three-hour interview with five Western correspondents, Premier al-Qasim said that he felt "ready and able" to check the Community Party in Iraq if he felt it a threat to "the rights of the people." He added that he did not now consider the Communists a menace, saying that they were working with others "for the good of the country." He also indicated that he hoped for improved relations with the UAR and the West, it was reported.

May 31: The Soviet Ambassador conferred for two hours with Premier al-Qasim in Baghdad.

June 1: The US Embassy in Baghdad announced that Iraq had renounced US military aid on the grounds that it conflicted with her policy of "positive neutrality." The Iraqi note emphasized that this action was not meant as an unfriendly act toward the US.

June 4: Premier al-Qasim announced that Iraq will with-

draw from the sterling currency area "in the near future."

June 10: A Special Military Court sentenced four Army officers to death and five to life imprisonment for participating in the Mosul uprising.

June 13: It was announced that the US would present as a gift to the Iraqi Ministry of Education the books and equipment of the US Information Agency office in Baghdad. The office has been closed since the revolution last year.

June 14: Iraq ordered the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (a French bank) to cease activity in Iraq.

A US Embassy spokesman denied an announcement by the Iraqi Ministry of Education that the US Information Agency library would be given to the Iraqi government.

June 15: It was reported that a clash took place between farmers and townsmen outside the Defense Ministry in Baghdad. Several were injured.

Israel

(See also General, Palestine Problem)

1959

Mar. 18: Several hundred students of Hebrew University demonstrated outside the office of Premier Ben Gurion against a government decision to raise tuition fees; it was reported.

Mar. 26: Queen Elizabeth of Belgium arrived in Israel for a visit.

Apr. 1: An order for the partial mobilization of the Israeli Army was broadcast. It was later explained as "a notification of routine maneuvers."

Apr. 3: A trade agreement was concluded between Israel and Poland providing for a mutual exchange of goods worth \$4,500,000 during the next year.

Apr. 4: It was reported from Washington that Israel would not require any direct US foreign aid in 1959-60, although she will receive some technical aid and may continue to purchase surplus farm commodities.

Apr. 5: Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador to the US, pleaded for an increase in the "scope and range of Hebrew activity" in the US; it was reported.

The first International Agricultural Convention to be held in Israel opened in Jerusalem. Premier Ben Gurion addressed the group.

Apr. 6: Premier Ben Gurion won a confidence vote in the Knesset after he told the Parliament that he was "shocked and surprised" by a radio call-up of Army reservists on April 1. Actually, only 1,200 reservists were called for training, he explained.

Apr. 7: Pinchas Sapir, Israeli Minister of Trade and Commerce, said in Santiago that Israel plans to increase its trade with Latin America.

Apr. 8: It was announced that negotiations on the first large business deal between Israel and West Germany have been concluded. Long-term credits equal to \$6,500,000 have been granted Israel by an unidentified West German concern to expand Israel's power capacity.

Apr. 13: It was disclosed in New York that Israel would not be invited to the celebration of Africa Freedom Day. It was also reported that Israel had protested the exclusion.

Apr. 14: Two Israeli Army officers—Brigadier Yehoshaphat Harkaby, Chief of Intelligence, and Brigadier Meir Zorea, Chief of the General Staff Branch—were relieved of their posts as a result of mobilization orders issued April 1, it was reported.

Apr. 15: It was reported that new law has been adopted which designates the Government Employment Agency as the only legal channel for the placement of workers in Israel.

Apr. 28: An Israeli Trade Union leader, Aharon Becker, told the press that President Tito of Yugoslavia had promised him to include Israel in his next visit to the Middle East.

May 3: It was reported in Washington that US Representatives Edna F. Kelly and Leonard Farbstein had pledged themselves to restore US economic aid to Israel.

May 4: French Mystère jets were seen over Tel Aviv, it was reported.

May 10: US Zionist leaders, at the end of a two-day Conference of the Zionist Organization of America, appealed to Western nations to safeguard Israel "as a democratic state."

May 11: It was reported that Premier Khrushchev said in Moscow that a great many Jews "were facing difficulties in Israel and were seeking to return to the Soviet Union." A later dispatch from Jerusalem declared that "there was no evidence" of this charge.

May 12: US Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told Ambassador-designate to Israel Ogden Reid that "he must rebut the presumption that he is unqualified for his post" in order to win Senate confirmation as Ambassador. Mr. Reid testified before the Committee.

May 13: Nearly one-half million people lined the streets of Tel Aviv for a celebration of Israel's eleventh year as an independent state, it was reported.

May 14: It was reported that a majority of the member countries of GATT welcomed Israel's bid to join the international organization.

May 15: Former French Premier Guy Mollet said in Tel Aviv that President de Gaulle had instructed him to inform the people of Israel that France would support Israel "if her existence were again threatened."

May 17: Trade Union elections were held in Israel. It was reported that the Mapai Party retained control of the General Federation of Labor.

May 21: Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir arrived in Buenos Aires on a good-will tour.

May 26: Dr. Nahum Goldmann, President of the World Zionist Organization, said in Jerusalem that the emancipation of Jews from ghetto life and their integration into a free society were "a new danger" to Jewish survival. "It could easily lead to the disintegration of the Jewish communities and the loss of their con-

sciousness of being all parts of the Jewish people," he said.

The International Court of Justice ruled that it had no jurisdiction in the dispute between Israel and Bulgaria on the shooting down of an Israeli airliner over Bulgaria in 1955.

Ogden Reid was confirmed as Ambassador to Israel by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The vote was 10 to 4. Those voting against Reid were Senators Fulbright, Green, Kennedy, and Long.

May 27: Premier Ben Gurion appealed to members of B'nai B'rith, world Jewish Service Organization, to "link themselves closer to Israel."

May 29: Israel announced appointment of Avraham Harman, former Israeli Consul-General in New York, as new Israeli Ambassador to the US. He succeeds Abba Eban, who announced his resignation on Mar. 3.

June 2: The Knesset postponed indefinitely collection of a compulsory loan that was designed to finance the integration into Israel of 80,000 immigrants.

June 3: Ogden Reid was sworn in as US Ambassador to Israel.

June 7: The Knesset approved the making of all information pertaining to immigration a state secret.

Jordan

(See also Iraq)

1959

Mar. 17: King Husayn left Taiwan for an official visit to the US.

Mar. 21: It was reported that widescale arrests of "pro-Nasir" army officers had been carried out throughout Jordan for allegedly "participating in a plot" against King Husayn.

Mar. 22: King Husayn arrived in San Francisco.

Mar. 23: A Jordanian government spokesman told the press that there was no truth to a Damascus report that a plot to overthrow the government of King Husayn had been uncovered in Jordan.

King Husayn arrived in Washington. He was greeted by Vice President Richard Nixon and Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter.

Mar. 24: King Husayn conferred with President Eisenhower. Following the conference, the President told the press that the King was "a man who had withstood the temptations to weaken his defense of his principles and rights."

Mar. 27: King Husayn and Jordanian Premier Samir al-Rifa'i ended their conversations with President Eisenhower and the Acting Secretary of State.

Mar. 28: King Husayn and his entourage began a tour of the US.

Mar. 29: King Husayn, in an interview over CBS, said that "there was danger" that Communists would come to power in Iraq. He added that "the Soviet Union has a plan to take over the entire Middle East."

Apr. 3: King Husayn piloted a Lockheed jet at 1,520 miles an hour at Los Angeles.

Apr. 6: The US handed over \$5,000,000 worth of railroad equipment to Jordan. It was announced that this

was part of the aid allocated last year for Jordan.

Apr. 13: King Husayn arrived in New York after a visit to the US Military Academy at West Point.

It was reported from Amman that Khalil Qunsul, Secretary of the Jordanian Communist Party, had been arrested by Jordanian security police.

Apr. 14: King Husayn said in New York that he would aid his people "in the pursuit of happiness" if the US continued to help Jordan "not as charity, but as investment in the future of a free and determined people," it was reported.

Apr. 15: The British government announced that a grant-in-aid of \$5,600,000 to Jordan had been concluded.

Apr. 16: King Husayn said in New York that Jordan would fight on the side of the free world in any "world-wide clash." "We do not hide behind any expressions such as neutralism," the monarch said.

Apr. 17: Cardinal Spellman presented King Husayn a check for \$5,000 "to alleviate the suffering of the poor and homeless in Jordan, regardless of race, color, or creed."

Apr. 19: King Husayn said in London that the "Communist danger in the Middle East was not confined to Iraq." The Communists are "very interested" in the Middle East because of its oil and as "a bridge to further their interests in Africa," he asserted.

Apr. 20: King Husayn in London called upon the US and Britain for a "more positive policy toward the Middle East and the countries who are fighting there to preserve their independence," it was reported.

Apr. 22: King Husayn conferred with Prime Minister Macmillan in London.

Apr. 26: The Jordanian government banned the book, *Strange Lands and Friendly People*, by US Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, for allegedly criticizing the Arab peoples.

Apr. 30: Pope John XXIII received King Husayn in a twenty-minute audience in the Vatican.

May 2: King Husayn returned to Jordan after an eight-week world tour.

May 3: Premier Samir al-Rifa'i resigned as head of the Jordanian government. The action was ascribed to poor health. The King asked Hazza' al-Majali to form a new government.

May 6: Hazza' al-Majali formed a new Jordanian government. A new Cabinet was appointed and sworn in by King Husayn. Its members are:

Premier and Foreign Minister—Hazza' al-Majali
Health—Dr. Jamil Tutunji
Communications and Justice—Anastas Hananiyyah
National Economy—Khulusi Khayri
Finance—Hashim Jayyusi
Education—Muhammad Amin Shanqiti
Interior—Wasfi Mirza
Defense and Reconstruction—Anwar Nashashibi
Public Works—Ya'qub Mu'ammam
Agriculture and Social Welfare—Akif al-Fa'iz

May 10: Premier Hazza' al-Majali said that his country "would steer clear of pacts with either East or West."

May 14: It was announced that Jordan would establish a consulate in New York.

May 28: Premier al-Majali received 30 visiting Americans traveling throughout the Middle East under the auspices of the American Friends of the Middle East.

May 29: It was alleged in Amman that the Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces was "at the center" of a conspiracy against the government, reports from Amman indicated.

June 7: The Jordanian lower house of Parliament gave Premier al-Majali a vote of confidence on his foreign policy.

Kashmir

(See also Pakistan)

1959

Mar. 21: The Pakistani government asked the UN to investigate an alleged Indian raid on the village of Sudhpura in Kashmir, it was reported.

Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld visited the cease-fire line in Kashmir where UN observers are enforcing a truce between India and Pakistan.

Mar. 24: Baqshi 'Abd al-Hamid, brother of the Premier of Kashmir, was arrested and held under the Preventative Detention Act. He resigned from the ruling National Conference Party last month after differences with his brother.

Mar. 27: The government of Kashmir announced the end of restrictions on travel between Kashmir and India. The announcement stated that this was "another step toward the closer integration of Kashmir and India."

Apr. 19: It was reported that the government of the Pakistani section of Kashmir had resigned.

Apr. 23: Prince Karan Singh, Governor of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, left by air for Moscow.

Lebanon

1959

Mar. 19: The government of Lebanon announced a decision to cancel all licenses for the possession of fire arms in an attempt to disarm the population.

Mar. 20: The Council of Ministers announced creation of a special department in the Ministry of Interior to handle Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

Mar. 22: The newspaper offices of the Communist newspaper, *al-Akbbar*, were damaged by two bomb explosions. No one was reported injured.

Mar. 25: Lebanese President Fu'ad Shihab and UAR President Nasir met for three hours on the Syrian-Lebanese border, it was reported.

Mar. 27: A dockyard strike was called. A workers' spokesman said that the strike was in protest to the government for refusing to permit workers to form a union.

Apr. 1: The strike of dock workers ended, with the government "assuring freedom of work at the port," it was announced.

Apr. 3: Raymond Eddé said that a general election in Lebanon could not be held as long as civilians continued to be armed, it was reported.

Apr. 20: A Conference of farm experts from 14 countries opened in Beirut. The Conference was sponsored by ICA.

The Parliamentary Internal Security Committee recommended that 100 lira be deducted from the salary of any Deputy who absents himself from a meeting of the Chamber without excuse.

Apr. 22: The People's Resistance Organization issued a warning to former Premier Sami al-Sulh not to return to Lebanon from Paris. There had been indications that the former Premier might return, it was reported.

Apr. 28: Farhat 'Abbas, leader of the Provisional Algerian Government, arrived in Beirut for discussions with Lebanese leaders.

A Sudanese livestock delegation arrived in Beirut for conferences with the Ministry of Agriculture.

May 5: The Chamber of Deputies passed legislation requiring compulsory vaccination against smallpox every four years.

May 8: The Ninth Middle Eastern Medical Conference opened in Beirut. The group was addressed by Pierre Jumayil, Minister of Health.

Dr. Charles Malik, President of the General Assembly, visited a Trade Fair in New York. The Fair included an Israeli exhibition.

May 9: The Council of Ministers approved a plan to reorganize the Lebanese Foreign Ministry. In part, the plan will restrict diplomatic appointments to "highly qualified candidates who must sit for a special examination." The plan would also prevent the transfer of any member of the diplomatic service from one country to another "without reasonable excuse."

May 11: Twenty-five graduates of the Lebanese University Teachers' College began a hunger strike in protest against not being given government posts, it was reported.

May 12: Mgr. Paul Ma'ushi, the Maronite Patriarch, left Beirut for Rome on an official visit to the Vatican.

May 13: Premier Karami said at a press conference that the government "did not intend" to seek from the Chamber of Deputies an extension of its special authority to issue legislative decrees. This authority will expire on June 15, it was reported.

May 18: Fifteen persons were arrested following two bomb explosions in a soccer stadium in Beirut.

May 20: The Lebanese Parliament requested former Foreign Minister Charles Malik, now President of the General Assembly, to submit "a report" as to why he visited an Israeli exhibit at New York's World Trade Fair.

May 23: Representatives of IPC, negotiating with Lebanese officials over oil transit royalties in Beirut, left for London to present Lebanon's latest proposals to high company officials.

The Council of Ministers approved a new law dealing with pension age, discharge, and indemnity for government employees.

It was reported from Beirut that Lebanon has begun to deport Arab Communists who allegedly had been

operating "an international party center" in Lebanon. Minister of Interior Raymond Eddé told the press that "my intention is to stop all infiltration and all activities of communism."

May 26: Dr. Charles Malik, in a cablegram to the Lebanese Parliament, said that he had attended the Trade Fair with Mayor Wagner of New York in his capacity as President of the General Assembly. He added that he had been the victim of "an unworthy intrigue" when he was photographed in the Israeli pavilion.

May 27: Premier Karami said at a press conference that "he would like to visit Cairo soon to meet President Nasir," it was reported.

June 1: Six persons were hurt and thirty-five arrested in a suburban clash in Beirut, it was announced. The clash occurred when Communists, distributing literature, were attacked by members of the Ba'th Party, the announcement said.

June 2: Raymond Eddé announced to the press that he would resign from the Lebanese Cabinet "about June 22." He stated that he considered his task at an end now "that the situation is calm."

June 4: Premier Karami signed a new transit agreement with the IPC. Under the agreement, the IPC will pay Lebanon about \$3,450,000 annually in royalties instead of the present \$1,000,000.

June 6: Premier Karami left Beirut for Cairo to sign an economic agreement between Lebanon and the UAR, it was reported.

June 10: Premier Karami told a press conference that the question of enlarging the present government had not been considered "because all our time is taken up with the preparation of legislative decrees under our extraordinary powers."

June 12: Mgr. Paul Ma'ushi, the Maronite Patriarch, was awarded the pallium by Pope John XXIII at a ceremony in the Vatican.

June 13: It was announced that the Council of Ministers had completed the legislative decrees for reorganizing the governmental administration, and had referred them to the Chamber of Deputies.

Libya

(See also General)

1959

Mar. 18: It was reported that a crowd of Libyan students marched through Tripoli to the Soviet Embassy shouting pro-Nasir and anti-Communist slogans. Police disbursed the crowd.

Mar. 20: Police employed tear gas to break up a second anti-Communist demonstration in Tripoli.

The Libyan Embassy in Washington said that the Libyan government was drafting new laws for the Jewish Community Organization in Libya, and had "taken charge of that Organization at its request to investigate charges that the Organization's funds had been mishandled." Only the Jews in the Community Organization were affected, the Embassy said.

Apr. 16: The newspaper, *al-Libi*, criticized the slow pace of the US-Libyan negotiations to amend the 1954

Base Agreement. Negotiations began three months ago.

Apr. 20: Crown Prince Hasan al-Ridha al-Sanusi was married in Tobruk.

Derek Martin Riches, new British Ambassador to Libya, presented his credentials to King Idris.

Apr. 28: The King promulgated a law providing for the importation and exportation of goods without duties and restrictions in a number of Libyan ports.

May 21: A 600-mile telephone link between Tripoli and Benghazi was opened, it was reported.

May 25: The US and Libya reached an agreement providing for the direct payment of US financial assistance to the Libyan government instead of through US aid organizations, it was announced.

June 14: The Esso Petroleum Company announced in Tripoli that a test well drilled to 5,500 feet in Cyrenaica had produced oil at the rate of 17,500 barrels a day.

Morocco

(See also Algeria)

1959

Mar. 23: It was announced that French military units, stationed at the four US Air Force Bases in Morocco under an agreement with France when Morocco was a French Protectorate, will be withdrawn on March 31.

Apr. 1: Thirteen Jews were arrested for trying to leave Morocco illegally for Algeria, it was reported.

Apr. 6: A Czech freighter with arms and ammunition for the Moroccan Army was overdue at Casablanca. It was reported that the ship may have been seized by the French.

Apr. 8: Morocco charged that France had seized a Czech ship carrying arms and ammunition to Morocco. A protest was sent to Paris.

Apr. 14: It was announced in Rabat that the Moroccan Crown Prince will visit the UAR at the invitation of Field Marshal 'Abd al-Hakim Amir.

It was announced by the Moroccan government that a Spanish-Moroccan Mixed Commission would be established to "examine relations between the two countries." The Commission will sit alternately in Madrid and Rabat.

Apr. 24: 'Abd al-'Aziz Bin Driss, a member of the Consultative Assembly, was killed at a political meeting in Rabat.

Apr. 25: Premier 'Abdallah Ibrahim was expelled from the Istiqlal Party, it was announced by 'Alal al-Fasi, President of the Party, following an attack on the Premier for "not controlling banditry and disorders."

May 3: The Moroccan government charged seven persons with the murder of 'Abd al-'Aziz Bin Driss.

May 6: King Muhammad V turned over to the Spanish Ambassador forty Spanish prisoners, held in Moroccan prisons since 1937. They had been captured during the Ifni revolt.

May 8: It was reported that King Muhammad V "would probably not" meet with French President Charles de Gaulle on the Algerian problem.

May 12: The US Operations Mission announced that it

had offered Morocco \$40,000,000 to help finance about half of Morocco's Development Program for 1959.

May 25: King Muhammad V declared at Agadir that foreign aid would be accepted by Morocco only if it were given "with respect for our independence, our liberty of action, and the superior interest of the nation." He added that "we will pursue our steps to obtain evacuation of foreign troops and recover the rest of our territory."

May 26: A clash between Moroccan irregulars and the Army was reported. The clash, in which several were killed and wounded, reportedly occurred when the King arrived in Agadir.

May 27: The government issued a royal decree forbidding all radio transmissions in Morocco after the end of 1959 except for broadcasts of the state radio, it was reported.

May 31: The Crown Prince flew to Paris to "make preliminary arrangements for the July meeting" between King Muhammad V and President de Gaulle, it was reported.

June 3: French employees of the State Bank went on strike to enforce their demand for guarantees of their future status after the "Moroccanization" of the Bank on July 1.

June 6: It was reported that the government had decided to speed up the "Moroccanization" of the state radio.

June 11: King Muhammad V visited the troubled areas of the Rif Mountains. He was cheered in the port of Alhucemas, it was reported.

Pakistan

1959

Mar. 16: Aziz Ahmad, new Pakistani Ambassador to the US, arrived in New York.

Mar. 26: A Presidential decree was issued which disqualified persons found guilty of "misconduct" while holding public office from holding any political office for fifteen years.

Apr. 4: Khan 'Abd al-Ghaffar Khan, the Pathan "frontier Ghandi," was released from prison because of ill health, it was announced.

Apr. 7: The US General Accounting Office reported to Congress that US aid to Pakistan has been "more costly and less beneficial" than it should have been. The report charged that "serious deficiencies in the administration of the aid program" had been uncovered.

Apr. 10: It was reported that Pakistani fighter planes shot down an Indian Air Force bomber near Pakistani Army headquarters at Rawalpindi in northwestern Pakistan.

Apr. 11: Indian Defense Minister, V. K. Krishna Menon, declared that the shooting down of an Indian military plane by the Pakistanis was "unwarranted and contrary to international law and custom." He added that the plane had "strayed" into Pakistani air space.

The Pakistani government lodged a protest with the

Indian government against "repeated incursions on Pakistan territory by Indian military aircraft."

The Pakistani Foreign Office announced that the Indian pilot of the bomber shot down over Pakistan had admitted flying deliberately over Pakistan "to photograph military targets," it was reported.

Apr. 14: Prime Minister Nehru said that the shooting down of India's bomber by Pakistan has "almost no parallel in the world."

Indian Defense Minister, V. K. Krishna Menon, said that the Indian government did not believe that the pilot of the Indian bomber "could have been in a fit condition to make any statement."

Apr. 18: The government adopted new powers to prevent the publication of material in the Pakistani press that is "likely to endanger defense, external affairs, or the security" of the state.

India and Pakistan signed a one-year agreement regulating the use of the Indus River and its main tributaries for irrigation.

Apr. 19: The Editor of the *Pakistan Times* resigned after that newspaper was taken over by the government under the 1952 Pakistan Security Act.

Apr. 21: Indian Defense Minister, V. K. Krishna Menon, accused the Pakistani government of having bullied and harassed two wounded Indian airmen "to wring from them confessions of spying on military targets."

Apr. 30: The Pakistani Ambassador to the US declared in New York that "a special responsibility" rested on the US in resolving strife between his country and India.

May 3: President Ayub Khan called for a "renaissance of Islam" to meet the challenge of Communism, which, he said, was making "inroads in the Middle East."

May 4: Prime Minister Nehru said that although he wished to settle all disputes with Pakistan, he ruled out any future defense arrangement with the Pakistanis.

The head of the Pakistani Bar Association attacked the government of Ayub Khan for "delaying general elections and popular government," it was reported.

May 7: Pakistan protested to the UN Security Council that India had "subjected" the arrested Kashmiri leader, Shaykh Abdallah, to a "stage-managed trial."

May 10: President Ayub Khan said that he was "very keen" to resolve outstanding disputes with India. He also said that every effort was being made to improve relations with Afghanistan.

May 15: Pakistan rejected India's protest over the shooting down of an Indian plane over Pakistani territory.

May 18: The government of Pakistan denied a report in *The Times of India* that a revolt had broken out in the Kalat area of Baluchistan Province.

Eugene Black, President of the IBRD, said in Karachi that he had found "common ground" between India and Pakistan in their dispute over the waters of the Indus River Basin.

May 26: President Ayub Khan announced that a commission to draft a new Constitution for Pakistan would be established before the end of the year.

May 30: India again protested to Pakistan over the

shooting down of an Indian military plane. The note demanded "full compensation," it was reported.

June 9: It was announced in New Delhi that India, Pakistan, and the IBRD would meet in London in August to work out a treaty dealing with the waters of the Indus River Basin.

June 12: It was announced that the capital of Pakistan will be moved from Karachi to a "place outside Rawalpindi."

Palestine Problem

1959

Mar. 18: Israel complained to the UN Security Council against the alleged seizure by the UAR of cargoes from Israel aboard two foreign freighters passing through the Suez Canal.

Mar. 19: It was reported that Israel had appealed to neutral maritime nations to support her demand for release of cargoes allegedly seized by the UAR.

Mar. 20: It was reported from Cairo that "informed sources" told the press that the UAR would continue to seize Israeli cargoes shipped through the Suez Canal.

Israel reported that an Egyptian infiltrator had been killed by an Israeli patrol in the Negev Desert.

Mar. 22: It was reported that Israel arrested 16 Lebanese women who had crossed into Israel to cut grass.

It was reported that clashes between Communist sympathizers and pro-Nasir Arabs had occurred in several Arab villages in Israel.

The President of the Zionist Organization of America, Abraham A. Redelheim, criticized what he termed "falsehoods spread by the Arab propaganda machine" to try to stop Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe to Israel.

Apr. 1: Israel broadcast an order over the radio for the partial mobilization of the Israeli Army. It was also reported that Syria soon after mobilized her troops along the borders of Israel.

Apr. 3: The Israeli Military High Court of Appeals upheld the guilt of eight Israeli policemen who killed 43 Arabs at Kafr Kasem in 1956. The Court reduced penalties, however, since the men were acting under orders.

Apr. 15: Syrian and Israeli surveyors met under UN auspices to arrange for demarcation of the border between Israel and Syria.

Jordanian and Israeli investigators cooperated in tracking down the murderer of an Israeli night watchman in Jerusalem. It was reported that the trail of the assailant led across the Jordanian border.

Apr. 20: Israeli and Syrian surveyors began measuring checkpoints along the Israeli-Syrian border as the first step in a UN plan to place markers along the troubled boundary.

Apr. 21: Abba Eban conferred with Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld at UN headquarters. It was reported that they discussed UAR seizures of cargoes passing through the Suez Canal.

Apr. 23: Dr. Ralph Bunche toured the Israeli-Egyptian border and conferred with Lt. Gen. E. L. M. Burns.

Apr. 26: It was reported that Jordanian Security Forces clashed in a battle with smugglers allegedly taking food and other goods into Israel.

Apr. 28: An Israeli military spokesman said that two Arab infiltrators were killed in Southern Israel. He also stated that Egyptian planes were engaged by the Israeli Air Force over the same area.

Apr. 30: It was reported that Dr. Ralph Bunche presented "informal proposals by the UAR regarding passage of Israeli cargoes through the Suez Canal" to Mrs. Golda Meir, Israeli Foreign Minister, in Jerusalem.

May 11: U Thant, Burmese delegate to the UN, said at a farewell dinner for Abba Eban that "only peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Jews could offer any hope of reconciling these two great peoples of the Middle East."

The representatives of the ten-member Arab states of the UN presented a joint letter to the Secretary-General expressing "grave concern" about "Jewish immigration into the Israeli-occupied territory of Palestine."

May 12: Jordan complained to the Jordanian-Israeli Armistice Commission that the Israelis displayed a Star of David over buildings on Mount Scopus, a demilitarized zone on the outskirts of Jerusalem.

May 13: Jordan accepted an Arab League proposal for an Arab "summit conference" on the Palestine problem.

May 18: It was reported that Israeli jets intercepted a plane carrying a group of UN Emergency Force troops from Egypt to Lebanon for a vacation. The report said that the plane was intercepted over the Mediterranean and forced to land at Lydda.

May 26: Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir said in Buenos Aires that she was "astounded" that the UN was not enforcing free navigation through the Suez Canal.

The UAR protested to the UN Mixed Armistice Commission against the detention of an Egyptian vessel allegedly to have occurred on May 23.

May 30: A clash broke out between Brazilian members of the UN Emergency Force and some Arab inhabitants of Port Sa'id, it was reported. The Brazilians were there to sail for Brazil.

June 3: The UAR proposed at a meeting of the International Labor Conference in Geneva that a study be made of "undesirable mass migratory movements."

Premier Ben Gurion declared that the UAR's refusal to permit a Danish ship carrying Israeli cargoes through the Suez Canal was "a blow not only to the interests of Israel, but also to the integrity of the UN."

June 4: Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld said at UN headquarters that he hoped the dispute over the seizure of Israeli cargoes passing through the Suez Canal could be "settled as a legal and not a political problem."

It was reported that Premier David Ben Gurion conferred with the Soviet Ambassador on the right of unrestricted navigation through the Suez Canal, and requested Soviet support for Israel's position.

June 5: An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman was re-

ported to have told the press that Israel would not agree to a "court test" of her right to navigation through the Suez Canal, a right, according to the report, which "has already been established by the UN."

June 7: The Egyptian Air Force said that two Israeli planes violated UAR air space over the Sinai and were engaged by an Egyptian aerial patrol.

An official Israeli report said that Israeli jet planes had driven off four MIG-17's of the UAR in an encounter over the Negev desert.

Persian Gulf

1959

Mar. 20: It was reported that a St. Helena court dismissed an application for a writ of *habeas corpus* to release 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bakr, a Bahrayni nationalist leader imprisoned there since 1956. He had been convicted of plotting the murder of the ruler and of his British advisor, Sir Charles Belgrave.

Apr. 1: The Egyptian press reported that Communists from Iraq "had attempted" to overthrow the government of Kuwayt, but "had been foiled" by Kuwayti authorities.

Apr. 30: A new power station, operating on gas supplied by the Bahrayn Petroleum Company, was opened at Jufair.

May 1: The Omani Office in Cairo reported that the British in Muscat and Oman had instituted "wide-spread troop movements" to combat the activities of "Omani nationalists."

May 19: A large Norwegian oil tanker caught fire off the coast of Muscat. The crew was saved.

May 25: The acting ruler of Kuwayt, Shaykh 'Abdallah Mubarak al-Sabah, arrived in Bahrayn to visit the ruler of the island.

Saudi Arabia

(See also Palestine Problem, Persian Gulf)

1959

Mar. 17: King Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia received Amir Salih ibn 'Isa al-Harithi, the representative of the Imamate of Oman in Riyadh.

Mar. 22: The Omani leaders were feted in Riyadh as guests of King Sa'ud.

Apr. 1: His Royal Highness Amir Faysal attended the meeting of the Arab League Political Committee to mediate the dispute between Iraq and the UAR.

Apr. 9: At a press interview HRH Amir Faysal stated that Saudi Arabia does not object to a restoration of diplomatic relations with Great Britain provided that Britain is willing to work for a solution of the outstanding disputes between the two countries.

Apr. 16: 'Abdallah al-Tariki, the Director General of Petroleum and Mineral Affairs, led an eight-man Saudi Arabian delegation to the First Arab Petroleum Congress in Cairo.

Apr. 25: It was announced that the Council of Ministers has nominated Hafidh Wahbah and 'Abdallah al-Tariki to serve as members of Aramco's Board of Directors.

Apr. 26: The Saudi Arabian Government has withdrawn the citizenship of 'Umar Haliq, its former alternate delegate to the United Nations, because of improper conduct.

May 17: It is reported that West Germany and Saudi Arabia have agreed to raise the status of their diplomatic representation in Bonn and Riyadh to that of embassies.

May 18: In reply to a charge by the American Jewish Congress that William Rountree, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs in the United States Department of State, had condoned Saudi Arabian discrimination against Jews by denying them entry and transit visas, refusing to permit their employment, and by boycotting American Jewish businesses, the State Department said that it would seek "improvement in the Arab attitude" toward Jews whenever possible, but it saw little hope as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict persists. The Jewish Congress also accused King Sa'ud of having ordered the Arabian American Oil Company to apply discrimination in the United States as well as in its operations in Saudi Arabia.

June 7: It was announced that the trachoma research program being conducted jointly by the Arabian American Oil Company and the Harvard School of Public Health has been extended for five years.

June 8: Jordanian Air Force planes rescued a Saudi Arabian airliner that made a forced landing fifty miles east of Amman with thirty-six passengers aboard.

Sudan

(See also Lebanon, UAR)

1959

Mar. 15: The Sudanese cabinet endorsed a £2,230,000 trade exchange agreement with Russia whereby Russia will buy Sudanese cotton in exchange for machinery, trucks, and cars.

Mar. 24: Sayed 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the 73-year-old posthumous son of the Mahdi, died in Khartoum. Although a patron of the Umma party, his leadership in the country remained religious and non-political. It is felt in Cairo that al-Mahdi's death will weaken the Umma faction and those forces within the army wishing to pursue the rigorously independent policy laid down by former Premier Khalil.

Mar. 25: Siddiq, the eldest son of al-Mahdi, was named as head of the Ansar, a reformist sect. He was the former head of the *Dairaf*, the commercial part of the movement.

Apr. 16: Six Army officers and enlisted personnel, sentenced up to 20 years in prison on a charge of attempting to overthrow the government in 1957, have been released, it was announced.

Apr. 23: The government announced formation of a Committee of three Army colonels to carry out what has been officially described as "a complete purge of the Sudanese civil service."

May 7: A military mission, headed by Brigadier 'Awad

- 'Abd al-Rahman, left for Belgrade for an official tour of Yugoslav military installations.
- May 13: The Sudan announced that it will protest to the UN against France's proposed nuclear tests in the Sahara.
- May 15: A World Bank mission arrived in Khartoum to continue discussions with Sudanese officials on an extension of the Roseires Dam project.
- May 26: It was reported that twenty-four members of the outlawed Communist Party had been arrested and charged with "working to undermine the security and peace of the country."
- May 29: It was reported that the roundup of Communists by the Sudanese government had been extended, and that about forty alleged Communists were now detained.
- May 31: Fifteen Army officers were arrested after a "bogus" telegram was sent bringing platoons of the Eastern Command to the outskirts of Khartoum.
- June 1: Two members of the ruling Supreme Council—Brig. 'Abd al-Rahim Shinan and Brig. Ahmad 'Abdallah—were arrested. No reason was given.
- June 4: The Sudanese government banned the Cairo newspaper, *al-Akbbar*, for allegedly "misquoting" the Sudanese Minister of Information as saying that there was a Communist plot to overthrow the régime.

Tunisia

(See also Algeria)

1959

- Mar. 19: The official newspaper of the Neo-Destour Party, *al-Awal*, protested recent French rocket tests made near Colomb-Béchar in the Sahara.
- Apr. 5: Salah al-Din Baccouche, former Tunisian Premier who was sentenced to prison last November for "collaboration with French Protectorate officials," was released.
- Apr. 6: The Tunisian government charged that two French army tanks penetrated about a mile into Tunisian territory last week. The charge said that the tanks "captured an Algerian refugee" before withdrawing.
- Apr. 13: The French and Tunisians signed an agreement to continue French technical assistance for a period of 18 months.
- Apr. 16: The Tunisian government charged that French artillery in Algeria bombarded a Tunisian village for four hours. The village was identified as Bou Jaber.
- Apr. 23: President Habib Bourguiba announced that a new Constitution for Tunisia would be promulgated on June 1.
- The President also said that the price of tobacco had been raised to secure revenue to equip the Tunisian Army with equipment from Britain, the US, and Yugoslavia.
- Apr. 28: The Algerian rebels warned Tunisia that the French plan to extend their operations against the Algerians to Tunisia next year. The rebels asserted that they possessed "information" to this effect.
- May 2: President Bourguiba announced that all land neglected by its owners would be seized and exploited

by the government as part of a plan to increase agricultural production.

- May 27: The French Army in Algeria announced that its forces crossed into Tunisia after having been attacked by Algerian rebels across the border. The announcement explained that a French patrol in Algeria was fired upon from Tunisia in the area of Djebel Harraba.

The US signed an agreement with Tunisia under which the US will loan the Tunisian National Railways \$12,400,000 to help buy diesel-powered and trailer passenger coaches.

- June 1: A new Constitution for Tunisia was promulgated. In a speech to the nation, President Bourguiba said that the document was aimed at "preserving the state from excess of power" and declared it was in harmony with the realities of the country.
- June 11: President Bourguiba praised the US for its economic assistance to Tunisia given "with no conditions imposed," it was reported.

Turkey

(See also Syria)

1959

- Mar. 22: An article in the *Buyuk Dogu*, a weekly magazine, which stated that prior to 1910 Turkish statesmen had made it almost a crime to discuss religion has set off student demonstrations against "reactionaries" whom they claim endanger the republic by their criticisms of the reforms of Ataturk, it was reported.
- Mar. 23: A bill to protect private United States investments in Turkey by allowing the US Government to intervene in controversies between Turkey and American companies brought forth a storm of criticism by the Opposition Deputies in the Grand National Assembly and delayed final action on the bill.
- Dr. Namik Gedik, the Turkish Minister of the Interior, is scheduled to make a three-week tour of the United States at the invitation of that government to study American techniques related to the Department of the Interior.
- Mar. 26: The editor of the *Buyuk Dogu*, an Istanbul weekly, was arrested and sentenced to a one-year prison term for having "insulted" a former Turkish Foreign Minister in an article printed in his magazine.
- Mar. 31: A United States C-124 military transport plane crashed killing four crewmen shortly after its take off from the Incirlik Airbase in southern Turkey.
- Apr. 8: The editor of the Opposition newspaper *Ulus* was sentenced to ten months in prison for an alleged distortion of a statement by the Minister of Justice.
- At the fifth National Military-Industrial Conference in Chicago, Fatin Zorlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, suggested that a Marshall-plan type of organization be set up by the Western powers to help underdeveloped countries.
- Apr. 11: Foreign Minister Zorlu left the United States after having attended the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Washington on April 2-4 and addressing various foreign policy organizations.

Ethem Menderes, Turkish Minister of Defense, returned to Turkey from an extended official visit to South Korea, Nationalist China, and Japan.

Apr. 14: Foreign Minister Zorlu signed an agreement with Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella in Rome for Italy to extend a \$50,000,000 credit line for exports to Turkey.

Apr. 15: A Soviet newspaper reported that two Turks were sentenced to fifteen years in prison for spying in the southern province of Georgia for the United States.

Apr. 16: Foreign Minister Zorlu joined Premier Adnan Menderes in Spain where the Turkish representatives signed a Turkish-Spanish friendship pact with General Francisco Franco.

Turkey has inaugurated a literacy program financed by the United States for 120,000 military youths per year.

Apr. 17: The Turkish Government has ordered emergency action to clear a jam of cargo vessels loaded with foreign aid supplies in the port of Istanbul.

Apr. 24: President Sukarno of Indonesia in an address before the Turkish National Assembly in Ankara said that his country "shall not become a hotbed of war between East and West. We do not intend to take part in either of the two power blocs, East or West."

Apr. 28: Archbishop Iakovos, Primate of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America, was received by the Turkish Ambassador in Washington.

Apr. 29: The Soviet Union has warned Turkey against allowing her territory to be used for US missile bases, it was reported.

May 2: Researchers under a contract from the United States International Cooperation Administration have completed a bibliography of literature on the study of civics and political science in Turkey to be used in the public administration courses at the University of Ankara.

May 4: Policemen and soldiers routed demonstrators in a political strife caused by the return to Istanbul of President Ismet İnönü, the leader of the Opposition to Premier Adnan Menderes.

May 5: There is speculation that the Government of Premier Menderes may take drastic steps to curb the wave of demonstrations in Turkey following the speaking tour of former President İnönü.

May 7: Prime Minister Konstantin Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza of Greece arrived in Ankara for a six-day visit to discuss Cyprus and other mutual problems. The two men were Turkey's first state visitors from Greece in six years.

The Turkish Government has announced that Turkey's gross national product reached \$11.24 billion in 1957 as compared to \$8.69 billion in 1956.

May 15: Three members of the Turkish Opposition Republican People's party were injured in a battle with Deputies of the ruling Democratic party in the corridors of the National Assembly.

May 28: The newspaper *Zafer*, an organ of the ruling

Democratic party, was suspended for one month because one of its articles was deemed insulting to an Opposition member of Parliament.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly approved of plans for the new Middle East Technical University with a campus of 11,000 acres and a proposed enrollment of 20,000 students.

May 29: The United Nations granted \$15,000,000 to be used for a library and equipment for the new Middle East Technical University.

May 30: The publisher, the editor, and a journalist of the independent newspaper *Vatan* were imprisoned for publishing an article attacking the Minister of Education for having ordered the retirement of the director-general of the State Theater.

June 5: The Turkish National Assembly voted unanimously to return to West Germany the property in Turkey which was seized from Germany in World War II.

June 8: President Celal Bayar began an official state visit to Italy at the invitation of President Giovanni Gronchi.

June 11: President Bayar visited the Vatican and had a state audience with Pope John XXIII.

An agreement was signed in Rome to provide for Italian long-term credit totaling \$50,000,000 to enable Turkey to buy railroad and other equipment in Italy.

June 13: The Turkish Government warned the Soviet Union to stop distributing propaganda publications and pamphlets in Turkey.

United Arab Republic

(See also Iraq, Palestine Problem, Sudan)

1959

Mar. 16: Premier Khrushchev said in a speech in Moscow that UAR President Nasir's anti-Communist policy was "doomed to failure," and warned the Egyptian leader against trying to force a union of Iraq and the UAR. The speech was made at a reception for visiting Iraqis, it was reported.

President Nasir accused Khrushchev of "distorting facts" and added "we do not interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union or support a faction of it against another faction."

Khalid Bakdash, Chief of Syria's outlawed Communist Party, attacked President Nasir in a speech before a conference of Communist leaders from 42 countries held in Warsaw. He applauded Iraq as the "unconquered bastion of the Arab nationalist movement."

Mar. 19: Premier Khrushchev in a press interview in Moscow said that President Nasir was "a rather hot-headed young man" who "took upon himself more than his stature permitted" in assailing Communism in the Middle East.

It was announced by the UAR Finance Ministry that Cairo was considering an offer from the IBRD to finance some development projects in the UAR.

Mar. 20: President Nasir in a speech in Damascus denounced Soviet Premier Khrushchev for "interference in our affairs," and said the Communists in the UAR must be "crushed" as "agents" of a foreign power.

Mar. 30: President Nasir said in a speech in Cairo that an elected Parliament in the Soviet Union was "dismissed in 1917, and now they are governed by the Communist Party where no one has the chance to speak except the Communists."

Apr. 4: It was reported from London that the restoration of diplomatic relations between Britain and the UAR "may be forthcoming."

Apr. 6: It was reported that Liberia had protested to the UAR against seizure of Liberian ships sailing through the Suez Canal.

Apr. 20: The Soviet Ambassador in Cairo handed President Nasir a note from Premier Khrushchev. The Ambassador refused to disclose the contents of the note.

Apr. 21: An agreement to release from sequestration four oil company affiliates was signed by the UAR and Britain in Cairo. The four companies are: Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields, Ltd.; Shell Chemicals; Shell, Ltd.; and B. P., Ltd., all affiliates of Royal Dutch Shell.

Apr. 27: The UAR has agreed to let a British mission come to Egypt to help implement a financial agreement signed between the two countries on Feb. 28.

May 11: President Nasir named Lieut. Gen. Muhammad Ibrahim as Minister of War.

May 12: It was reported that the UAR and Yugoslav Foreign Ministers secretly met at Maribor, near the Austrian border, to discuss relations between their two countries.

May 14: President Nasir sent a reply to Premier Khrushchev's letter. The contents were not disclosed.

May 17: President Nasir proposed to India, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia that the three nations meet "soon" with the UAR to discuss "any position taken at the Geneva meeting" of the US, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.

May 18: President Nasir disclosed in a two-hour interview in Cairo that Premier Khrushchev had given him "renewed assurances" of non-interference in Arab affairs.

May 19: It was announced in Cairo that a group of alleged Communists will be tried by military court on a charge of "trying to overthrow the government."

June 1: Baghdad Radio announced that Field Marshal Afif Bizri, former Syrian Army Chief of Staff dismissed by Nasir last year, had fled Syria and taken refuge in Iraq.

June 3: A shake-up of the UAR diplomatic corps, affecting 21 Ambassadors and 159 other officials, was reported. Details were not disclosed.

June 11: The UAR announced that it will participate in the activities of the World Refugee Year.

June 15: President Nasir called a halt to the screening of candidates participating in national elections in the UAR, it was reported.

EGYPT

1959

Apr. 8: Maj. Salah Salam, former Minister of National Guidance who resigned in 1956 after differences with President Nasir, was named chairman of the Tahrir Publishing House, owned by the Egyptian government.

Apr. 14: It was reported that 11 children drowned in the Nile when a ferry overturned near Sohag.

Apr. 28: It was reported that "part of the funds" granted to the UAR by the World Bank would be used to widen and deepen the Suez Canal.

May 1: The distribution of US flour, corn meal, and powdered milk to 700,000 "needy Egyptians" began.

May 5: Former King Faruq became a citizen of Monaco.

May 10: Eugene Black of the IBRD discussed with Egyptian officials possible help by the Bank in widening and deepening the Suez Canal, it was reported.

May 30: The Egyptian government announced that it had decided to stop all barter deals in cotton.

June 8: Polling to choose local committees of the National Union Party in preparation for the election of an Egyptian Parliament began.

SYRIA

1959

Mar. 25: It was reported that four Arabs were killed when three mines exploded on the Syrian-Turkish frontier.

Apr. 19: Spain agreed to purchase 12,000 tons of Syrian cotton for \$7,000,000, it was announced.

It was reported that a "large number of Communists and Kurds" had been dismissed from the Syrian military forces.

May 22: An Australian charged today that Syrian fighters forced his plane down at Damascus. He was flying from Australia to Paris.

June 3: It was reported that Syria plans to construct "a huge dam" on the Euphrates River in northern Syria. Costs are estimated at \$140-170,000,000, according to the report.

Yemen

(See also Aden)

1959

Mar. 19: Several shipments of US wheat left for the Yemen as emergency aid during Yemen's current period of famine, it was reported.

Apr. 17: Imam Ahmad arrived in Rome for medical treatment. It was reported that he is suffering from a form of arthritis.

May 5: Several "incidents" between Italian photographers and Yemeni guards protecting the Imam's harem were reported when the photographers attempted to obtain pictures of the Imam's three wives and several concubines.

May 15: The Governor of Beidha District in Yemen and

several other "high officials" were reported arrested and charged with misappropriating government funds. It was alleged that some of the funds included money to pay the Yemeni Army in that district.

May 26: It was reported from Cairo that Crown Prince al-Badr was carrying out a "major purge of elements

trying to sow dissension" in Yemen. Details were not disclosed.

June 8: It was reported that the Yemeni Director of Public Security, Qadi Yahya al-Imari, had been arrested and charged with fomenting "disturbances" in the Yemeni Army last month.

DOCUMENT

United Nations General Assembly—Fourteenth session

Proposals for the Continuation of United Nations Assistance to Palestine Refugees

Document submitted by the Secretary-General

A/4121

15 June 1959

INTRODUCTION

At the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, in the course of its consideration of the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), I undertook to make such proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees as I might consider helpful or necessary to put forward to the General Assembly. It was understood that in the preparation of such proposals I would look into the technical operations of UNRWA, whose present mandate is due to expire on 30 June 1960.

After a careful examination of the problem of the Palestine refugees in its various aspects, I recommend the continuation of UNRWA pending, as expressed by the General Assembly, the "reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement. . . ." At present, this is envisaged in the other relevant General Assembly resolution as resulting from the choice of the refugees themselves.

I base my recommendation on an examination of the three predominant factors in the refugee problem—psychological, political and economic—which follows as Part I. Part II contains recommendations for certain arrangements which would constitute improvements in the continued work of UNRWA. In keeping with my undertaking to the General Assembly, this report is limited to the question of United Nations assistance to the refugees; thus, no proposals for a solution of the Palestine problem as a whole, nor for the refugee problem as such, are set out in this paper. However, a development along the lines herein discussed might facilitate steps toward a resolution of such problems with justice and equity for all concerned.

PART I

GENERAL ANALYSIS

1. Previous resolutions of the General Assembly on the subject of the Palestine refugees, the recent annual reports of the Director of UNRWA and relevant debates in the General Assembly reflect the predominant factors in the refugee problem. As generally recognized, these are psychological, political and economic in nature. An understanding of the problem is easier if the different aspects are considered separately first. I shall begin with a consideration of the economic aspect because this establishes a framework within which the political and psychological aspects can be viewed more constructively.

2. Viewed from the economic angle, the reintegration of close to one million Palestine refugees into the productive life of the Near East presents problems similar to those faced in all cases of reintegration into economic life of a largely unemployed population. This will be true wherever and however the reintegration takes place in the Near East. We can, therefore, concentrate our attention for the moment on an economic analysis, dealing with the area as a whole.

3. As complete an analysis as available information permits, together with the supporting statistical data, is annexed hereto. It reviews key economic indicators and projections with regard to all of the countries concerned in the Near East and for the area as an economic unit, primarily for the ten-year period 1960-1970.

4. As it appears from these statistics, the national income *per capita* in all the Arab countries remains very low, although the rate of increase of the national income now in some cases is fairly high. At income levels like these, it is not to be anticipated that reintegration of a refugee population, over and above the absorption of the natural population increase, could be brought about if it had to be accompanied by a lowering of the income *per capita*. If this did happen, the result might well be a fall in the rate of capital formation, thus hampering still further an increase of income.

5. In these circumstances, it is realistic to assume that the reintegration of the refugees in the Near East would have to run parallel to an increase in the national income at least proportional to the number reintegrated. That, in turn, would require that the added population can be productively employed with at least capital equipment equivalent to the one available to those already in productive life. The conclusion is that the reintegration must go hand in hand with such a new capital formation. If the reintegration, in practice, would have to be coordinated with some increase of the *per capita* income—which seems to be, if not necessary, at least highly desirable—the increase in national income and in capital formation would, of course, have to be more than equivalent to the addition to the population.

6. Given the present economic situation in the area, we can, in general terms, state that the reintegration of the refugees through normal economic processes into the productive life will, for the immediate future at least, require capital imports sufficient to render possible an increase in national income and capital formation preferably more than proportional, but at least proportional to the increase in population. From an economic viewpoint, such capital imports would represent sound invest-

ment in an area with great potentialities and great needs for a more diversified production. In the long run, with increasing revenues from oil in some parts of the region, the emphasis would switch from capital imports to investment of surpluses in the areas where reintegration takes place.

7. The capital formation will to a large extent have to take the form of agricultural and industrial investments. The agricultural investments would have to take place in semi-arid areas of low natural productivity, which probably would require fairly great amounts in order to be put into satisfactory production. The Israel experience of the capital needed per head of the population for such a development of investments is in this context of interest. I refer to the annex regarding these and other relevant data.

8. An additional factor that has to be taken into account is that it is likely that agriculture, in order to remain competitive, will have to be highly mechanized, which, in turn, will render necessary the opening up of new areas of production, with ensuing investment, in order to absorb the agricultural population set free in the process of mechanization.

9. The population increases foreseen in the area are considerable. On the other hand, the natural resources of part of the region may in the years ahead yield considerably increased income in foreign exchange. Thus, and quite apart from the refugee problem, a significant degree of general economic development for the area as a whole will be required and possible. In general, the region can be seen as economically viable in the long run provided there is a fair degree of mobility of capital or labour, or both, among at least some of its parts. This will be encouraged if the area can begin soon economic development of appropriate scope, thereby providing attractive investment opportunities for a significant portion of such surplus capital as may become available from its natural resources.

10. Viewed from an economic angle, the reintegration of the Palestine refugees into productive life, although it must be considered as a fairly long process, is perfectly within reach provided that the area can be developed through sufficient capital formation; the recent acceleration in the rate of progress and the great natural resources are encouraging elements. However, capital imports would probably have to be considerable, if it is found desirable that reintegration be furthered without considerable delays.

11. Viewed in the perspective of what has been said, the unemployed population represented by the Palestinian refugees should be regarded not as a liability but, more justly, as an asset for the future; it is a reservoir of manpower which in the desirable general economic development will assist in the creation of higher standards for the whole population of the area. It follows that, irrespective of the fact that humanitarian reasons would urgently call for continued assistance to the refugees, such assistance is strongly indicated as a sound part of any programme of economic development for the area.

12. In the light of these considerations, and disregarding for the moment both political and psychological

factors as well as the humanitarian aspects of the problem, I strongly and unreservedly recommend the continuance of the United Nations activities in support of the refugees, for all the time and to all the extent necessary, pending the reintegration of the refugee population into the productive life of the area for which there are economic reasons to hope in connection with its general development. This will require the prior, or at least concurrent, resolution of political and psychological problems, to which the discussion can now turn.

13. There is the question of *where* the integration of the refugee population can or should come about. Short of further and intense studies it is impossible to say where that could best be achieved from an economic viewpoint. The absence of these studies, however, should not delay the general development to which reference has just been made. This can and should proceed on the basis of information already available. There is no immediate danger of over-development in any particular part of the area.

14. The question of where integration should be sought has, as is well known, an important political aspect. In resolution 194 (III) the General Assembly:

"II. *Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."

The stand thus taken by the General Assembly would involve integration of refugees into the productive life of Israel as well as of the Arab countries in accordance with the choice of the refugees themselves. This stand has been consistently maintained by the Arab Governments concerned. However, Israel, stressing that the resolution relates to "refugees wishing . . . to live at peace with their neighbors . . .", has limited itself to offering, with conditions, a form of compensation to former landowners in the country and does not exclude an extension of the uniting of families scheme under which former Arab residents have already come back to Israel territory.

15. The economic development which has been presented here as necessary to an integration of the refugees requires that we overcome various political difficulties which now hamper progress in the desirable direction. One of them is the Palestine problem in its various aspects; another one the problem of inter-Arab relationships; a third one the problem of an Arab economic co-operation so framed as to render possible the exploitation of the natural resources of the area to the full benefit of all the countries in the area. In the last two aspects mentioned, important progress has been registered. Attention may be drawn especially to the decision of the Economic Council of the Arab League to implement a previous decision regarding an Arab development fund and to establish a preparatory council for Arab economic unity. However, fairly complete mobility of capital within the area can only be regarded as a long-range objective—not an immediate possibility. Regarding the

Palestine problem no progress towards a solution is now in view.

16. While, under prevailing conditions, there is nothing to prevent internal economic development in each of the countries from proceeding to the extent possible, at least a gradual approach to the solution of the political problems mentioned above is a condition for that degree of development, on a regional or on a national basis, which is attainable and highly desirable in view of the unsatisfactory level of income in the area. In these circumstances, it is not adequate to direct attention primarily to the relationship which exists between these political problems and the question of the refugees. In fact, a solution of those political problems should be sought, *inter alia*, in order to create conditions for a sound general economic development in the area, irrespective of its significance for the reintegration of the refugees. If the problems are solved sufficiently well to provide for such conditions, the proper political setting would probably *ipso facto* be created also for a solution of the refugee problem in its political aspects.

17. Although the refugee problem may, usefully, in the first instance be studied in economic and political terms, it is basically a human problem. No reintegration would be satisfactory, or even possible, were it to be brought about by forcing people into their new positions against their will. It must be freely accepted, if it is to yield lasting results in the form of economic and political stability. The views now voiced by spokesmen of refugees would seem to indicate that the refugees would not voluntarily accept integration into the productive life unless they have been given freedom of choice in accordance with the United Nations decision—or in some other acceptable way—as they now regard such freedom as the means through which the wrong that they consider themselves to have suffered could be put right and their individual self-respect safeguarded. However, it should be noted that a *de facto* economic integration—that is, an integration which does not result from a choice in accordance with the resolution—would not prejudice any rights established by the resolution. In view of this serious psychological problem it is to be hoped that in the course of the lengthy process which must be anticipated in the economic sphere, ways will be found to bring about a mutually satisfactory adjustment of stands and reactions on all sides which would resolve these psychological difficulties by the time when integration of most of the refugees becomes an economic possibility.

18. It follows from the preceding argument that my previous recommendation for the continuance of the

work of UNRWA is not conditioned by political considerations although such considerations may lend added strength to the economic reasons on which I base my recommendation. The perspective is not a discouraging one, provided that the world is willing to assist the region in its economic development and provided, further, that, step by step and as economic conditions permit, progress regarding the political and psychological obstacles is sought in a conservative spirit and with a sense of justice and realism.

19. Just as I support the continuance of UNRWA pending progress in the economic field, I recommend, after a careful study of the technical operation of UNRWA, certain arrangements which seem to me to be indicated as essential improvements in the continued work of the Agency. In part II of this paper, I will turn to those improvements, the main significance of which is that the UNRWA operation should be so conducted as to be in harmony with the general view of the refugee problem which I have set out above.

PART II

Technical considerations

1. The technical matters to which I would invite the General Assembly's attention fall under four main headings: who is to receive assistance; how should this be administered; of what should it consist; and the status of the administering authority—UNRWA.

(a) Recipients of assistance

2. The annual reports of the Directors of UNRWA¹ have made frequent references to a problem under this heading which has given serious and continuing concern. I refer to the facts that (a) there are at present a considerable number of persons who receive assistance from UNRWA to which they are not now entitled, and (b) there is an approximately equivalent number of persons who are entitled to assistance but who cannot be given it because of limited funds. In the first category are mainly those who receive assistance on behalf of the unreported dead, those who are fraudulently registered as refugees, and those who are now earning incomes sufficient for self-support; in the latter category are mainly certain children and some persons who have lost a previous source of income and become in need. According to the best estimates available, the numbers in the two categories are, as indicated, approximately equal and there is therefore no question, for the present at least, of misuse of internationally contributed funds. Moreover, from a purely economic point of view, the only relevant question is need, and on this basis, it is clear that most of

¹ Reports of the Director of UNRWA and special reports of the Director and Advisory Commission to the General Assembly:

Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19;

Ibid., Sixth Session, Supplements Nos. 16 and 16A;

Ibid., Seventh Session, Supplements Nos. 13 and 13A;

Ibid., Eighth Session, Supplements Nos. 12 and 12A;

Ibid., Ninth Session, Supplements Nos. 17 and 17A;

Ibid., Tenth Session, Supplements Nos. 15, 15A and 15B;

Ibid., Eleventh Session, Supplements Nos. 14 and 14A;

Ibid., Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 14;

Ibid., Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 14.

those who receive assistance, with the exception of those with steady incomes, do need it.

3. What must be of concern to an agency of the United Nations, however, is the equity with which available assistance is distributed. If UNRWA were to be terminated at the end of its present mandate in 1960, matters could be allowed to stand as they are; but the indefinite continuation of UNRWA makes it necessary and desirable, particularly from the point of view of the refugees themselves, that the position be regularized.

4. This should consist in the application in full of what UNRWA has in fact endeavoured to do over the past several years, but with only partial success. It should be recalled at this point that UNRWA's working definition of a person eligible for its services is someone who lived for two years prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 in that part of what was then Palestine and has become the State of Israel, and who lost both his home and his means of livelihood as a result of that conflict and is in need of assistance. This definition is not contained in any resolution of the General Assembly but has been stated in Annual Reports of the Director and tacitly approved by the Assembly. It has in fact two parts: The first concerns the status of a person as a *bona fide* refugee, and this of course does not change; the second has to do with a refugee's economic position or need for assistance, which can change from day to day. This distinction provides the key to a system of administration satisfactory to all concerned.

5. What is especially required is a rectification of the present rolls on the basis of the first part of the definition, that is, the deletion from the rolls of those who are ineligible or those who are no longer eligible (the fraudulently registered and the undeclared dead) and the addition thereto of those who are eligible (mainly the children and adults not previously registered). Since births have exceeded deaths over the past several years, this process cannot help but result in an increase in the ration rolls. Thereafter, arrangements must be in effect for keeping the rolls current. It will be essential to have the full cooperation of the host Governments and the refugees on the one hand and, on the other, assurances by the contributing countries that UNRWA has sufficient funds.

6. The application of the second part of the definition—the determination of need—is and ought to remain an entirely distinct process administratively. The fact that this is a problem at all, that is, that there is a fairly significant number of refugees receiving assistance which they do not need, is ample evidence of the willingness and the desire of the refugee to work and become self-supporting whenever he can. What is important, particularly in terms of the analysis in part I, is that the refugee be encouraged to take advantage of economic opportunity when it occurs, and for this purpose he must have the assurance that he can again claim assistance if and when he needs it within a reasonable period. It must be recalled at this juncture that in the present

state of economic development throughout most of the Near East, the kind of economic opportunity that is available to any unemployed population is to a very large extent casual or seasonal or, if of a longer term nature, often subject to sudden change. Moreover, wages offered to a refugee are usually based on the assumption that he will continue to receive assistance from UNRWA. All of this means that income is often precarious, and considerable flexibility of administration is consequently essential.

7. UNRWA has developed the technical means for handling this matter through what it calls the graduated income scale. Such scales have been worked out appropriate to the level of income and cost of living in each of the host countries. They are so designed that assistance is withdrawn progressively as income rises and, as an incentive, the amount of additional income which brings with it a reduction in the particular service is always greater than the value to the refugee of that particular service on the open market. Again, the full co-operation of the host Governments and the refugees will be required and sufficient funds must be assured so that UNRWA can employ the scales with the necessary flexibility.

8. Although not strictly speaking within the terms of reference of the present study, I cannot let this occasion pass without referring to certain groups of persons who are excluded by a technicality from the receipt of assistance from UNRWA, i.e., those who have lost their means of livelihood but not their homes, under UNRWA's definition. They have been variously called "economic refugees" or, in UNRWA's more technical language, "other claimants for relief." A full report was prepared by the Director of UNRWA and submitted to the General Assembly in 1955.² These persons include particularly the frontier villagers in Jordan, certain of the Bedouin and the Gaza poor, that is, mainly persons who still have their homes, but whose means of livelihood have been lost or greatly affected. The stand of the General Assembly is understood to be that UNRWA should not give these people assistance. There is, however, no doubt that many of them are in greater need now than some of the refugees in UNRWA's care. In simple humanity, something should be done for them.

(b) *Administration of assistance*

9. There are, in logic, two ways whereby assistance from the United Nations can be administered: by the Governments of the countries in which the refugees live (on the basis of a financial subsidy), or by an organ of the United Nations itself. The latter alternative also offers two choices, at least theoretically: to continue UNRWA or to create a new organization to take its place. UNRWA has the experienced personnel, has demonstrated its efficiency and has gained the confidence of the refugees and the host Governments in its integrity. There would seem to be no reason to change and every reason to retain the organization as such. There are,

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Session Supplement No. 15A.

therefore and in fact, only two alternatives: administration by the host Governments or by UNRWA.

10. Heretofore, because of the underlying philosophy of short-term assistance, the question of whether UNRWA should administer all or any part of the assistance was hopelessly entangled in political considerations. The establishment of the principle of long-term assistance to the refugees removes all grounds for consideration of the matter from a political angle; the way is clear for an examination of the question on purely technical grounds but in the broadest sense, i.e., what is the most efficient and effective way of providing assistance, taking into account the interests of all concerned. It is also possible to see the problem as not entirely one of hard and fast distinctions between administration by UNRWA or by host Governments, but to envisage an acceleration of a trend toward methods which already exist of a sharing in the administration between UNRWA and the host Governments.

11. From this point of view, it seems clear that for the present UNRWA should continue to have at least primary administrative responsibility for the food programme, the construction, maintenance and sanitation of camps, and the health programme. This is because of the technical skills and/or the degree of administrative centralization required for efficient operation. UNRWA should also continue for the present to have primary administrative responsibility in that part of the self-support field requiring special technical skills not yet available in sufficient quantity in the area, such as vocational training and the economic analysis which provides the basis for installation grants and the like.

12. Primary administrative responsibility for the programme of general education, however, could with advantage to all concerned be assumed by the host Governments. There is relatively little in the way of centralized management required since the present programme has been carefully geared to the curricula and standards of host countries. The transfer and subsequent integration of staff (to the extent the host countries, as the new employers, wished) along with buildings and equipment into the host countries' present systems would be a relatively simple matter administratively since a considerable amount of integration has already taken place, and the host countries are already making a substantial financial contribution which has never been adequately acknowledged. Arrangements would, of course, have to be made whereby UNRWA contributed an annual subsidy on the basis of appropriate assurances as to the accountability of funds. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization could be counted on to continue its present practice of providing technical guidance.

(c) *Types of assistance—programmes of self-support*

1. It is customary to describe UNRWA's programmes under two headings: relief, including general education; and rehabilitation or self-support, including especially vocational training and individual grants.

14. In recommending the indefinite continuation of assistance by the United Nations, I had in mind the continuation of the relief programme at least the same

standards that now prevail. If these could be raised there would be a net gain for all concerned. UNRWA's efficiency in the use of funds provided is already well known; less fully appreciated perhaps is the extent to which many refugees augment assistance by their own efforts but still live at the edge of subsistence. Nor, I believe, is it at all appreciated the extent to which the UNRWA type relief operation can in fact be regarded as a form of much needed technical assistance for the area as a whole. For example, the health programme not only cares for the individual refugee, it also introduces new standards and concepts of such care for the refugee population as a whole; but construction meets a current and obvious need; it also provides training in construction and in community development; even the administration, involving some 10,000 refugees in all, including doctors, nurses and teachers, can be regarded as a training programme for persons in the skills just mentioned as well as in civil administration. I do not wish to push this point too far, but it is worth mentioning in relation to an operation which is all too often viewed pessimistically because it is called relief. More correctly, it finds its place in the broader context of general economic assistance discussed in part I.

15. The second part of UNRWA's programme has, of course, an even more direct role to play in this economic development. In paragraph 11 of part I, it was shown that the Palestine refugees can and should be regarded as an asset for the future. This will be true in proportion to the extent that the refugees have been adequately trained and equipped to take advantage of the economic opportunities that emerge.

16. UNRWA's specific experience is in harmony with the foregoing generalization. Because there has not been a satisfaction of the political and psychological aspects of the problem, the refugees have refused to participate as a group in large-scale projects designed specifically for them since they feel this would mean giving up rights. Nor was it ever realistic to have assumed that they could or should be the exclusive beneficiaries of such projects at the expense of the indigenous population. The refugees do, however, welcome opportunities to become self-supporting as individuals. To this end, they can be helped by UNRWA through its programmes of vocational and agricultural training for young people and individual financial grants for adults in order to take advantage of economic opportunities they have found on their own initiative. UNRWA has already developed the skill for carrying out and expanding these programmes. It is to be hoped that similar but more varied programmes might also become feasible in the future. Thus far the obstacle to the expansion of the training and grants programmes has been mainly financial; UNRWA has been able in the past two years to collect barely enough money to maintain its relief and education programmes. It is accordingly absolutely essential that it receive sufficient funds over and above these in order to implement a programme of self-support of appropriate scope.

(d) *Agreements with host Governments*

17. It will be appropriate—if UNRWA is to continue as recommended here—for all of the present agreements

with the host Government to be reviewed and revised or renegotiated to the extent necessary. UNRWA, which is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations and an agent of the General Assembly, in accordance with the stand of the General Assembly, must have an appropriate status and be provided with the facilities, including non-interference in matters of internal administration, to ensure maximum efficiency in operation and in the use of internationally contributed funds. It is my conviction that this can be achieved without the scale of UNRWA's operations posing problems to the host countries touching on their national sovereignty. In this context, the United Nations Charter and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities will, of course, be the basic instruments.

ANNEX

Economic dimensions of the problem of the Palestine refugees

1. A first essential step in a broad consideration of the problem of the Palestine refugees is to determine its economic dimensions. This can only be done against the background of the recent rate of economic growth of the area and of its potentialities for further growth. If for the purpose of this first step we were to regard the refugees as representing a largely unemployed population not integrated into the surrounding economy, we could determine what, in purely economic terms, the reintegration of an unemployed population of this magnitude would involve. More specifically, what is attempted here is to obtain an approximate measure of the amount of capital investment which this process would require and, in particular, the amount of external capital needed, under the general condition that present rates of economic growth of the area should at least be maintained and if possible accelerated. The analysis does not go beyond this stage and therefore does not enter into any discussion of lines of action. Nor does it take any account of the political and psychological aspects of the problem which must, of course, be given their due weight in any final analysis. It merely attempts to establish what in any given circumstances would be minimum economic requirements for a solution of the problem.

2. *Per capita* incomes in the area remain low and therefore, if we are to be realistic in appraising these minimum requirements, we must take it as a condition that the reintegration should be accomplished without any lowering of *per capita* income. This means that national incomes in the area would have to grow at least fast enough to compensate both for the natural increase in the population and for the reintegration of the refugees. If this result were to be achieved only at the expense of a fall in *per capita* income, the rate of capital formation would also be expected to decline, thus hampering still further the increase in income.

3. Thus, the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Middle East requires an increase in national income at least proportional to the number re-integrated. Actually, it is highly desirable that national

income should grow at a greater rate than this in order that the relatively low *per capita* incomes should also be able to grow. To achieve such a result, any addition to the labour force must be supplied the necessary means of production in the form of capital equipment and land, over and above what is necessary to maintain the existing stock, so that national income would grow more than in proportion to the added population.

4. In recent years, some economic growth has been experienced throughout the area. Statistics indicating the extent and nature of this growth are available. It will be sufficient here to recapitulate the salient points. Since 1950, gross national product has increased markedly in all countries of the area for which data are available—the increases being greatest in Iraq, Israel and Syria. On a *per capita* basis, income has risen less rapidly because of population growth.

5. The two major factors influencing the rate of economic growth are the level of capital formation and the increase in the population. Population has been growing throughout the area by natural increase at a rapid rate of from 2 to 3 percent *per annum*, and in Israel also by large-scale immigration. Gross capital formation has also been increasing throughout the area and has been at a high level in some parts of it. Expressed as a percentage of gross national product, gross capital formation has varied considerably in different countries of the area. It has been lowest in Egypt, varying from 10 to 16 per cent, and highest in Iraq where in 1956 it had risen to nearly 27 per cent, and in Israel where it has fluctuated around 26 per cent in the years 1953-56, after having reached the exceptionally high level of nearly 42 per cent in 1950. Since in all the countries of the area for which data are available there has been in recent years an increase in *per capita* incomes (slight in the case of Egypt, but significant in Lebanon, Iraq, Israel and Syria), gross capital formation has been large enough both to provide for the maintenance of the existing stock of capital and to add sufficient new equipment to employ productively a growing labour force.

6. The capital which has been necessary to bring about the results described above has been derived from a variety of sources and no single generalization applicable to all countries in the area can be made on this subject. Taken as a whole, the area has been a net importer of capital. However, only Israel and Jordan are dependent on foreign sources for a major part of their capital, and in both countries direct foreign aid represents a major part of the capital inflow. Between 1950 and 1958 Israel received about \$2,400 million in this way. \$1,000 million being accounted for by official United States financing and by German reparations, and the remainder by donations and loans provided largely through Jewish organizations in the United States and elsewhere. Jordan, during the same period, received some \$200 million in official United States and United Kingdom aid. Lebanon also depends on external sources of capital largely in the form of a sustained flow of immigrant remittances without which domestic saving would fall considerably short of investment. Capital imports into the United Arab Republic have been relatively small; thus, Syria has

financed most of its investment from domestic savings, and Egypt has been able to live very largely on its own means with the help of previously accumulated sterling balances. With the possible exception of Saudi Arabia, the major oil-producing countries have had a surplus of capital over and above their own needs and opportunities for investment; Iraq, though involved in considerable development plans, has not until recently been able to invest the whole of its income in productive projects; because of lack of local investment opportunities, the oil-producing sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, foremost among which is Kuwait, have been accumulating substantial capital surpluses.

7. In the light of the facts described above, it is possible to assess more precisely the economic dimensions of the problem of the reintegration into the economic life of the area of approximately one million additional people. To do this it is necessary to make some fairly simple projections into the immediate future of trends in population growth, national income and other significant economic magnitudes. It should be emphasized that this appraisal is not a forecast of what will happen, but a projection, on what appear to be the most reasonable assumptions, of certain significant trends. By this means the economic order of magnitude of the problem, and therefore of the steps needed to overcome it, are established in as rational a manner as is possible.

8. The essential conclusions of this study can be stated in fairly simple terms, though the calculations and procedures by which they have been reached have been complicated and laborious. However, a brief account may be given here of the procedures employed in arriving at the conclusions set out in the following paragraphs.

9. Using the year 1955 as a base year, the growth of the population and labour force was projected for each country to 1970. On the basis of the estimated results for the years 1950-1956 and other considerations, gross national product was then projected for each country. Gross and net domestic savings were projected for the same period. Estimates were made for each country of the amount of new investment needed to employ an additional worker, and this figure, together with the estimated increase in the labour force, provided the basis for an estimate of total investment needed to employ the additional labour force and achieve a modest increase of *per capita* income. Taking into account both domestic savings and the expected inflow of private foreign capital and outstanding foreign official financial commitments, and comparing the result with the total investment required to absorb the labour force at an accelerated rate of development, an estimate was reached of the additional foreign investment needed. The Palestine refugees were then taken into account by considering those among them of working age as an additional labour force to be reintegrated into the economy, necessitating an additional investment the size of which could be simply calculated on this established basis. In order to arrive at more realistic quantities, the figures were also broken down into five-year periods.

10. Put in the simplest and most general terms, the analysis indicates that for the area as a whole the labour

force, exclusive of the Palestine refugees, may be expected to increase by 5.6 million between 1960 and 1970. For this increase in the labour force to be absorbed into productive employment so that *per capita* incomes will continue to increase at a modest rate will require over the period new net investment from all sources of approximately \$12,000 million.

11. The funds necessary to finance such investment may be considered as coming from two major sources: domestic savings and various flows to the area from outside. Total availability of capital, however, varies substantially from country to country. Some countries of the area are capital-deficit countries even excluding any investment for the reintegration of refugees; others, the major oil-producing countries, are capital-surplus countries because of the revenues arising from an expected increase in oil production. The capital-deficit countries are those of greatest population concentration and include those in which the refugees are situated. Their dependence on outside capital to finance part of their development, in order to achieve a modest rate of increase in *per capita* income, is likely to increase. Both provinces of the United Arab Republic, which in recent years have been very largely to finance their own development, will no longer be able to do so and will have to rely increasingly on outside capital to finance the employment of their growing labour force. Lebanon may also be expected to look to outside sources for some of its development. Jordan, as in the past, will have to rely on foreign aid for almost the full amount of its investment. Israel, especially in view of its officially estimated further inflow of immigration, will stand in need of capital imports on a large scale as in the past.

12. In contrast, oil income in the oil-producing countries is expected to increase substantially during the period under consideration. This is especially true in the latter period of the 1960-1970 decade. Iraq, which since 1952 has been self-sufficient for capital needs, will probably become a capital-surplus country; so will Saudi Arabia, though to a lesser extent; Kuwait, along with the other oil-producing sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, will experience a vast increase in the size of its present capital surplus. Depending on whether the lower or the higher oil-revenue estimates are utilized, the over-all surplus is expected to be in the order of magnitude of \$5,300 million or \$8,200 million, respectively, in the period of 1960-1970.

13. Considering for the moment the area as a whole, and assuming perfect intra-regional mobility of capital, total availability of investment resources in the area would depend on the selection of oil-revenue estimates. If the lower estimates are used, gross savings of the area would be \$17,600 million. Of this quantity some \$5,400 million would be required to make good depreciation of capital so that about \$12,200 million would be available for new net investment. Adding to this the flow of foreign capital estimated at \$1,850 million, we have a total net availability of capital in the area as a whole of approximately \$14,000 million. This leaves a net surplus of \$2,000 million. If, however, the higher oil-revenue estimates are used, the net surplus of capital

in the area becomes \$5,000 million. It is to be noted, however, that the availability of capital surpluses shown above represents a highly favourable and therefore an extreme view. The other extreme is that oil-revenue surpluses do not become available for investment in the capital-deficit countries of the area. Under this alternative assumption, and in order to achieve modest increases in per capita incomes, the capital-deficit countries of the area will need approximately \$3,000 million in the period 1960-1970.

14. It is useful to remember that the Middle Eastern countries included in this study fall, mainly from an economic point of view, into three groups: the oil-producing Arab countries, the non-oil-producing Arab countries, and Israel. Our analysis shows that, for Israel to provide employment opportunities for the increase in the labour force (inclusive of official estimates for immigration) in the period 1960-1970, it will need a total capital investment of approximately \$2,000 million. Out of this quantity, a foreign capital inflow already assured is expected to meet about one half, leaving a deficit close to one billion dollars which, for the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed would be obtained by Israel, as in the past, from sources outside the area. Thus, the \$3,000 million capital deficit referred to in paragraph 13 above, exclusive of Israel, becomes \$2,100 million.

15. If, for the sake of clarification, we now concentrate on the non-oil-producing Arab countries (United Arab Republic, Lebanon and Jordan), we discover that in the period 1960-1970 they are expected to save close to \$6,800 million, \$3,100 million of which would be needed to maintain the capital stock. This means a total net savings of approximately \$3,700 million. To this we should add a sum of about \$700 million, which represents expected receipts from foreign sources, giving a total of investment funds of approximately \$4,400 million. For these countries to create employment opportunities for all the natural increase in the labour force and to ensure slightly better living conditions for the people, they will need additional investment resources in the magnitude of \$2,100 million.

16. The sum of \$2,100 million should be regarded as a minimum in that it is based on the assumption of modest increases in income. In all these countries *per capita* incomes are low and in some of them there is considerable under-employment of labour. Therefore, an acceleration in the rate of development over that envisaged is much to be desired, and it may be anticipated that, with better prospects for a steady capital inflow, some of the development plans which Governments may draw up within the next decade will aim at higher rates of growth than their present plans imply. In particular, in certain countries a more rapid rate of industrialization might be necessary in order to overcome the problem of under-employment and to make it possible to realize the maximum benefits of improved agricultural techniques. Given a will on the part of the non-oil-producing Arab countries to take the necessary measures to promote economic development, the limit to the possible rate of growth is more likely to be set by the availability of capital than by other factors. It is, however, important to note

that, strategic as capital is in the process of development, the rate of economic growth is also seriously affected by such factors as the preparation and execution of specific projects, the supply of skilled labour, and the possibilities of social adaptation to technological changes, not to mention the political factors.

17. In the light of the considerations set out above, it may be stated that an increase in the volume of capital for the non-oil-producing Arab countries, of the order of 20 per cent above the modest rate used as a basis for estimating minimum capital requirements between 1960 and 1970, would significantly increase the rate of economic development. This proposed 20 per cent increase represents a sum equal to \$1,300 million, and is derived from a total capital of \$6,500 million estimated to be the minimum capital requirements of the non-oil-producing Arab countries. Following this approach, the total capital needs of the non-oil-producing Arab countries, at an accelerated rate of growth, would become \$7,800 million, \$4,400 million of which is expected to become available from domestic savings and, to a much lesser extent, from other sources, leaving a deficit of \$3,400 million.

18. It is not necessary for our present purposes to attempt a measurement of the favourable consequences of an enhanced rate of economic development. Suffice it to say that both income and domestic savings are likely to increase significantly, thus reducing the capital needs of these countries in subsequent stages of development. Moreover, such an accelerated rate of growth would greatly assist in the establishment of a larger and more stable economic base at higher levels of income, and create better employment opportunities and a more attractive climate for investment.

19. Turning again to the region as a whole, if we now consider the approximately one million refugees as an additional population to be reintegrated with the region, an additional investment will be needed. We shall assume that such a reintegration takes place under conditions which would at least maintain the level of *per capita* incomes resulting from the expanded volume of investment discussed in paragraph 17 above. We may then suppose that the capital cost of providing one job for the refugees, within the context of such improved conditions, is \$3,300. This figure, which represents the simple capital-labour ratio for the area, is very close to other estimates. Now, as the present refugee population represents a labour force of approximately 380,000 which will increase to 500,000 by 1970, the total capital investment required to reintegrate the refugees by that date would be approximately \$1,700 million. It will be recalled that in paragraph 17 above it was estimated that the non-oil-producing Arab countries would have a capital deficit of \$3,400 million by 1970. Taking this amount together with the \$1,700 million estimates as necessary to reintegrate the refugees, wherever this may be within the area, a total capital shortfall of \$5,100 million, exclusive of the capital surpluses of the oil-producing countries. [*sic.*] It is to be expected, however, that a significant part of this capital will come from the capital surplus derived from oil production finding in-

creasing opportunities in the non-oil-producing countries.

20. The picture which emerges then is one of a region with great development potentialities, ultimately capable of meeting a large part, if not all, of its capital requirements. To bring the picture more sharply into focus, however, we must take into account two other circumstances. On the one hand, we must distinguish clearly between the capital-surplus and the capital-deficit Arab countries. On the other hand, we must recognize that, if an accelerated rate of development is to be initiated and sustained, there will be a considerable gap in investment funds in the immediate and early stages which will have to be filled by funds from outside the area. In the longer run, the extent to which these capital-deficit Arab countries will attract investment funds from the capital-surplus Arab countries of the area will depend largely upon their success in starting and sustaining their economic development on a scale sufficient to create an adequate demand for the employment of their available resources.

21. The foregoing analysis dealt with the entire 1960-1970 period, with a view to establishing orders of magnitude in regard to the total capital requirements and availabilities of the Arab Middle East and to providing a background for an assessment of the potential economic growth of the area. To gain insight into the immediate and so into the more urgent problems, however, it is necessary to focus attention on a shorter period, extending to 1965. Thus, the crucial question which remains to be answered is, what scale of investment is required to achieve this more immediate objective? Our estimates show that by 1965 the non-oil-producing Arab countries will need to provide for an additional labour force of approximately 1.8 million which will require, at an accelerated rate of growth, a net investment of \$3,900 million for their employment. Out of this amount, net domestic savings will supply approximately \$1,900 million and expected foreign capital inflow \$500 million, adding to a total of \$2,400 million. This would leave a shortfall of capital of approximately \$1,500 million. Over the same period, the oil-producing Arab countries of the area may be expected to have a capital surplus of over \$2,000 million and it may reasonably be supposed that a substantial part of this surplus will be invested in the capital-deficit Arab countries.

22. To provide the means for productive employment to the Palestine refugees—irrespective of where in the area they may be integrated—would require by 1965 an additional investment of \$1,500 million. The total

shortfall of capital by 1965 would then be of the order of \$3,000 million. If we consider this amount together with the shortfall of the non-oil-producing Arab countries and the expected flow of capital into these countries from the oil-producing countries of the area, we may obtain an indication of the scale on which capital from outside the area would be needed during the next five years or so. The shortfall thus to be made good will be of the order of \$1,500 million to \$2,000 million.

23. If within the next five years foreign capital of this order of magnitude is actually invested, it would—together with capital likely to become available from within the area—create a demand for labour sufficient to absorb, with rising *per capita* income, the increase in the labour force arising from the growth of population in the United Arab Republic, Lebanon and Jordan. Furthermore, it would also give equally productive employment to the Palestine refugees, irrespective of where in the area such employment may be created. After this initial period, the need for capital from outside the area might be expected to diminish considerably. This decline in the need for outside capital would be an expected consequence of the increase in the pace of economic development and the rise in the domestic supply of capital as a result of the general process of economic development, as well as from the growth of oil production.

24. The reintegration of the Palestine refugees into the surrounding economic life of the area is possible only within the context of general economic development. This condition sets certain economic dimensions to the problem. What those economic dimensions are, in terms of capital investment, has been approximately indicated. No attempt to deal with the problem on a scale considerably smaller than this analysis suggests can hope to be more than partially successful. There are, however, two critical aspects: the scale on which investment needs are conceived, and the timing of the investment. An immediate investment from outside the area in the order of magnitude indicated in paragraph 22 is a necessary condition to start the process of economic development on a sufficient scale.

25. The rate of economic development of the area in recent years and the fact of its still undeveloped natural resources are not only in themselves encouraging signs, but should lead us to regard the refugee population not as a liability but as an asset for the future. The more rapidly the refugees could be productively employed, the greater the contribution they would make to national income and thus also to the availability of domestic capital.

Table 1. Middle East: projected rates of growth in non-oil-producing countries, 1960-1970
(values in millions of U.S. dollars and population in thousands, unless otherwise indicated)

	Egypt	Syria	Lebanon	Jordan	Israel	Total
Population						
1960	25,941	4,560	1,601	1,056	2,126	35,284
1965	29,465	4,179	1,818	1,200	2,568	40,230
1970	33,706	5,924	2,080	1,372	2,995	46,077
net cumulative increase	7,765	1,364	479	316	869	10,793
Labour force						
1960	9,944	1,748	614	405	741	13,452
1965	11,192	1,967	691	456	871	15,177
1970	12,704	2,233	784	517	990	17,228
net cumulative increase	2,760	485	170	112	249	3,776
Gross national product						
1960	3,315	679	583	166	1,681	6,424
1965	3,842	866	744	188	2,031	7,671
1970	4,418	1,117	961	215	2,369	9,080
annual percentage increase (1950-1956)	5.0	10.0	7.0	5.0	13.0	—
annual percentage increase (1960-1970)	3.3	6.5	6.5	3.0	4.1	—
Gross per capita income						
1960	128	149	364	157	791	—
1965	130	167	409	157	791	—
1970	131	189	462	157	791	—
Gross investment, annual average 1950-1956	342	70	70	11	308	801
Gross investment as per cent of GNP, annual average 1950-1956	13.0	15.0	18.0	9.0	30.0	—
Total gross domestic savings						
1960	365	88	58	9	59	579
of which necessary for depreciation	(166)	(34)	(29)	(6)	(59)	(294)
1961-1965	1,994	512	338	48	323	3,215
of which necessary for depreciation	(906)	(197)	(169)	(33)	(323)	(1,628)
1966-1970	2,307	654	433	55	390	3,839
of which necessary for depreciation	(1,049)	(252)	(216)	(39)	(390)	(1,946)
1960-1970	4,666	1,254	829	112	772	7,633
of which necessary for depreciation	(2,121)	(483)	(414)	(78)	(772)	(3,868)
Gross savings as per cent of GNP						
1960-1970	11.0	13.0	10.0	5.0	3.5	—
Depreciation as per cent of GNP						
1960-1970	5.0	5.0	5.0	3.5	3.5	—
Total net domestic savings						
1960	199	54	29	3	0	284
1961-1965	1,088	315	169	15	0	1,587
1966-1970	1,258	402	217	16	0	1,893
1960-1970	2,545	771	415	34	0	3,765
Total consumption						
1960	2,950	591	525	157	1,622	5,845
1965	3,419	753	670	179	1,960	6,981
1970	3,932	972	865	204	2,286	8,259
Per capita consumption						
1960	114	130	328	149	763	—
1965	116	145	369	149	763	—
1970	117	164	416	149	763	—
Net investment necessary to create one job (U. S. dollars)	1,400	1,950	5,000	4,000	8,000	—

Table 1. (continued)

	Egypt	Syria	Lebanon	Jordan	Israel	Total
Number of jobs that can be provided with the expected net domestic savings						
1960	142	28	6	0.750	0	176.75
1961-1965	777	162	34	3.750	0	976.75
1966-1970	899	206	43	4.000	0	1,152.00
1960-1970	1,818	396	83	8.500	0	2,305.50
Surplus of labour						
1960	77	11	7	9.250	25	129.25
1961-1965	471	57	43	47.250	130	748.25
1966-1970	613	60	50	57.000	119	899.00
1960-1970	1,161	128	100	113.500	274	1,776.50
Capital necessary to employ surplus labour force						
1960	108	21	35	37	200	401
1961-1965	659	111	215	189	1,040	2,214
1966-1970	858	117	250	228	952	2,405
1960-1970	1,625	249	500	454	2,192	5,020
Expected inflow of foreign private capital						
1960	0	0	35	0	86	121
1961-1965	0	0	215	0	430	645
1966-1970	0	0	215	0	430	645
1960-1970	0	0	465	0	946	1,411
Outstanding official financial commitments						
1960	78	12	0	0	100	190
1961-1965	60	81	0	0	58	199
1966-1970	0	51	0	0	0	51
1960-1970	138	144	0	0	158	440
Required foreign official financing						
1960	30	9	0	37	14	90
1961-1965	599	30	0	189	552	1,370
1966-1970	858	66	35	228	552	1,709
1960-1970	1,487	105	35	454	1,088	3,169

The following exchange rates were used for the dollar:

Egypt	LE = 0.36
Syria	SL = 2.58
Lebanon	LL = 2.30
Jordan	JD = 0.36
Israel	IL = 1.80
Iraq	ID = 0.36

Other oil-producing countries: original figures in dollars.

Table 2. Middle East: projected rates of growth in oil-producing countries, 1960-1970
(values in millions of U.S. dollars and population in thousands, unless otherwise indicated)

	Iraq	Saudi Arabia	Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar	Total
Population				
1960	6,515	6,650	403	13,568
1965	7,400	7,554	459	15,413
1970	8,465	8,641	524	17,630
net cumulative increase	1,950	1,991	121	4,062
Labour force				
1960	2,498	2,549	155	5,202
1965	2,811	2,869	174	5,854
1970	3,191	3,257	197	6,645
net cumulative increase	693	708	42	1,443
Gross national product				
1960	1,188	669	574	2,431
1965	1,515	854	739	3,108
1970	1,935	1,090	953	3,978
annual percentage increase (1950-1956)	13.0	40.0	...	—
annual percentage increase (1960-1970)	6.3	6.3	6.6	—
Gross per capita income				
1960	182	101	142	—
1965	205	113	161	—
1970	229	126	182	—
Gross investment, annual average				
1950-1956	132	45	...	177
Gross investment as per cent of GNP, annual average				
1950-1956	17	13	...	—
Total gross domestic savings				
1960	249	153	287	689
of which necessary for depreciation	(59)	(27)	(20)	(106)
1961-1965	1,442	897	1,721	4,060
of which necessary for depreciation	(344)	(119)	(121)	(624)
1966-1970	1,854	1,157	2,210	5,221
of which necessary for depreciation	(440)	(205)	(155)	(800)
1960-1970	3,545	2,207	4,218	9,970
of which necessary for depreciation	(843)	(391)	(296)	(1,530)
Gross savings as per cent of GNP				
1960-1970	21.0	20.0	50.0	—
Depreciation as per cent of GNP				
1960-1970	5.0	3.5	3.5	—
Total net domestic savings				
1960	190	126	267	583
1961-1965	1,098	738	1,600	3,436
1966-1970	1,414	952	2,055	4,421
1960-1970	2,702	1,816	3,922	8,440
Total consumption				
1960	939	516	287	1,742
1965	1,197	663	369	2,229
1970	1,529	872	476	2,877
Per capita consumption				
1960	144	78	710	—
1965	162	88	800	—
1970	181	101	910	—

Net investment necessary to create one job (U.S. dollars)

2,340

1,800

6,000

Table 2. (continued)

	Iraq	Saudi Arabia	Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar	Total
Number of jobs that can be provided with the expected net domestic savings				
1960	85	70	148	303
1961-1965	490	412	889	1,791
1966-1970	631	532	1,142	2,305
1960-1970	1,206	1,014	2,179	4,399
Surplus (deficit) of labour				
1960	- 29	- 14	- 143	- 186
1961-1965	-177	- 92	- 870	-1,139
1966-1970	-251	-144	-1,117	-1,512
1960-1970	-457	-250	-2,130	-2,837
Surplus capital available for investment				
1960	65	25	257	347
1961-1965	396	165	1,566	2,127
1966-1970	562	258	2,010	2,830
1960-1970	1,023	448	3,833	5,304

The estimates of income, domestic savings and surplus capital available for investment reflect estimates of oil production and income based largely on a 1968 unpublished OPEC study. The conclusions of this study are more conservative than other estimates such as the projections of Middle East oil production published in 1968 by the Chase Manhattan Bank. According to the Chase Manhattan projections of oil production, the 1960-1970 surplus capital available for investment would be over \$5,000 million instead of \$5,300 million. For more details, see technical appendix.

Table 3. Middle East: regional totals and Palestine refugees, 1960-1970
 (values in millions of U.S. dollars and population in thousands, unless otherwise indicated)

	Middle East Total	Palestine Refugees
Population		
1960	48,852	1,021
1965	55,643	1,160
1970	63,707	1,327
net cumulative increase	14,855	306
Labour force		
1960	18,654	391
1965	21,031	440
1970	23,873	500
net cumulative increase	5,219	109
Gross National Product		
1960	8,855	
1965	10,779	
1970	13,058	
annual percentage increase (1950-1956)	—	
annual percentage increase (1960-1970)	—	
Gross per capita income		
1960	—	
1965	—	
1970	—	
Gross investment, annual average		
1950-1956	978	
Gross investment as per cent of GNP, annual average		
1950-1956	—	
Total gross domestic savings		
1960	1,268	
of which necessary for depreciation	(400)	
1961-1965	7,275	
of which necessary for depreciation	(2,252)	
1966-1970	9,060	
of which necessary for depreciation	(2,746)	
1960-1970	17,603	
of which necessary for depreciation	(5,398)	
Gross savings as per cent of GNP		
1960-1970	—	
Depreciation as per cent of GNP		
1960-1970	—	
Total net domestic savings		
1960	867	
1961-1965	5,023	
1966-1970	6,320	
1960-1970	12,205	
Total consumption		
1960	7,587	
1965	9,210	
1970	11,136	
Net investment necessary to create one job (US dollars)	2,113	
Number of jobs that can be provided with the expected net domestic savings		
1960	480	
1961-1965	2,768	
1966-1970	3,457	
1960-1970	6,703	

	Middle East Total	Palestine Refugees
Surplus of labour		
1960	129	391
1961-1965	748	49
1966-1970	899	60
1960-1970	1,777	500
Total capital deficit (non-oil-producing countries)		
1960	- 90	
1961-1965	-1,370	
1966-1970	-1,709	
1960-1970	-3,169	
Total capital surplus (oil-producing countries)		
1960	+ 347	
1961-1965	+2,127	
1966-1970	+2,830	
1960-1970	+5,304	

Table 4. Capital requirements and capital availabilities of the Arab Middle East, including Palestine refugees, 1960-1965
(millions of US dollars)

	Non-oil Arab countries ¹	Non-oil Arab countries ²	Palestine refugees ³	Total deficit	Oil-revenue surplus OEEC ⁴ CMB ⁵	Total surplus or deficit OEEC CMB
Total capital deficit						
1960	- 76	-108	-1,280	-1,464		
1961-1965	-818	-541	- 172	-1,531		
1960-1965	-894	-649	-1,452	-2,995		
Total capital surplus (oil-producing Arab countries)						
1960					+ 347 + 295	
1961-1965					+2,127 +2,612	
1960-1965					+2,474 +2,907	
Net capital position of the Arab Middle East						
1960						-1,117 -1,169
1961-1965						+ 596 +1,081
1960-1965						- 521 - 88

¹ Minimum capital requirements from outside in order to employ the natural increase in the labour force under conditions of a modest rise in income.

² Additional capital needed to accelerate the rate of economic development.

³ Based on a capital-labour ratio of \$3.300 which is the simple average for the area.

⁴ Based largely on OEEC projection of Middle East oil production.

⁵ Based on the Chase Manhattan Bank projection of Middle East oil production.

ANTI-ISLAMIC PROPAGANDA IN KAZAKHSTAN SINCE 1953

Chantal Quelquejay

IS it true, as some Western observers believe and others fear, that the friendship shown toward the Arab countries and toward the Muslim peoples as a whole by the Soviet Government since 1954-55 implies a recognition of the "progressive" character of Islam or the possibility of a genuine alliance between communism and Islam? Does it represent a real shift in Soviet Islamic policy or is it simply a tactical move?

In order to answer these questions it is necessary to examine the policy of the Soviet authorities with regard to their own Muslims, numbering around thirty million and inhabiting Central Asia, the northern and eastern Caucasus and the Middle Volga region.

This policy is perfectly straightforward; neither the Government's official friendship toward the Arab countries nor its sympathy with the liberation movement of the Muslim peoples has led to the slightest modification in its basic hostility for all religion.

Let us take, for example, the case of the Kazakhs, a Turkish and Muslim people numbering 3,099,000 in 1939. They inhabit the largest Muslim federal republic which has undergone, in recent years, a significant influx of Russian and Ukrainian settlers. If one considers the number of anti-religious publications which have appeared in Kazakhstan since the death of Stalin, one is forced to conclude that anti-Muslim propaganda has not ceased to exist.

Between March 1, 1953 and July 1, 1957 the following publications appeared:

- 26 anti-religious publications—
311,100 copies
- 24 of which were printed in Kazakh
—304,100 copies
- 1 in Russian—3,000 copies
- 1 in Chechen—4,000 copies

The Kazakh population numbers at present around 3,300,000 people. It may be said, therefore, that in the last five years one anti-religious publication has been put out for every ten people or, discounting the old illiterates and small children, for each family.

1953

KAZAKH LANGUAGE

GUREV, A. *Gbylym men din älemnin kurylyssy turaly*. ("Science and religion on the subject of the cosmic structure"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge—36 p., 20,000 copies (trans. from the Russian).

IL'NISKIY, N. P. *Adam sanasyndagby din qaldyptarym zhoju turaly*. ("The struggle against religious survivals in the people's conscience"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge—40 p., 15,000 copies—Conference minutes (trans. from Russian by S. Akhmetov).

KAGAROV, V. M. *Mishurindik biologiya zhane onyñ din qaldyktaryn zhojudagby roli*. ("Mishurinian biology and its role in triumph over religious survivals"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge—40 p., 20,000 copies—Conference minutes (trans. from Russian by B. Mazitov).

♦ Mlle. QUELQUEJAY is an associate of the Direction de la Documentation de la Présidence du Conseil, Paris. For this study she has used the Alma-Ata press (in Russian and Kazakh), the annual bibliographical lists edited by the Book Section of the Ministry of Culture Kazakh SSR: *Kitap Letopisi*, and a study by K. S. Bekmuhamedov and A. M. Dairova published by the State Library of Kazakhstan: *Audandyq Kitaphanalar Katolagi* (Alma-Ata 1955). The article was translated from the French by Helen Chavchavadze.

KÄKIMZHANOV, A. *Islam dininiñ reaktstajalyq mäsli turaly*. ("The reactionary nature of Islam"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—60 p., 20,000 copies.

PAVELKIN, P. *Dini sogysrenimder zbäne onyñ zjany*. ("Religious superstitions and their danger"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge—172 p., 20,000 copies. Collection of articles compiled by Zh. Kulerov (trans. from Russian by M. Ishmuhametov).

PROKOF'EV, V. I. *Moral' zbäne dñn*. ("Morals and religion"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—40 p., 15,000 copies (trans. from Russian by R. Syzdykov).

SOKOLOV, V. G. *Dini ädet-gburyphtar men mejram-dardyn shygby zbäne olardyñ reaktstajasy mäsli*. ("The origin and reactionary nature of religious rites and ceremonies"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat* (trans. from Russian by Kh. Kutkhov).

1954

KAZAKH LANGUAGE

VATAN-ÖGLY. *Panislamlizm bäm pantürkizm anglo-amerika imperlizmynyñ kuralıdır*. ("Panislamlizm and panturkizm—Instruments of Anglo-American imperialism"). Alma-Ata, edited by the *Jangi hayat* Journal—59 p., 2,100 copies.

KAGAROV, V. M. *Micburindik biologija zbäne dñn-shir dik qaldyktardy zbajundagby onyñ roli*. ("The role of the Mishurinian biology in the triumph over religious survivals"). Alma-Ata, Ministry of Culture Kazakh SSR—36 p., 3,000 copies (trans. from Russian by A. Dzhokebaev) modified second edition of a pamphlet published in 1953).

LUPALO, I. G. *Gbylym dñge qarshy*. ("Science versus religion"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge (trans. from Russian by T. Balagayev).

MIKHNEVICH, D. E. *Markizm-Leninizm dñn turaly zbäne ony zhenudin zbaldary degen taqyryqqa lektor-gba metodikalıykenes*. ("Methodological advice to lecturers on the subject of Marxism-Leninism on religion and means of triumphing over religion"). Alma-Ata, Ministry of Culture Kazakh SSR—30 p., 3,000 copies (trans. from Russian).

PROKOF'EV, V. I. *Orystyñ uly gbylymdary dñni zboqqa senusbilikterben küreste*. ("Great Russian scholars in the fight against religious prejudices"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge—80 p., 20,000 copies (trans. from Russian by B. Shorabaev and A. Azhiev).

SATPAEV, T., President of the Academy of Sciences Kazakh SSR. *Gbylym men dñn zberdiñ zbarytlywy turaly*. ("The origin of the world according to science and religion"). Alma-Ata, Ministry of Culture Kazakh SSR—22 p., 3,000 copies (trans. from Russian by Aytbaev).

EMME, A. M. *Gbylym men dñn zber ästünde strıbilik-tñ paja bolwy turaly*. ("The origin of life on earth according to science and religion"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgo-*

sizdat—123 p., 20,000 copies (trans. from Russian under the direction of D. Kudabaev).

1955

a) KAZAKH LANGUAGE

LENIN, V. I. *Dñn turaly*. ("About the Religion"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—Kazakh affiliation of the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute—84 p., 20,000 copies (Collection of articles translated from Russian).

BISENOV, Kh. *Islam dininiñ shygby zbäne onyñ taptyq mäsli*. ("The origin and nature of class in Islam"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge—32 p., 10,000 copies (Conference minutes).

PROKOF'EV, V. *Dñn gbylym men progresstñ zshwy*. ("Religion—enemy of science and progress"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—72 p., 10,000 copies (trans. from Russian by T. Mukarov).

SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV, I. I. *Dñn turaly ojar*. ("Thoughts on religion"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—40 p., 10,000 copies (trans. from Russian by Shalabaev).

b) RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

KOZLOVA, K. I. *Nauka o stroenii vzlennoj v bor'be protiv religioznykh predrasudkov*. ("Cosmology in the struggle against religious prejudices"). Alma-Ata, Ministry of Culture Kazakh SSR—40 p., 3,000 copies.

1956

a) KAZAKH LANGUAGE

BASKIN, M. P. *Materializm zbäne dñn*. ("Materialism and religion"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—144 p., 10,000 copies (trans. from Russian by S. Orzanov).

„GUSLAVSKI, V. M. *Bilim zbäne kudaigba senn*. ("Knowledge and belief in God"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—64 p., 10,000 copies (trans. from Russian by Z. Oryspaev).

MEDVEDEV, N. V. *Gbylym men dñn psikhiyalıy kublystar zbajunda*. ("Psychic phenomena according to science and religion"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—84 p., 10,000 copies (trans. from Russian by K. Salabaev).

b) CHECHEN LANGUAGE

KOLONISKIY, P. F. *What is religion?* (Exact title unknown). Alma-Ata, *Znamya Truda*—44 p., 4,000 copies.

1957 and 1958

Information on anti-religious publications appearing in 1957 and 1958 is still incomplete. We know of three works published in Kazakh in 1957 and one which appeared in the beginning of 1958.

a) 1957

MARX-ENGELS. *Dñn turaly*. ("Religion"). Alma-Ata, *Kazgosizdat*—Kazakh affiliation of the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute—316 p., 15,000 copies (trans. from the Russian).

SYDYKOV, Z. *Gbylym men dīn zherdīn zharatyluy turaly.* ("The origin of the world according to science and religion") and a third pamphlet by MUSABAEVA whose title seems to be "The importance of Pavlov's doctrine in the struggle against idealism and religion"—written and published in Kazakh. Alma-Ata, *Kazgizdat*—Kazakh society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge—44 p., 10,000 copies.

b) 1958

GUREV, G. A. A pamphlet, whose title is: "Scientific previsions and religious prejudices," (trans. from the Russian). Alma-Ata, *Kazgizdat*—88 p., 8,000 copies.

The following assumptions are based on an analysis of these works:

1) *Anti-religious efforts are directed primarily at the Kazakh community of Kazakhstan.*

The total population of Kazakhstan numbered 8,488,000 inhabitants¹ on April 1, 1956, of which only a minority was Kazakh, the majority being Russians and Ukrainians. The last Soviet census of 1939 registered a total of 3,099,000 Kazakhs in the Union, around 2,500,000 of whom inhabit Kazakhstan and the remainder Uzbekistan, Kirghizia and the RSFSR. At present Kazakhs hardly represent more than 40% of the total population of their republic.

One must therefore assume:

- that the authorities consider Orthodox Christianity less of a danger to the regime than Islam;
- that the Russian and Ukrainian population has become less attached to its religion than the Kazakhs are to Islam.

Observations made by foreign visitors to Kazakhstan in the summer of 1958 prove that this last is not the case. In Alma-Ata there are two churches and close to one thousand persons attend the Sunday service; the city has only one mosque and scarcely two hundred and fifty persons and no young people attend the prayer on Friday.

Among the different national minorities which inhabit Kazakhstan (Dungans, Uyghurs, etc.) only the Chechens (Caucasians deported to Kazakhstan in 1944 and rehabilitated in 1957) have access to an anti-religious publi-

cation in their own language. The tenacity with which these mountain people cling to Islam explains the importance attached to anti-religious propaganda directed at their community.

2) Kazakh authors play a minimal role in the anti-religious propaganda effort. Only five of the twenty-seven aforementioned publications are original pieces written in Kazakh by indigenous authors (KEKIMZHANOV, VATAN-OGLY, BISENOV, SYDYKOV and MUSABAEVA). The other twenty-two are translations from the Russian. Could this be, as is often implied in the Alma-Ata press, because of the fundamental aversion with which indigenous intellectuals view attacks on the Muslim religion?

3) The subjects of these anti-religious publications reflect the new so-called "scientific" method, set forth by Stalin's successors, of fighting religious prejudices.

The publications are grouped as follows:

Fifteen—(two of which appeared in 1953, five in 1954, two in 1955, three in 1956, two in 1957, one in 1958) deal with the irrecconcilable opposition of science and religion; Five—(four of which appeared in 1953, one in 1954) condemn traditional customs and superstitions; reveal the injurious nature of religious rites; compare "reactionary" religious ethics to the "constructive" ethics of communism;

Three—(one of which appeared in 1953, one in 1954, one in 1955) directly attack Islam; Four—(two of which appeared in 1955, one in 1956, one in 1957) are general works or translations of Marxist-Leninist classics (Lenin, Marx).

Direct attacks against Islam and religious beliefs, which gave rise to four publications in 1953 and one in 1954, ceased to appear after 1955; at that time in Kazakhstan, as in all the Soviet republics, new editions and translations of Marx's and Lenin's writings were undertaken which are, if anything, more violent and incisive than the writings of present-day anti-religious propaganda specialists.

4) Of all the Muslim peoples of Central Asia,

1. *Narodnoe Khozjajstvo SSSR*—Moscow, 1957, pp. 24-29.

the Kazakhs have been the least "worked over" by anti-religious propaganda efforts.²

We lack sufficient data in order to establish any comparisons for the period between 1 January 1953 and 1 July 1957 but certain comparisons can be drawn for the period 1 January 1955 to 1 August 1957.

During these two and one half years, forty-nine anti-religious tracts were published in Central Asia as a whole and 670,000 copies in local languages (not including works in Russian or other languages) were distributed as follows:

Uzbek SSR—22 works—479,000 copies
 Karakalpak SSR—2 works—5,000 copies
 Kazakhstan SSR—8 works—78,000 copies
 Tadzhikistan SSR—7 works—38,000 copies
 Kirghiz SSR—6 works—38,000 copies
 Turkmen SSR—4 works—31,000 copies

It is interesting to note that less anti-religious publications were distributed among the Kazakhs on a population basis than among the other central Asian Muslims.

Peoples	Number of inhabitants according to 1959 census	Number of copies of anti-religious tracts	Number of inhabitants per copy of anti-religious tracts
Uzbeks	4,844,021	479,000	10.1%
Kirghiz	844,306	39,000	22.6%
Turkmens	811,769	31,000	26.1%
Tadzhiks	1,228,964	38,000	32.3%
Karakalpaks	182,559	5,000	36.5%
Kazakhs	3,099,000	78,000	49.2%

5) After the death of Stalin in March 1953 until the middle of 1957, anti-religious propaganda efforts were relaxed in Kazakhstan as well as in the other Muslim republics of the USSR.

In 1956 and in the beginning of 1957, not one anti-religious article was printed in the Alma-Ata daily press or in any Kazakh magazine. The implication was that either Soviet policy toward Islam had changed or that

twenty-five years of anti-religious efforts had accomplished their purpose. As one Pakistani described the situation on returning from a trip to Central Asia in 1952: "In Kazakhstan Islam is not dead but it is on its last legs . . ."³

During the first three months of 1957, the Soviet authorities appear to have reversed their decision and realized the danger of weakening their campaign against Islam. This danger does not proceed so much from a resurgence of religious practices, of which there is no indication, as from the reappearance of "bourgeois nationalist manifestations" as it is described in the Alma-Ata press, which were favored by the unquestionable ideological relaxation which followed Stalin's death. In the Muslim republics these nationalist manifestations" are closely bound to the "reformist" velleities which are constantly forcing their way into the Communist Party and which take the most diversified forms: idealization of the feudal past, wish to keep the native language free of Russian influence, exaggerated importance accorded to pre-revolutionary national literature, etc. . . .

Resumption of the anti-religious campaign Summer 1957

The new anti-Muslim campaign which began in June 1957 was preceded in March of that year by a series of doctrinaire articles which appeared in a number of important Alma-Ata magazines and clearly pointed the direction the Party line was to take.

In the second issue of *Trudy Sektora Filosofii y Prava* of the Academy of Sciences Kazakh SSR (Alma-Ata, March 1957, pp. 54-67) appears an article by A. Iskakov entitled "*Chokan Valikhanov o reakcionnoj roli Islama*" which presents Valikhanov as a progressive democrat, declared enemy of Kazakh feudalism, strong supporter of his people's collaboration with the "great Russian people" and militant atheist,

2. The Kazakhs, like all the old nomadic peoples of Central Asia, were Islamized in a superficial manner at a relatively recent date and have therefore never been fervent followers of Islam. Their clergy has always been small (except in the southern regions of the republic inhabited by Uzbeks); Muslim religious rites are scarcely observed, if at all; in short, common law (*adat*) has always prevailed over Muslim law (*sharia*).

3. Riaz Ali Shah—"A doctor looks at the Soviet Union"—*Dawn* (Karachi) 3 August 1952.

4. Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov (1835-1865)—ethnographer and orientalist—great grandson of Khan Ablay—one of the first authors in the Kazakh language.

irreconcilably opposed to "Islamic obscurantism."

Inspired by the writings of Valikhanov, Iskakov describes Islam as a "conservative, reactionary, anti-scientific and anti-Russian" religion: "Its moral code condemns its followers to fatalism" (p. 59) and "prevents them from participating in the development of their country." (p. 60)

"Islam is a religion foreign to Central Asia, which was forcibly imposed on this area by the Arab invaders who destroyed a flourishing national civilization." (pp. 60-61) In the thirteenth century it was disseminated by the Tatar clergy and in the nineteenth century by the Tsarist administration who "used it to stultify and oppress the Kazakh masses." (pp. 64-65) "This foreign religion has proven more harmful than the ancient shamanism of the Kazakhs." (p. 66) "It has annihilated their culture and curbed the development of their language and literature." (p. 61)

"Islam is a religion of hate founded on the Holy War dogma which impedes the establishment of harmonious relations between the Russian and Kazakh peoples." (p. 62)

Finally, "Islam is a class religion used by the propertied classes to oppress the working masses." (p. 63)

In this article, Iskakov appears to be pursuing the specific aim of providing new arguments to be used by the specialists on atheism.

During the same period, two important studies appeared in Vol. I (4)⁵ of the *News*, (a series on history, economy, philosophy and law) published by the Academy of Sciences:

The first study is written by D. Kshibekov,⁶ candidate in philosophical sciences at the Philosophy and Law Department of the Academy of Sciences Kazakh SSR; it is: "O preodolenii perezhitkov Islama." (pp. 108-115)

The second study is written by N. D. Dzhandil'din, secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party: "K voprosu o

kriticheskom ispolzovanii kul'turnovo nasledija proshlovo." (pp. 3-36)

Kshibekov insists that "the struggle against Muslim religious prejudices" is one of the most important lessons in the education of a communist. He reiterates Iskakov's arguments:

"Islam is a foreign religion imposed on the Kazakhs at a relatively recent date (XVIII-XIX centuries)."

"Islam is a pessimistic doctrine, degrading to human dignity."

"Islam, like all religions, is a doctrine incompatible to science."

"Islam is a 'class' doctrine which defends the propertied classes, encourages social oppression and lowers the woman to a condition of slavery."

Finally, "Islam is a fanatic and intolerant religion which hinders a rapprochement between peoples."

Kshibekov cites numerous examples to prove the strength of religious feelings not only in the masses but also among the intellectuals; he calls attention to the vitality of the Muslim clergy which "is no longer, as in 1917, a sclerotic, traditionalist and bureaucratic cast."

"The servants of the Muslim cult are now endeavoring to adapt their religion and religious rites to the new living conditions and the higher cultural level of the Soviet man . . ." (p. 114)

He appeals to the intellectuals and above all the writers to resume the anti-religious struggle on a scientific basis by exposing the "idealistic" and "absurd" nature of Islam:

"The continued existence of Islam is injurious because it obscures the conscience and impedes the development of communism."

Kshibekov emphasizes the difference between the policy of the Soviet Government as regards religion and that of the Communist Party. The former is liberal and tolerant and acknowledges "the right of each citizen to follow the religion of his choice," while the latter which "educates the Soviet people in the spirit of scientific ma-

5. *Qazaq SSR Ghylym Akademiasynyñ Habarlary—Izvestiya Akademii Nauk Kazakhskaya SSR*—Alma-Ata, March 1957.

6. Kshibekov's article was analyzed by H. Carrere d'Encausse in his article entitled "Awakening of Islam in the Soviet Union? Kazakhstan," which appeared in *L'Afrique et l'Asie*, second quarter of 1958, pp. 35-47.

terialism cannot consider religion a private affair. It cannot and should not remain indifferent. It must combat religion." (p. 113)

Dzhandil'din calls attention to the bourgeois-nationalist deviations which are coming to light among the Kazakh youth and intellectuals, perhaps as a result of events in Hungary. The bourgeois-nationalist problem is indirectly tied up with Islam. According to Dzhandil'din, the principal manifestations of nationalism at present are evidenced in the desire to protect the Kazakh language from Russification and the wish to safeguard the national culture which is unquestionably heavily influenced by Islam.

Finally, an article by S. Beisembaev, the director of the Science and Culture Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, entitled "Ideino vospitatel'naja rabota sredi studencheskoi molodezhi" appeared in the magazine *Kommunist Kazakhstana* (No. 3, March 1957, pp. 22-28—Alma-Ata) which calls for "an energetic fight against the artifices of bourgeois ideology to expose provocations and destroy 'amoral' attitudes." (In Soviet terminology this last term applies generally to such traditional customs as polygamy and marriage of minor girls.)

Administrative measures were to follow the appearance of these three articles.

On June 6, 1957, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan met in plenary session and adopted a resolution on "measures to be taken with a view to improving the working organization and policy of the Communist Party in the Kazakh republic." This resolution was published in the June 7, 1957 issue of *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*. It represents a violent attack against bourgeois nationalist tendencies and religious manifestations reminiscent of the Stalinist era.

... Atheistic propaganda is unsatisfactory . . . The Society for the diffusion of scientific and political knowledge (which leads the anti-religious fight) and the Party organizations have relaxed their educational operations, committed serious errors and politically misinterpreted several questions relating to the cultural development of Kazakhstan . . . The publication of works on anti-religious subjects is inadequate . . .

The Central Committee appeals for greater vigilance in all the Party organizations in the struggle against religious manifestations.

One month later on July 20, a second resolution was adopted on the "discriminating utilization of the cultural heritage of the Kazakh people." This resolution was published in *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* on July 21, 1957. It condemns Kazakh intellectuals for "indiscriminately exalting pre-revolutionary art and poets, independent of their ideological and political tendencies; for failing to make a distinction between progressive and reactionary elements and forgetting Lenin's thesis according to which only democratic and socialist elements may be borrowed from the past and only on condition that these elements serve as a counter-balance to the culture and to bourgeois nationalism."

These two resolutions set off a siege of ideological re-adjustment directed both at cultural nationalism and at the Muslim religion.

In July *Kommunist Kazakhstana* (No. 7, 1957, pp. 15-22) published another article by Dzhandil'din entitled "O nekotorykh voprosakh razvitiya natsional'noy kul'tury" in which he reiterates with even greater intensity the accusations launched in March against Kazakh "deviationist" intellectuals.

There are among us individuals who are disseminating provocative rumors which malign the Communist Party and its national policy . . . It is true that these monsters are rare; unfortunately their mischievous ideas are shared by a section of our intelligentsia . . .

Dzhandil'din attributes the existence of nationalist tendencies among Kazakh intellectuals to the "penetration of bourgeois reactionary ideology into our country" and to "ignorance of Marxism-Leninism." He demonstrates that Kazakh opposition to the Party line is concentrated around two problems: preservation of the national language and safeguarding the cultural patrimony. In concluding, he advocates the necessity of resuming the fight against "all those who are hostile to progress and friendship between peoples in the name of cultural or religious traditions." Dzhandil'din points out that the struggle against nationalism and the struggle against Islam become confused:

Not all the champions of feudal customs and defenders of survivals of the past have disappeared.⁷ They justify their attitude by their defence of national traditions. We must learn to distinguish between authentic national traditions and malicious survivals of out-dated cultures and primitive customs of certain decomposed elements.

In September an important article by Kh. Bisenov entitled "Reaktsionnaya *Sushchnost'* religii" was published in *Kommunist Kazakhstana* (No. 9, 1957, pp. 37-43). This article is a summary in Russian of a pamphlet published in Kazakh in 1955: "*Islam dīnīnīn shygbuy zhāne onyū taptyq māni.*" Bisenov points out the origin of all religions, their anti-scientific nature and their utilization by the imperialists. He mentions in particular two religions prevalent in Kazakhstan: the Protestant sects (Adventists, Baptists and Jehovah Witnesses) to which the new immigrants belong and Islam which exists "in a survival form" among a section of Kazakhs and the Uyghurs. He does not even refer to Orthodox Christianity.

According to Bisenov, Islam is manifested in traditional customs: polygamy, marriage of minor girls, observance of religious holidays and the Ramadhan fast, pilgrimages to local holy places:

'Anti-religious propaganda is inadequate, bureaucratic and badly organized . . . It makes no allowances for the 'new attitude of the clergy' which has adapted itself to new Soviet conditions. The fight against Islam must continue with renewed vigor because the English and American imperialists are using the Muslim groups to combat the national liberation movement of the Asian peoples.'

The campaign against religious survivals has not remained purely verbal. Words have been carried into actions in the application of new methods.

Novikov, in an article in *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 30 July 1957, gives the city of Taldy-Kurgan, the main center of the *oblast* of the same name, as an example: "The *gorkom* (City Communist Party Committee) recently began to occupy itself with anti-religious propaganda."

The propaganda is now made by conferences

directed by the Propaganda-Agitation Section of the *gorkom* on the following subjects: "Marxism-Leninism and religion;" "the origin of religious holidays;" "the contradiction of medicine and religion." These conferences are conducted in business enterprises and factories and the names of the speakers are all Russian.

To reach the non-workers, anti-religious discussions are held on the radio, at motion picture showings and in the public parks.

"Collective or individual" discussions with "believers" are encouraged to supplement the conferences (this proposal was specifically mentioned in the *gorkom* resolution.) These discussions are to be held at *Agitpunkt*, recreation activities and at public anti-religious evenings which are organized by the Party or the society for the diffusion of political and scientific knowledge.

Here is an example of one such evening: The following subjects were discussed before an audience of 400 persons: What is the origin of belief in God? What is the origin of life on earth? Is there life beyond the grave?

Following the discussion an anti-religious film was shown and the meeting ended with entertainment.

Finally, to stimulate Party vigilance, political education groups have been set up within all the basic Communist Party organizations. These groups meet once or twice a month to discuss various political and cultural problems. Anti-religious propaganda plays an important role in these discussions. The group within the basic organization of the Agricultural Bank, for example, studied "the attitude of the Communist Party toward religion."

"With the Orthodox and Muslim clergy and that of the sects intensifying their action," Novikov considers this program inadequate. He proposes that anti-religious propaganda be extended to the educational institutions which have virtually "abandoned the struggle against religious feelings among the pupils and their parents."

7. In Soviet terminology, the expression "feudal customs" applies to the traditional attitude toward the woman: polygamy, the veil, confinement of married women. The expression "survivals of the past" applies more particularly to observance of religious rites.

"Certain education workers falsely believe that there is no longer any need to uphold atheism among the students."

Novikov considers this attitude dangerous "in view of the fact that the churches and mosques are not only frequented by old people but also by students."

In September, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (20/9/57) announced that classes in atheism had been introduced into the newly created Faculties of History, Philosophy and Economy at the Alma-Ata University of Marxism-Leninism. In November the Communist Party held a republic-wide seminary in Alma-Ata for propaganda and conference workers specialized in anti-religious action. Three hundred persons attended these sessions at which the following problems were discussed:

"Dialectic-materialism—philosophic basis of militant atheism"; "Atheistic education of the youth in the school and in the family"; "Methods for individual work with believers"; "Medicine versus religious superstitions and sorcery"; "Scientific importance of soviet sputniks in discrediting religion." (*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* 23/11/57)

With the resumption of the fight against religious survivals, the Party strengthened its guard against "nationalist" tendencies:

At a meeting of the "artistic and literary workers" active in the city and *oblast* of Alma-Ata, Dzhandil'din lectured on ideological work and violently attacked the Kazakh literary magazine *Qazaq Ądebiaty*, the organ of the Union of Soviet Kazakh Writers, and *Sovietskiy Kazakhstan* for having published "ideologically dangerous" articles. (*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* 8 October 1957)

On December 26, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan proclaimed in its resolution the necessity for combatting revisionism and other manifestations of bourgeois nationalism. (*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* 27 December 1957)

This two-pronged campaign continued into 1958. An article by D. Kshibekov, "O feodal'no baiskikh perezhitkakh i ikh preodolenii" (the title is in Russian but the text is in Kazakh), appeared at the beginning of 1958 in the pub-

lication of the Republican Academy of Sciences. This article made quite a disturbance and received much publicity.

Another important article appeared on 4 January 1958 in the magazine *Sovietskiy Kazakhstan* (No. 12, December 1957). This article was written by N. Dzhandil'din, secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party. In it he attacks "revisionist and nationalist bourgeois" tendencies which he has perceived in various Kazakh literary revues, notably in *Qazaq Ądebiaty*, which endeavors to defend the purity of the Kazakh language against Russification, and in *Ądabijat Zhāne Iskustvo*, which idealizes "reactionary" early nineteenth century poets.

The Alma-Ata press also continues to publish anti-religious articles:

In *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 23 January 1958, appears an article by V. Shtein entitled "Chemy nauchil sluchai v Sary-Sagane" and in the April 6 edition of the same newspaper appears an article by M. Burabaev and G. Valikhanov entitled "Reshitel'no borot'sja s feodal'no baiskimi perezhitkami."

Notably absent in the Kazakh periodical press are attacks against the Orthodox Religion, in spite of the fact that there are now as many Russians in Kazakhstan as there are Kazakhs and they are, at least in appearances, more attached to their religion than the Kazakhs are to Islam. In fact, during the whole of 1957, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* published only four articles against the Christian sects, of which three were directed at the Jehovah Witnesses—a sect which is particularly prevalent in Moldavia and was brought to Kazakhstan by Moldavian immigrants (the 1 September, 21 November and 8 December issues) and the fourth at the Baptists (3 April 1957 edition).

What does the new anti-Islamic campaign in Kazakhstan mean?

It is a known fact that Islam has always been superficially accepted in this area. In the nineteenth century, the Kazakh intellectual elite, while not openly anti-Muslim, was unenthusiastic and indifferent to Islam. The Kazakh intellectuals, Chokan Valikhanov, Ibrai Altynsarin, Abai Kunanbaev and the ideologists of

Alash Orda were modernists, generally hostile to conservative traditionalism. On the eve of the Revolution, the Kazakh nomadic masses were still closer to the ancient shamanism than they were to Islam.

The anti-religious struggle which began in 1924 did not, therefore, meet with a resistance anywhere near as strong as it did, for example, in the main centers of Uzbekistan. It must certainly have been much easier to separate the Kazakhs from a religion to which they had not yet been converted as late as the eighteenth century, and even the nineteenth, than it was the Uzbeks or the Tadzhiks who were Islamized in the height of the Middle Ages.

Moreover, the Kazakh culture, unlike that of the Uzbeks or the Tadzhiks, owes little to

Islam. Arab and Persian influences have always been weak, both in the linguistic and in the literary vein.

The Kazakh national and cultural tradition, perceptible in the national epics (*Koblandy-Batyr*, *Alpamyrs* . . .) and in the works of the Pleiade of nineteenth century writers, stems from the traditions of the Mongol Empire and the memory of the nomadic tribes.

How then can this insistence on fighting a religion, which no longer appears to present any kind of a serious obstacle to the edification of socialism, be explained? Could it be, as often occurs in the Soviet Union, a "diversionist campaign" against Islam in order to achieve indirectly Kazakh nationalism?

GENERAL

THE ARAB FEDERALISTS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, by Hassan Saab. Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1958. 322 pages. Bibliography and index. No price indicated.

Reviewed by William R. Polk

In his introduction, the author states that the "subject-matter of this book (is) the final form such a (comprehensive Arab) unity may take." To this reviewer, that statement represents a fairer estimate of the purpose of the book than the title, for the author is clearly concerned not with a historical study of the Ottoman period, but rather is, in the whole work, in search of elements of Arab unity with possible relevance for today. In a highly eclectic ramble through Arab institutions and writings from pre-Islamic tribal groupings to last year's journalism, he is in quest of anything remotely resembling federalism.

Part I, entitled "Roots," deals with Arab tribal organizations, the Islamic polity, and the institutions of the medieval Islamic state. Part II, "Modern Manifestations," ranges over Persian and Turkish groupings—of all varieties—in the Umayyad and 'Abbasid states, the Turkish tribal incursions in the disintegrating 'Abbasid state, the nature of Mount Lebanon's government following the Ottoman conquest, and the impact of the Ottoman decline on the

Arabs. Part III, beginning on page 142, begins to deal with the subject-matter of the book's title, and lastly, under "Final Remarks," the author tries to make a case for the relevance of his study to the modern scene.

This is a difficult book to assess. If it were to be taken simply as political writing, it would attain a validity it lacks as a serious study. The author provides a wide range of quotations (of which nearly half the book is composed), but these are chosen without evident regard for their varying value. Many come from outdated sources (e. g., Robinson-Smith on Arab tribal totemism, page 6), general texts, and curiously inappropriate studies (e. g., Toynbee's *Study of History* on "Arab public feeling" in the time of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, page 172). Even in the short section (pages 200-264), which actually deals with the Arab "Federalists," no primary sources are used and even many of the important secondary sources are not mentioned. For example, al-Kawakibi is cited only through a (and not the best) secondary source.

Mistakes abound. Apart from numerous printing errors, serious factual errors are evident. The origin of the vizirate is not appreciated (pages 53-54), the nature of conversion to Islam is highly simplified (page 55), fiefs did not (as would seem to be indicated on page 100) come with the decline of trade, but far

pre-dated it, the origin of the Ottoman Empire (page 80) is not understood, Turkish was certainly not called "Ottoman" in order "to create among all these (non-Turkish Muslims) the sense of a common tongue" (page 189).

These are minor, however, in comparison with other criticisms. In the first place, it does not seem that the author himself was ever clear about his subject and consequently the book lacks purpose and unity. If his subject is that of the title, most of the book is simply irrelevant. Secondly, for whatever purpose, the kinds of questions which he asks of his materials are often so phrased as to be useless (e. g., page 41), or self-answering (e. g., "... did pre-Islamic Arabia lack any unity of political organization in spite of the existence of a sense of unity among all pre-Islamic Arabs? In answering this question, it should be taken into consideration that in this period of its history, Arabia was in a state of transition from disunity to unity," page 11).

Less immediately evident is a weakness of historical sense: on the one hand, institutions are discussed as though they did not vary throughout the ages, and, on the other, a modern appraisal is made of an early situation and it is then assumed to have been so seen in an earlier age (e. g., a modern political scientist and Muhammad on Jewish nationalism in ancient Israel, pages 21-22).

Particularly obscuring these weaknesses is a lavish use of footnotes, such jargon as "geo-strategic," "socio-tribal," "structural-political," "geo-historic," and such vague but grand writing as:

"The Abbasid stage of the Arabo-Persian-Turkish struggle for political supremacy in *Dar-el-Islam* produced an intellectual pseudo-racialist movement which reflected some aspects of the struggle of ideas and ideals which animated the struggle for power" (page 83).

The lack of concrete evidence derived from close study of primary sources gives rise to such vague phrases as "... Arab consciousness passed with some agony through many alternatives before it took the separatist course during the First World War" (page 79).

These weaknesses are the more disturbing because Mr. Saab's basic idea is sound: it is pre-

cisely the sort of study implied by the title of the book which we need. And in the short section in which he deals with this topic, the author shows he has some interesting points which deserve being explored more fully.

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BODY MARKING IN SOUTHWESTERN ASIA, by Henry Field. Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, 1958. xiii + 162; 37 figures, bibliography and index. No price indicated.

Reviewed by Malcolm Quint

Henry Field has done a remarkable piece of work in collecting and compiling a large number of tattoo patterns used by Arabs, Kurds, Turkmans, Yazidis, Jews, Assyrians, Sluba, Qawliya, and other groups in the Arab World, Iran, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and Turkey. His descriptions of the various types of body markings used by these peoples and their methods of application form an interesting bit of esoterica, but unfortunately contribute little or nothing to our understanding of these groups who are coming more and more into the forefront of world affairs as they are caught up in the twentieth century with its conflict of ideologies and its political and economic ferment.

Field, in scattered sentences throughout his compilation, hints at the very real social significance of body marking in Southwestern Asia. Unfortunately he never gets down to an adequate interpretation or analysis of the relevance of tattooing, scarification, and decoration with henna and kohl to the societies which practice these types of body marking. Field, for instance, discusses at some length the designs, frequencies, positions, etc. of tattoos among the Albu Muhammad and Sua'id Tribes of Southeastern Iraq. During the twenty-one months I lived with these tribes, I had an opportunity to observe many aspects of body marking, and agree with Field that it is a subject well worth investigation. The basic shortcoming in this volume is the fact that the author contents himself with suggesting

that, for example, tattooing among males is therapeutic in nature. He ignores the more relevant questions as to why these people consider tattooing therapeutic, and what there is in it which has a therapeutic effect. Obviously for a custom (and in this case one dealing with alleviation of pain) to persist, there must be some relationship between it and the desired goal. The custom itself is merely one portion of a complex of factors, in this case including such things as notions of the causes of disease and control of supernatural forces.

Among these same tribes, the tattooing of females for non-therapeutic reasons may be infinitely more significant than Field suggests. I have found that females are invariably tattooed in intricate patterns sometime between completion of marriage negotiations and the wedding ceremony. I would suggest that the tattooing ritual represents a formal recognition by the community of a change in status from that of *Hāditha* (young girl) to *'ārūṣ* (bride). I would further compare the pre-marital tattooing of girls to the circumcision of boys, since both represent transitions in status and are hedged about with equal amounts of ritual and ceremony, although necessarily of a differing nature.

It would seem that Field has done the preliminary, and parenthetically, the simplest portion of the job. What remains to be done is the analysis and integration of this data into a body of knowledge and understanding about these peoples. It is sincerely to be hoped that the author in a future volume will make some attempt to indicate the relevance of his material.

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BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST, by C. M. Woodhouse. Publications de l'Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, No. 30. Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1959. 59 pages. No price indicated.

Reviewed by Halford L. Hoskins

The Director General of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in the three lectures that comprise the substance of this small volume, has set forth the product of much

thought and meditation on the nature of British interests in the Middle East over a period of some two hundred years. His study is an exceptionally fine and praiseworthy piece of historical interpretation. Without stint of admiration, the reviewer would wish only to see a slight shift in emphasis here and there; for example, he suggests that the importance to Great Britain currently of Middle East oil may be a bit overstressed, relative to considerations involving defense strategy and communications.

At the outset, the author seeks to determine what the term "Middle East" denotes in comparison with its meaning at times in the past. He finds that its present definition depends upon the point of view of the definer. In the author's view, for contemporary practical purposes, the Middle East is the entity comprising the seventeen sovereign states that stem from the applied policies of Great Britain and other European powers in the relatively recent past. He notes that British interests in the area have changed from one time to another, originally having been related principally to the defense of and access to India, and presently being concerned almost entirely with oil supply and the invested proceeds of oil operations. "The dependence of the Western powers on the area, so long as their economies are based on oil," he observes, "is far greater than ever before." He credits Western influences with having created among Middle Eastern peoples a "revolution of rising expectations" which—not having been satisfied—has led to increasingly bitter attitudes toward the West. "This is the full irony of our position," he says; "our own influence in the area has helped to destroy our own control over it, and our dependence upon it has grown as fast as our control has diminished."

With a somewhat nostalgic air, the author notes the fact that British interests in the Middle East are no longer exclusive; that there is a new balance of forces in the area consisting, in the first instance, of the United States and the Soviet Union; secondly, of the independent states of the area themselves; thirdly, of other Western states, including Britain; and fourthly, of the remaining interested countries, India in particular. He indicates how these forces operate to counteract or to reinforce each other and tend

to produce a state of "greater or less chaos and anarchy." As he looks speculatively into the future and assesses the relative strength and motives of the nations interested in the area and the global issues at stake, the author can only feel that "this is a nightmarish situation in which the worst is obviously imminent all the time." Yet he thinks that there are certain "mitigating factors," the principal one deriving from the fact that war on a major scale did not develop from late crises. He concludes that "we must be ready to confront the worst, of course;—but if we are ready, it may never happen."

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THE MUQADDIMAH, by Ibn Khaldūn. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. vol. 1: cxv + 481 pages, 5 plates and 2 figures; vol. 11: xiv + 463 pages, 9 plates; vol. 111: xi + 603 pages, 4 plates and diagram in pocket. Indexed. \$18.50.

Reviewed by Harold Glidden

It is with considerable humility that one approaches the task of reviewing this monumental translation, which represents a great order of scholarship and years of painstaking labor and research on the part of him who accomplished it. The reviewer could easily spend almost as much time reviewing it as Rosenthal did translating it. The present reviewer can present only a judgment based on a woefully incomplete checking of the translation, since only a small fraction of the textual material used by Rosenthal was available to him.

Heretofore, the standard translation of the well-known *Muqaddimah* (Introduction) has been de Slane's *Les Prolegomènes d'Ibn Khaldoun*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1934), vol. 11 (Paris, 1936), and vol. 111 (Paris, 1938). De Slane's translation, however, was not complete, although it contained the most important material. He summarized the long and complex excursus on the *Zāyirajab* (a means of securing the answers to questions by means of intricate tables); he did not attempt to translate the Bedouin poetry of 'Alī ibn 'Umar ibn Ibrāhīm,

shaykh of the Banu 'Āmir (Rosenthal, vol. 111, page 432 ff.); and he omits the difficult specimens of Judhāmi tribal poetry that Rosenthal has tackled in his vol. 111, page 438 ff.

Comparing the two texts, it is clear that Rosenthal's is not only the more complete, but also the more definitive. In the first place, Rosenthal through persistent effort has gained access to more manuscript sources and thus has been able to straighten out a number of obscurities and errors that appear in de Slane's work. In the matter of style, de Slane and Rosenthal lie at opposite extremes. De Slane frequently bent, and indeed distorted, the meaning of the Arabic original in order to produce smooth, well-rounded, and polished French sentences. Rosenthal, leaning over backward to render accurately the meaning of the Arabic, often comes up with a short, jerky style that is quite un-Arabic in its effect. Arabic is strongly conjunctive in its structure, and Rosenthal's disjunctive treatment often reminds one of certain types of modern Turkish rather than Arabic. Another characteristic of Rosenthal is that he sometimes resorts to rather slangy and anachronistic expressions (such as "outfit" for "regalia" or "paraphernalia," cf. French *équipe* in vol. 11, page 48, and "salesman" for "vendor" in vol. 11, page 300). This latter tendency appears also in his use of the word "paper" to refer to writing material used in the reign of the Caliph Mu'awiyah (A. D. 661-680); de Slane here uses the less specific but correct word *feuille* for what was probably a sheet of papyrus.

The problem of dialectical usage of certain words provides another trap for the translator. Thus in vol. 11, page 320, it seems likely that the word *ṭullāb* (presumably the Arabic original of the term in question) is not to be taken in its usual meaning of "students," as Rosenthal does, but is to be rendered as "treasure hunters;" in other words, it is not to be construed as *ṭullāb al-'ilm* (seekers after knowledge), but *ṭullāb al-maṭlūb* (seekers after treasure). The present-day Libyan Arabic word for buried treasure, *maṭlūb*, is derived from the same root, *ṭlb*, and means literally "that which is sought after." On a different level, there are a few errors in the original text about which

Rosenthal expresses doubts, but which he does not venture to correct. A case in point is the reference to "Armenians" in an Old Testament context in vol. 1, pages 334 and 474, where it should clearly be corrected to "Aramaean."

Rosenthal has wrestled valiantly with the exasperating poetry of the Banu 'Amir; he deserves credit for what he has accomplished, although the riddle is not yet entirely solved and needs more work. In vol. 111, page 434, for example, Rosenthal's rendition "... their opinions/Are a stopgap, and like rags that cannot be repaired" actually should read "... their opinions/Are like a handicap and (like those of) a silly woman—they have no soundness to them." The trouble arises from the fact that *raflā'* (fem. of *arfa*, "silly") has been misread as a corrupt form of *raflab*, and the marginal explanation of it as being a synonym of *kharqā'* ("stupid") has been misinterpreted as *khirāq* ("rags"). Idioms are troublesome also. In Tāhir's letter to his son (vol. 11, page 144), the translation "Your affairs will begin to fail, so far as their effects both in this world and the other world are concerned, as soon as you give access to a liar or boldly use lies yourself" should be "For sooner or later your affairs will begin to go wrong if you give heed to lies or make bold to utter them." The idiom *fi 'ājilibā wa-ājilibā* means "sooner or later," not "in this world or the next."

In the geographical section in vol. 1, it would have been helpful if the translator had made reference to the travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭah to elucidate the text, particularly since Ibn Baṭṭūṭah was a contemporary of Ibn Khaldūn. Gibb's notes to his translation of that work (New York: Argonaut Series, 1929) would have been of use in this respect, particularly with regard to the Negro lands south of the Sahara.

With these points out of the way, one can return to the salient fact that while Rosenthal's translation will be further polished and refined by others, it is now the standard translation for use in the future. The notes and references supplied by Rosenthal and the bibliographical appendix by Walter J. Fischel signify in themselves a tremendous advance in the study of the *Muqaddimah*. The reader is not led into the

translation cold. He is prepared firstly by a critical examination of Ibn Khaldūn's career, secondly by a dissertation on the concepts and subjects dealt with by the author, and lastly by a thorough exploration of the manuscript resources and textual development of the work. In this respect, Rosenthal has enlarged considerably on the introductory material offered by de Slane.

It is difficult to conclude this review of the *Muqaddimah* without commenting on the significance of Ibn Khaldūn for the history of Muslim intellectual development. He stands on the verge of creating a revolutionary (to borrow a word from the vocabulary of W. F. Albright) approach to the study of society, culture, and history without quite being able to make the transition from the old to the new; the flashes of insight that shine through time and again flicker out without lighting a fire. Were it not for the inhibition inherent in the Islamic environment in which he lived and worked, he could have anticipated by half a millennium the schools of Spengler and Toynbee.

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THE OCCUPATION OF CHIOS BY THE GENOESE AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLAND, 1346-1566, by Philip P. Argenti. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959. 3 volumes. \$50.00.

Reviewed by G. G. Arnakis

The islands of the Greek Archipelago abound in history and most of them have found competent historians among their native sons, who, as a rule, made their careers in business and the professions and turned to historical research as an avocation. As Greeks, they were keenly aware of the importance of historical studies. As residents of distant lands (many of them wrote outside Greece), they felt a natural urge to go back to their origins and strengthen their sense of the past-in-the-present. Theirs was more than a nostalgia: it was a responsibility to the world they had left behind them, the world of their forefathers. Their sense of re-

sponsibility accounts, at least in part, for their success as historians.

The island of Chios has been exceptionally fortunate in as much as its long and varied past has been presented, through the medium of the English language, to an international audience, by Dr. Philip P. Argenti, a resident of England who has devoted many years of his life to the study of his ancestral island. He has written more than a dozen books on Chios. Among them, his most recent, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese*, is the most voluminous—a remarkable monument to a remarkable era. In mere length of time the Genoese period is the most prolonged foreign domination of Chios after the Ottoman. The latter succeeded the Genoese and was brought to an end by the Balkan War in 1912. Neither the Genoese, the Ottoman Turks, nor the Venetians, who held sway for brief periods in the twelfth century, were able to exert any influence on the ethnological character of the island, which remained Greek from the time of Homer to the present. Long association with the commercial republics of Italy, however, helped formulate the spirit of the modern Chians—progressive, positive, optimistic—which remained the same even under Ottoman domination.

As in his previous works, Dr. Argenti has gathered all the documentary evidence that he could find. He very aptly points out that since the fortunes of the various Greek provinces followed divergent paths after the Fourth Crusade, no adequate history of mediaeval Greece can be written until various local histories have been fully studied, compared, and synthesized. Dr. Argenti's documents of the Genoese period come from the archives of Genoa and Venice and from the Vatican. Particularly important is the almost unknown *Codex Berianus Chiensis*, which contains all the conventions between the Commune of Genoa and the Mahona, the famous Genoese mercantile company that governed and exploited Chios. Three other codices (the *Codices Giustiniani Chienses*) and a wide variety of documents from the files of Genoese notaries, shedding ample light on the public and private life of the Chians, have been transcribed from the original Latin in Volumes Two and Three, which have a continuous pagi-

nation (1-981). The text of the *Codex Berianus Chiensis* alone covers pages 1-372. The notarial deeds are not less important than the correspondence of the Mahona or the decisions of the councils; all kinds of human relations among the native Chians are recorded by the itinerant notaries, and the scholarly reader finds much to satisfy his human curiosity in such a wide variety of transactions as the sale of a house, the settlement of a loan, or a promise of marriage.

In Volume One, the author gives a detailed history of the Genoese in Chios, with all the background material. There are, for example, chapters devoted to the colonial expansion of Genoa during the Crusades, the Genoese colonies of the Near East in their relations with the declining Byzantine Empire and the rising power of the Turks, the struggles for the control of the island, the Turkish threat, and finally the Turkish conquest under Suleyman the Magnificent. Once the narrative of historical events is concluded, the author proceeds to give a series of descriptive chapters on such subjects as Genoese administration, Chian agriculture and commerce, topography, land tenure, social classes, arts and crafts, and the Greek and Catholic Churches. Appended to the chapter on arts and crafts is a list of the known tradesmen, the date of the documents in which they are mentioned, and the notary's name and file number.

Details such as these suffice to show the diligence with which the author has worked to produce these three volumes, which are unique of their kind as regards the mediaeval history of Chios and a most valuable contribution to the broader and even more fascinating subject of Italian commercial domination in the Near East.

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THE PROJECTED ARAB COURT OF JUSTICE, by Ezzeldin Foda. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957. XI + 258 pages. No price indicated.

Reviewed by Herbert J. Liebesny

In this ambitious study, the author, who is

a member of the Secretariat-General of the Arab League, sets out to analyze the project of an Arab Court of Justice as developed by a three-man commission of the Arab League. Mr. Foda does this against the background of the political and legal development of the Arab League, the pertinent ideas and rules of Islamic law, similar experiments in other parts of the world and the general experience with international adjudication and arbitration. In his *Presentation* of this study, Justice A. H. Badawi of the International Court of Justice emphasizes the broad sweep of this study and the fact that it deals with political as well as legal aspects of the problem. It can hardly be expected that a work of this scope could deal in the compass of less than three hundred pages with all these problems raised, and Justice Badawi himself stresses, for example, that the study was "not intended to be a statement of Muslim Law" and that the author dealt with that subject only to the extent required "to show correctly the historic atmosphere of the institution which is the subject of his study." Nevertheless, it might be asked whether Mr. Foda should not have sacrificed breadth of overall treatment to greater treatment of specifics. For example, the complex subject of personal sovereignty in Islam is dealt with in less than two pages and the author can hardly be blamed for not doing it justice.

However, these flaws do not detract from the basic value of this book as a study of an institution which, given a favorable political climate, might develop into a useful instrument for the settlement of inter-Arab disputes. In view of the fact that the Arab League has played a comparatively minor role in inter-Arab relations in the past several years, the question might be raised whether an inter-Arab Court of Justice as outlined in the Arab League project and discussed by Mr. Foda, can be more than a theoretical instrument, at least at this particular juncture in Middle Eastern affairs. Judicial determination of international disputes seems to require an atmosphere of relative calm, free from violent emotions. Furthermore, experiments with regional courts of international justice have not been too successful in other regions as the author himself recognizes. The

International Court of Justice in the Hague has established an impressive record in the field of international justice. Nevertheless, the main divisive problems in most areas of the world today are political in nature and even the International Court of Justice has rarely come to grips with the most burning issues of the day. Thus, the Arab Court of Justice may remain a project for the time being. However, the very fact that a detailed discussion may draw the attention of wider circles to this little-publicized project of the Arab League and a revitalization of the Arab League's role in inter-Arab affairs, may open practical possibilities for a judicial forum for the adjudication of disputes among the Arab countries.

The author divides his study into three parts. In the first, he discusses the Arab League system and the role of an Arab Court of Justice in that system. He traces the history of the Arab League and points to the restrictions imposed upon the League through the insistence of the member states upon the full maintenance of their sovereign rights. In the second part, the author discusses the various problems which might be raised in connection with the establishment of an Arab Court. It is here that he discusses Islamic concepts of sovereignty and advocates a wider use of Islamic law in an Arab Court of Justice as well as unified sovereignty for the whole Arab World. Given the complexity of these subjects, the discussion is rather brief and the author tends at times to oversimplify the issues involved. A last chapter in this part deals with a possible decentralization of international justice among several regional courts which, the author feels, would make international justice more effective.

In the last part of his study, Mr. Foda discusses the draft statute for the Arab Court of Justice as developed by an Arab League Commission. He deals with such problems as the jurisdiction of the Court and the enforcement of the Court's decisions and orders. In an Afterword, the author makes a strong plea for the establishment of such a Court as a means of unity and settling disputes between member states. Appendices contain the report made to the Arab League by the Commission charged with the drafting of the Court statute, the

Court statute itself and a number of other documents pertinent to the theme of the book. The book also contains a comprehensive bibliography and is well indexed.

This study will be read with interest by all students of the Arab unity movement as well as by lawyers and political scientists interested in the development of regional international courts. It is to the author's credit that he has attempted in this study to trace ways and means of applying methods of judicial settlement to an area, which, through much of its history, has been plagued by political turmoil.

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ARAB WORLD

DEUX MISSIONS EN MOYEN-ORIENT (1919-1922), by General Georges Catroux. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958. vi + 241 pages. 795 fr.

Reviewed by C. Ernest Dawn

The old Franco-British debate over responsibility for the trend of events in the Arab world since 1918 has been revived from time to time of late. General Catroux now returns to the fray with an account of his mission to King Husayn in 1919-20 and of his service as French Délégué at Damascus from August, 1920 to December, 1922. He remains convinced that the policy of the British government was "inspired by permanent preoccupation with reserving to Great Britain exclusive political influence and economic preponderance in the liberated Arab provinces." He also thinks that Soviet influence has become strong in the region largely because of the continuation of dissension among the three Western powers.

I must express my partial agreement with Catroux in regard to both points. I have the impression, however, that the best evidence of British desire to exclude the French from the Arab World is to be found in British sources, not French, and this book strengthens this impression. By the time Catroux began his first mission in 1919, the British government had finally accepted French predominance in Syria and Lebanon, as Catroux acknowledges. Ca-

troux's account of his sojourn in the Hijaz, accordingly, brings forward no evidence of British intrigues. Indeed, since the center of the Arab-French conflict had shifted to Damascus, this section of the book contains little of interest except two significant anecdotes: neither the Quai d'Orsay nor the office of President Deschanel knew the identity of one "Malik Husayn." Catroux's account of his service in Damascus likewise offers little concrete evidence of British machinations other than the reiteration of the familiar charge that the British permitted Syrian nationalists to use Transjordan as a base of operations and as a place of refuge. In this connection, Catroux misdates to 1922 the attempt which was made on Gouraud's life at Kouneitra in 1921.

If Catroux adds nothing of importance in support of the general French charge against the British, he does provide some interesting and valuable information about the consolidation of French control in Damascus and the development of French policy in general. His description of the measures which he took in the State of Damascus makes it clear that the French, having insufficient military force to impose their control, bought peace by making suitable agreements with the various loci of power: heads of religious communities, tribal and clan chieftains, and various notables. Catroux was in full agreement with this aspect of French policy, but he disapproved of the policy of divide and rule which Gouraud and his political advisors followed. He regarded the French Lebanese policy as a mistake, and even at that time he proposed a French effort to create an alliance with Arab nationalism. The Syrian Federation of 1922 was the fruit of his efforts. He believes that by the time he and Gouraud left Syria late in 1922, the basis had been laid for solid accomplishment. The means of erecting the superstructure was to be that used by the British in Iraq: the acceptance of the mandatory obligation to lead the Syrians to full independence. Catroux makes it clear that he believes the French mishandled their mandate after the departure of Gouraud. The latter is one of Catroux's heroes, and ample space is devoted to defending the General from his detractors.

The historian would like more detail than Catroux provides in describing his service in Syria. On the other hand, information from an important French participant in the establishment of the French mandatory régime is always welcome. One can only wish that there were more books like Catroux's.

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EGYPT, by Tom Little. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. Index + 321 pages. \$6.50.

Reviewed by John S. Badeau

Those who maintain, with a recent *New York Times* book review, that foreign correspondents in the Middle East are apt to write with "a slant typical of observers stationed behind Arab borders and compelled for professional reasons to get along with their hosts," will discount much of this book in advance. Its author, Tom Little, has been an eminent British journalist in the Middle East since 1943 and for the past ten years was general manager of the *Arab News Agency* in Cairo, until expelled during the Anglo-French intervention in 1956. He writes, therefore, from within the lines of Arab nationalism.

But to those who find it difficult to get an adequate picture of Middle Eastern affairs from exclusive reliance on Washington, London and Tel Aviv, Mr. Little's study will be a valuable and stimulating one. While the author does not present an apologetic for Nasir and his policies, he does describe the situation as it appears from the vantage point of Cairo, and adds many details of the internal situation that have been inadequately reported from the Western press. The result is one of the best books on revolutionary Egypt that has been published.

If a good newspaperman (which Tom Little is) can have a thesis in his reporting, it is that "President Nasir was not simply a precocious and rootless young officer who grabbed power for himself . . . he is what he is because of the mass of opinion on which his policy, for good or evil, rests" (page 7). As background for this conviction, the author briefly sketches the salient points of ancient and medieval Egyptian history, then takes up the fuller story from the

time of the 'Arabi Pasha revolt in 1882, which he sees as the precursor of the Egyptian Revolution. The latter half of the book dwells in detail upon the closing days of Faruq, the rise of the Egyptian Revolution, and the subsequent estrangement of Egypt from the Western World.

Readers will be most interested in Mr. Little's account of such debated matters as Nasir's rise to power, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the ill-fated Israeli-Anglo-French invasion, the High Dam scheme, and Nasir's program of social reform. Without defending Egypt's actions, he illumines Egyptian policy by careful reporting of what went on in Cairo and how the situation appeared there. After reading his dispassionate account, it is impossible to accept the easy explanations of Egyptian "intransigence" that are so popular in the American press.

A good example is the careful recording of the struggle between General Najib and Nasir for revolutionary leadership. This has been described by one correspondent as "Nasir's undignified double-cross of President Najib." Whether or not it was undignified, Mr. Little's account makes clear that to dismiss the situation as a "double-cross" is a journalistic over-simplification. At stake was not so much the personal leadership of the revolution as the question of whether or not there was to be any revolution at all. Najib, for all his personal charm, was like the occasional "reform" mayors of New York City—he thought that once the old rascals were cowed or thrown out of power, Egypt would stay cleaned up. But Nasir and his associates believed that a true political and social revolution had to take place, and to accomplish this Najib's unperceptive leadership would have to go.

Similarly his account of the Suez Canal crisis corrects some of the accusations that came from the inflamed passions of the dispossessed West. He rightly assesses the strict legality of nationalization and points out occasions on which a different approach by the Western powers might have led to a more satisfying and equitable conclusion.

In all this, the author avoids any defense of Egypt; rather, he shows what the impact of

Western policy was upon Cairo and its leaders. His conclusion is that "from both sides there must be an adjustment of policy; on the part of Egypt by a recognition of the fact that it is impossible to try to destroy every Western interest in the region, and at the same time retain friendly association with the West; and on the part of the West by recognizing that the strength of President Nasir lies in a popular movement with which it must come to terms" (page 321).

♦ JOHN S. BADEAU is President of the Near East Foundation.

IRAQ, by Stephen Longrigg and Frank Stoakes. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. 264 pages. \$6.50.

Reviewed by C. J. Edmonds

The publishers of the "Nations of the Modern World" series are to be congratulated on having secured for their volume on Iraq the collaboration of two such authorities as Brigadier Longrigg and Mr. Frank Stoakes, who, in addition to high academic qualifications, have between them brought to their study the advantage of a continuous connection with the country of over forty years.

After a general introductory description of the "Country and People," the book is divided into two unequal parts. The first, under the heading "The Iraq of Yesterday," consists of three chapters, all masterpieces of compression, dealing in turn: with the "Early Ages" from the dawn of history through the period of the great ancient monarchies (when, among other things, we are reminded that metropolitan Assyria, for three centuries the dominant power of Western Asia, fitted easily into three of the fourteen present-day provinces and metropolitan Babylonia into five or six) to the Arab conquest; with "Muslim Iraq" (including the great days of the 'Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, pride in which still exercises such a profound influence on Iraqi thinking) to the end of the long decline under the Ottomans; and, finally, with the short but formative twelve years of the "British Mandate."

Modern psychology teaches us that in the individual the influences of infancy deeply af-

fect adult life; and few will contest the authors' view that similarly "since wise judgment of the present and expectation of the future can only be in the light of history, . . . some survey of the past is needed for a just appreciation of the essentials and potentialities of the nation, in an identical setting, today and tomorrow."

The historical background having thus been set, the authors proceed to deal briefly with the course of political events from the achievement of independence in 1932 up to 1958, and in some detail with the "Economy," the "Machinery of State," including the social services, and the general pattern of "Society." The *coup d'état* of July 14, 1958, occurred when the book was already in the proof stage, and the bare facts up to August 2 are briefly recorded in an "Epilogue." But this is preceded by a last chapter on "Politics," which gives a most penetrating and impressive analysis of the many conflicting influences and emotions to which the Iraqi people have been a prey, especially since the end of the Second World War.

It is not surprising that, in seeking to justify the excesses of revolution day and the subsequent political trials, the new rulers should have been at pains to represent everything that went before as thoroughly evil. But even in the West, especially in the British press, the shock has led to much self-criticism, mostly of the vicarious kind, as well as to disparagement, not always very well informed, of the late régime. Judged by any standards the rise of Iraq, within a period of forty years, from the status of three remote and neglected provinces of a decaying Empire to an honored place among the nations is a remarkable phenomenon, and some credit must be due to the men who made possible the creation out of this unpromising material of a modern, independent state at all, and to those who, in more recent years, by the wise use of the increasing income from oil royalties, set her feet firmly on the road of material development and social advance.

The publication of this admirable volume, covering as it does, from start to finish, the period of the Hashimite monarchy in Iraq, thus comes at a very opportune moment and, by reason of its objective presentation of the facts and the shrewd and balanced comments and

judgments of two exceptionally competent observers, will be especially welcome to all serious students of the Middle East in the perplexing circumstances of today.

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THE LAND OF MIDIAN, by H. St. John Philby.
London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1957. xi + 286 pages. 36s.

Reviewed by George Rentz

Philby's zeal as an explorer is equaled only by his commendable perseverance in publishing his findings. Singlehanded he has done more to strip the veil from the face of Arabia than scores of Americans with their arsenal of mechanical contrivances. His latest record of travel expands an account of journeys first set forth in *The Middle East Journal*, vol. IX, no. 2 (Spring 1955), pages 116-129.

In 1950 Philby yearned to visit Buraimi and Oman. More's the pity that political considerations compelled the late King 'Abd al-'Aziz to say "no." Instead, he let Philby go off to the land of Midian in the northwest corner of Arabia. Leaving Riyadh in November, the traveler traversed 3,000 miles or so before his Land Rover came to rest in Jiddah in February of 1951. Khaibar, a great name in the story of Arabia's Jews and early Islam; Taima, where Huber found the stone now treasured in the Louvre; and Tabuk, which the Prophet knew on his northern marches—these were the towns Philby investigated before plunging into the wastelands in search of Nabatean ruins, of which he visited several, and samples of the proto-Sinaitic script, of which he discovered none to support his theory that this script may have originated in Arabia rather than Sinai.

In much of the area Philby had been preceded by others—Western wayfarers of the quality of Doughty and Musil or less—but his ranging was more extensive than theirs and his examination of the ground more intensive. His tale is told with his customary craftsmanship and care for detail. His photographs, better than those in his earlier books, give one the feel of the land.

In treating the Arabic definite article, Philby

is guilty of inconsistencies. Of the many examples of these, the two most striking nestle cheek by jowl: Wadi Hamdh and Harrat al-Khaibar (both incorrect) fall in the same line on page 10, while Wadi al-Hamdh and Harrat Khaibar (both correct) turn up in the same sentence on page 17. Laxity is occasionally found in the treatment of other Arabic names; e. g., the tribe of Billi on page 52 becomes Billi (Bali) on page 144 before finally restricted to the correct form Bali on page 246. The reviewer is not convinced that the proper form for the name of the Red Sea port west of Medina is Umm Lajj; at any rate, the form Amlaj prevails in the Arabian press and seems closer to the local pronunciation. An elaborate index, prepared with the yeoman aid of L. A. Siwek, helps one through the maze of unfamiliar toponyms.

The large sketch map, as the author himself recognizes, is not wholly adequate. Wadi al-Abyadh, the main drainage line of eastern Midian, is not named, making it difficult to follow Philby's route in that vicinity. This valley is shown on *The Middle East Journal's* simpler sketch map of Midian.

The reviewer has been privileged to see the sequel to this work in typescript. Entitled *The Mines of Midian*, it has been in the hands of the publisher for some time. May its appearance not be long delayed. It describes Philby's further wanderings from 1951 to 1953 in search of gold, sulphur, and turquoise, of which nothing to speak was found. Large deposits of iron, discovered in their stead, remain as yet unexploited.

♦ GEORGE RENTZ is Adviser on Middle East Affairs to the Arabian American Oil Company.

NASSER OF EGYPT: THE SEARCH FOR DIGNITY, by Wilton Wynn. Cambridge: Arlington Books, 1959. 213 pages. \$3.95.

Reviewed by William Sands

This is not a biography of the President of the United Arab Republic, though many incidents from his life are used to illustrate the author's thesis, stated briefly in the sub-title, "the search for dignity." Slightly less briefly, it is Wilton Wynn's point that Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir has, for the first time in modern his-

tory, brought a pride in themselves to the Egyptian people, and that this fact was largely the result of his conscious, driving effort. The author, therefore, chooses his incidents to illustrate a theme, and many of the events in Egypt of most recent concern to Westerners are mentioned briefly, if at all. To add an opinion, it seems to this reviewer that Mr. Wynn is justified in his basic approach. Everyone interested will remember when any political conversation in or about Egypt had to center around the "Egyptian question," and finished as often as not in a discussion of the number of times the British had promised an end to the military occupation. Now, there is no "question" about Egypt in this sense, and Egyptian political interests cover a wider spectrum by far, to the pleasure of some and the dismay of others. But that Egyptians stand up straighter is a fact, and that it was 'Abd al-Nasir who was largely responsible for this phenomenon is also hardly disputable.

The man behind the change is somewhat harder to get at. Mr. Wynn adduces Nasir's charm, as so many have, his phenomenal capacity for work, the loyalty he generates in his companions, his intuitive sense, his own pride in being a "real" Egyptian—so borne out by his physical appearance, etc. Yet the key to the character seems to be missing.

One phrase, which does not help very much, is the reference to the "*baladi* boy from Beni Mer," a locution Mr. Wynn likes so much that he repeats it several times with variations. Nasir is a long way from being *baladi*, in the sense the phrase has been commonly used in Egypt—of local make and therefore inferior. It would be profitable to examine, rather than his Asyuti origins, the effect which spending his youth in Alexandria had upon him. This most Western of all Arab cities (Beirut, possibly, excepted) must have greatly influenced the tendency Nasir has to put his aspirations for Egyptians in Western terms. One might as well describe Napoleon Bonaparte as "shabby-genteel from Ajaccio." This tells us a couple of things, but we are left with much to explain.

Still, if what we need is understanding, rather than elusive "good will" and its evanescent

"reservoirs," this book is a long step forward in that direction.

Nasser of Egypt is from the first list of a new publishing house, Arlington Books of Cambridge, Massachusetts. If Mr. Wynn's book is a fair sample, then the new venture should be welcomed by all. There is certainly a place, given the crisis of communication which exists between the West and the Middle East, for works that are neither so abstruse as to appeal only to the scholar's handful of colleagues, nor so narrowly devoted to a cause as to be a sermon to the converted.

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CYPRUS

BELOW THE TIDE, by Penelope Tremayne. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959. 192 p. \$3.00.

Reviewed by Roderic H. Davison

There is a kind of reporting which is convincing because it is the unpremeditated by-product of another job. When the reporter is sensitive to human needs and emotions, commands the local language, and writes with a sure instinct for phrase, the result is first-class. Miss Tremayne, who spent the year from May 1956 to May 1957 in Cyprus as a Red Cross volunteer, fills the bill. Most of her book concerns these twelve months. An epilogue done in the spring of 1958, when she revisited the island as a *Sunday Times* reporter, is not so convincing.

In a way this is a sequel to Lawrence Durrell's *Bitter Lemons*. But Miss Tremayne saw rather more of common villagers and less of urban life than Durrell, which in part accounts for the basic message of her book. The burden is this: the ordinary Greek Cypriot did not understand what the terrorism was all about, nor was he enthusiastic for Makarios, Grivas, or EOKA; sometimes he was terrorized into support, but more often, he was simply the victim of propaganda which was quite skillful, and of which Miss Tremayne gives some telling examples. (By shooting a few village *mubtars*, EOKA succeeded in stopping them from authorizing free hospitalization for their village poor, as it was their rightful job to do. The

British were then blamed for this inhumanity. EOKA did not care who suffered.) The Greek Cypriots were polite—even warmly friendly—to the British once barriers were broken or terrorism called off. But the terror was real. A number of incidents are well described, including a serious threat to shoot Miss Tremayne in reprisal for the arrest of a village boy.

Not only EOKA's inhumanity, but also unimaginative British policy in providing generations of Cyprus school children with Athenian textbooks educating them to Greek rather than Cypriot patriotism, comes in for Miss Tremayne's censure. And it is an interesting bit of intelligence that there are no Greek Cypriot patriotic songs, but only older songs of the mainland *klephts* who fought the Ottoman Turks. Cypriot patriotism attaches largely to pride in its wine, as far as Miss Tremayne reveals.

The absence of dates in her report is annoying, though in general the chronology can be fixed by her references to major events. And she gives less than fair treatment to the Cypriot Turks. Aside from this, her story is excellent, and absorbing reading. Events have now brought a variety of the solution she wished for: not *enosis*, not partition, but self-government and every man under his own fig tree.

♦ RODERIC H. DAVISON is a member of the Board of Editorial Advisors of the MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL.

PAKISTAN

THE PATHANS, 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957, by Sir Olaf Caroe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958. \$12.50.

Reviewed by James W. Spain

Sir Olaf Caroe's book on the Pukhtun tribesmen who dwell along Pakistan's North-West Frontier is the latest in a long and distinguished line dating back to a classic parent, the Hon. Mounstuart Elphinstone's *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul* . . ., published in 1815.

Sir Olaf, like Elphinstone, is an informed and sophisticated Englishman with wide experience of the world and a literary flair as well as intimate knowledge of his subject. In addition, Sir Olaf has served (1945-47) as Governor of the

North-West Frontier Province and has two other well-known books (*Wells of Power* and *The Soviet Empire*) to his credit. His present work is comprehensive, well-printed, and liberally supplied with maps and charts. To the student of the Pukhtuns the volume is well worth its by no means modest price.

Of the book's many original contributions to knowledge and understanding of the Pukhtuns, two in particular will stand out in the mind of anyone who has wrestled with the problems Sir Olaf has come near to solving. The first question involves the origins of these ten million tribesmen who first appear in a clearly-established historical setting in the chronicles of the Mogul Emperor Babur. As the title of his work suggests, Sir Olaf, with admirable logic and convincing scholarly detection (if little solid proof), takes the Pukhtuns back almost 2,000 years beyond Babur. In doing so, he provides a connected narrative history of the land and the people which is both valuable and unique.

In the second instance, Sir Olaf has tackled with rare diligence and intuition the problem of the divisions within the great Pukhtun tribal family. He reinterprets the confusing and sometimes contradictory genealogies of the varied clans to separate clearly the independent tribes (Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds, etc.) who inhabit the border hills from their Yusufzai, Durrani, and Ghilzai cousins. This achievement may sound academic, but it provides both a clarification and a historical background for a distinction which is very important to the Pukhtuns themselves and essential to an understanding of them by an outsider.

Unfortunately, there are also defects in the panoramic canvas of the Pukhtuns which Sir Olaf has produced.

In glancing at the table of contents, the prospective reader is likely to regret that only the last 100 of the 440 pages of the text are devoted to the period since the British arrived on the Frontier in 1847. Having completed the book, the feeling is rather one of regret that the last 100 pages are there at all. The breadth and sweep of the early pages with their sympathy for and admiration of the Pukhtuns gives way, when we come to the British period, to a

highly selective presentation deeply tinged with nostalgia. The good Pukhtun is a loyal Pukhtun. The true Pukhtuns are the relatively few who stood with the British in a relationship of mutual respect and cooperation. There is scant mention of the hundreds of thousands of tribesmen (a few of them men of rare genius) whose proudest boast was ever their uncompromising hatred and defiance of British rule.

Sir Olaf's almost total neglect of developments since the departure of the British in 1947 belies the latter part of the title of his work. His relegation of Khan Abdul-Qaiyum Khan (first chief minister of the North-West Frontier Province under Pakistan) to a single cursory and subtly insulting footnote is well nigh unforgivable. Qaiyum brought more progress to the Frontier in the six years after 1947 than the British did in their 100 years of rule.

Other deficiencies are less personal. Documentation is scanty. Despite a comprehensive index, the book does not easily lend itself to use as a reference work. Too much knowledge on the part of the reader is taken for granted, and the basic institutions and customs of the tribes (*Pukhtunwali*, the Pukhtun code; the *jirga*, tribal assembly; the *lashkar*, war party, etc.) are not clearly described.

All in all, however, it is not difficult for a student of the Pukhtuns to strike a balance sheet on Sir Olaf's work. It is certainly the best book yet produced in this century and to find its peer one must go back to Elphinstone.

♦ JAMES W. SPAIN, a frequent visitor to the Pukhtun area in the past several years, wrote "Pakistan's North-West Frontier" in the Winter 1954 issue of *The Middle East Journal*. His Ph.D. dissertation on the Pukhtuns has recently been approved by Columbia University and will be published next year.

TURKEY

THE LINGUA FRANCA IN THE LEVANT: TURKISH NAUTICAL TERMS OF ITALIAN AND GREEK ORIGIN, by Henry and Renee Kahane and Andreas Tietze. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1958. XIII + 752 pages. \$15.00.

Reviewed by Orhan F. Köprülü

This volume is the result of a close collabora-

tion between the Kahanes, who are professional linguists, and Andreas Tietze, a Turcologist, together with a number of others who have contributed the results of their own researches in this field.

This is the third and most comprehensive effort to present an etymological discussion of Turkish nautical terms of Italian and Greek origin. The authors deal with 878 terms, as compared with only 179 compiled by the earliest effort of G. Meyer in 1893, and 208 terms in a second effort. The work is divided into three parts: (a) a short historical survey and introduction to the subject (pages 1-46), (b) a dictionary of the nautical terms themselves, arranged alphabetically according to their forms in the European languages (pages 47-597), and (c) an appendix (pages 599-752), containing a list of the extensive sources which were consulted and lists of the words according to subject and language. For students of Ottoman history, the inclusion of an index in the Ottoman script is especially useful.

As the authors point out, this scholarly work is, after all, a demonstration of the influence of the Western and Greek civilizations on that of the Turks. According to their analysis, of the 878 terms presented, 723 come from the Romance languages, chiefly Italian, and only 155 from Greek (page 39). However, the authors point out that the Greek influence was in fact much more important than these figures would indicate because of the role Greek played as a transmitter between Italian and Turkish. In addition, one should not overlook the important role of the Greek seamen who entered the service of the Ottoman fleet after the dissolution of the Byzantine fleet in the 14th century, long before the conquest of Istanbul by the Turks. It was these Greek seamen who were the primary means by which the Turks adapted these Italian terms.

The authors point out the startling rise of Ottoman sea power in the second half of the 15th century. But in addition, at the same time the Turks themselves were developing in Istanbul important centers of mapmaking and navigation to serve the Ottoman ships and seamen.

The study, limited as it is to only those Turkish terms which were of European origin,

necessarily excludes those which were of purely Turkish origin. It is to be hoped that a separate dictionary of the latter can be produced along the lines which have been so ably set out in this work.

To the bibliography, the following works should be added:

1. *Menāzīr al-'Avālim* by Aşık Çelebi, written late in the 16th century and available in manuscript form in several Istanbul libraries.

2. *Zubdet al-abbār al-muta'allika bil-bibār* by Sehri Zade Mehmed Sa'id, of which the unique manuscript is number TY 2548 in the Istanbul University Library.

3. *Harita-i Kapūdānān-i Deryā* by 'Izzet, published in Istanbul in 1261/1845.

◆ ORHAN KOPRULU was a professor at the Near and Middle East Institute of Columbia University.

ISLAM

ISLAM AND THE MODERN AGE, by Ilse Lichtenstadter. New York: Bookman Associates-Twayne Publishers, 1958. 228 pages. \$4.50.

Reviewed by Edwin E. Calverley

Dr. Lichtenstadter's wide study of Islam, as indicated by the bibliography included in this book, and her intimate observation of Muslim life in Egypt and Pakistan make this book valuable for Islamic scholars and Middle East political personnel, both western and Muslim. The dedication of the book to a Muslim friend and the informative Foreword by another highly-placed Muslim express the spirit of goodwill that the work exemplifies.

Five early chapters describe the foundations of Islam. They contain information received from her teachers, extended by the reading of Arabic texts. Some of this information differs from or is additional to the instruction usually given about Muhammad's Islam; that is, the Islam of the Qur'an, in American universities. An instance is the explanation of the reason for the female infanticide practised in the *Jābilyyah* as an Arab father's "wish to impart the life-giving productive power in the female to the earth" (page 48). The Quranic explanation of fear of impoverishment in 17: 33/31 is more reasonable than that a nomad would use

a crying infant to fertilize a spot in the desert. The traditional interpretation of Qur'an 81: 8, 9 given by the Arabic commentaries and dictionaries should have specific contrary evidence before being discarded. Another questionable position is the limitation of Muhammad's conception of the expansion of his religion. The inherent logic of the numerical oneness of Allah as sole Creator and Ruler of mankind meant that all peoples should know and accept the original monotheism that he was restoring. Again, *zakāt* was no new practice imposed on the Arabs by Muhammad. In part it was the tax collected by tribal chiefs from all able to pay in return for protection and for the fulfillment by the shaykhs of the tribal duty of hospitality. The *riddah* after Muhammad's death was not solely a religious apostasy, but was sparked by the desire of the shaykhs to collect the taxes for themselves. Further, the un-Arabic sources of Muhammad's religious terminology and rituals could have been usefully expanded. Nevertheless, there is adequate and sound information in the 108 pages of Part I to provide readers with well-coordinated knowledge of the Foundations of Islam.

Part II, discussing the general, social and political problems of Islam in our modern age, is well worth serious and continued consideration. It presents the author's information about current conditions and her proposals for possible solutions, all offered with scholarly fairness and goodwill. This exceptional attitude, where partiality is all too common, was expressed in Part I, where Muhammad's massacre of the Jews of Yathrib-Madinah is described as "the only cruel and deplorable, though necessary, act in his whole career" (page 57).

The discussions are based on unusual and lengthy first-hand experience living with Muslim families. Her friendship and sincere desire for the welfare and progress of both individuals and communities give these chapters special value.

The first chapter of this vital section on the Muslim and modernism contains a statement of paramount importance about the Middle East that is all too often unknown, misunderstood, or disregarded by newspaper correspondents, V. I. P. tourists and prejudiced policy advisers.

Describing Islam, Dr. Lichtenstadter says: "it is an all-pervading faith that permeates all phases of a Muslim's life and envelops his whole being; the rites and ceremonies are only the external forms of a deeply-felt spiritual emotion. In this faith, life and religion are inseparable; for the Muslim, Islam is life itself" (page 112).

So, to understand any act or reaction in the Arab World, study Islam. This book will help.

♦ DR. EDWIN E. CALVERLEY is co-editor of *The Muslim World*.

SANUSIYAH: A STUDY OF A REVIVALIST MOVEMENT IN ISLAM, by Nicola A. Ziadeh. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958. 148 pages. 12 Gld.

Reviewed by Majid Khadduri

Revivalist movements in modern Islam have arisen either as a reaction to Western influence, such as Pan-Islamism, or Islam's reaction to its own decadence, such as Wahhabism. The latter is the more interesting, not only because it has produced a relatively more stable political system, but also because it has shown an ability to survive in the face of an influx of foreign ideas and institutions. Pan-Islamism rapidly gave way to nationalism; but the Wahhabi movement, reflecting a greater ability to adapt itself slowly to new conditions of life, has survived.

The Sanusiya belongs to the latter category. The Grand Sanusi, al-Sayyid Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Sanusi, horrified at the state of decadence of Islam among the Beduins of Cyrenaica (whom he described as knowing nothing about Islam except its name), established the headquarters of his movement in the interior of the Cyrenaican desert and conducted an active propaganda campaign among the tribes to win them back to Islam. Not only did he become successful as the founder of a new revivalist movement, but also he provided for his followers an organization which, after Ottoman withdrawal from his country, became its governing authority. Like the Wahhabi state of Arabia, the Sanusi order operated as the Sanusi State and conducted a *jibād* (a "colonial" war to the Italians) for the defense of Islam against Chris-

tian encroachment. The establishment of the Libyan Federal State under King Idris, grandson of the Grand Sanusi, may be regarded as the crowning event of the Sanusi movement. Its acceptance of a Western system of government, however, replacing the patriarchal Sanusi leadership, may be looked upon both as a point of weakness, demonstrating that the Sanusi organization is no longer adequate for a modern state, and as a point of strength, by shifting its emphasis from political to religious activities. Like Wahhabism, Sanusism is likely to survive as an order, since it is adapting itself to modern conditions of life, but its importance will, perhaps, be overshadowed by the rising tide of Arab nationalism.

Dr. Nicola Ziada (Ziadeh), now professor of history at the American University of Beirut, was in the employment of the Department of Education in Cyrenaica, during the formative period of the Libyan state and is well acquainted with that country. His book, therefore, is not only based on the printed materials on the Sanusi movement, but also on his personal observations and experiences there. He shows acquaintance with almost all available material on the history and the creed of the Sanusi order, as his list of sources indicates.

The book is divided into four chapters, an introduction, and an epilogue. The chapters on the rise of the Sanusi order, its creed and its organization (Chapters 2-4), are excellent, and the author clearly and accurately discusses the life of the founder of the order and his religious ideas. But both the introductory and concluding chapters are disappointing, since the author pays little attention to the intricate forces that produced the movement and fails to discuss in the epilogue the problems facing the order now and its relations with rising Arab nationalism. However, the greater part of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the activities and the religious ideas of Sanusi leaders, and constitute an important contribution to the study of the movement.

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RECENT PUBLICATIONS

General

- Avicenna, His Life and Works*, by Soheil M. Afnan. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. 298 pages. \$6.50.
- Doubts and Dynamite: The Middle East Today*, by Emile Bustani. London: Allan Wingate, 1958. 159 pages. 18s.
- Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1957-58*. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. New York: UN Publications, 1959. 104 pages.
- Histoire Diplomatique du Moyen-Orient de 1919 à 1939*, by Ladislav de Marothy. Privately printed, 1958. 216 pages. A thesis for the licentiate in international relations, which reviews the peace settlement, its revision at Lausanne, and the foreign relations of Turkey, Iran and the Arab states; based on a partial survey of the published materials.
- The Middle East*, by Europa Publications, Ltd. Seventh Edition. London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1959. \$13.50.
- Middle Eastern Affairs*. St. Anthony's Papers, No. 4. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 140 pages. \$3.50.
- Soviet Russia and the Middle East*, by Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1959. 366 pages. \$6.00.
- The Soviet Union and the Muslim World*, by Ivar Spector. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959. 328 pages. \$5.00. An analysis and interpretation of Soviet policy toward the Muslim World since the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Arab World

- Big Oil Man from Arabia*, by Michael S. Cheney. New York: Ballantine Books, 1958. 282 pages. \$4.95.
- L'Egitto Moderno*, by Paolo Minganti. Florence: Sansoni, 1959. 248 pages.
- Jordan, A State of Tension*, by Benjamin Shwadran. New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959. 436 pages. \$7.00.
- T. E. Lawrence, or the Search for the Absolute*, by Jean Beraud Villars. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1959. 353 pages. \$5.50. A new interpretation of the life of the legendary Lawrence of Arabia.

Iran

- Persia and the Defence of India*, by Rose Louise Greaves. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 300 pages. \$6.00. A study of how the advance of Russia in Central Asia during the nineteenth century influenced British policy in Persia.

Israel

- The American Bridge to the Israeli Commonwealth*, by Bernard A. Rosenblatt. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959. \$3.75.
- Foundations of Israel: Emergence of a Welfare State*, by Oscar I. Janowsky. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Com-

pany, Inc., 1959. An Anvil Publication. 189 pages. \$1.25.

Israel's Odyssey, by Abraham Mayer Heller. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959. \$4.00.

The Tide of Nationalism, by Abba Eban. New York: Horizon Press, Inc., 1959. 62 pages. \$2.00. The Israeli Ambassador to the US explores the factors behind the crisis in the Middle East.

Tumult of Creation, by Abba Eban. New York: Horizon Press, 1959. \$6.00.

North Africa

Al-Yousi, Problèmes de la Culture Marocaine au XVII^{ème} Siècle, by Jacques Berque. Paris: Mouton and Company, 1958. 144 pages.

La Révolution Algérienne, by Charles-Henri Favrod. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1959. 1.950 fr.

Pakistan

Early India and Pakistan, by Sir Mortimer Wheeler. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1959. \$5.50.

India, Pakistan and the West, by Percival Spear. Third edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 256 pages.

Turkey

Bibliography on Public Administration in Turkey, 1928-1957. Edited by Albert Sturm and Cemal Mihçioğlu. Ankara: University of Ankara, 1959. 224 pages.

Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, by Ziya Gökalp. Selected, arranged and translated by Niyazi Berkes. New York: Columbia University Press, \$5.00.

Art, Literature, & Linguistics

The Avestan Hymn to Mithra. Introduction, translation, and commentary by Ilya Gershevitch. London: Cambridge University Press, 1959. 357 pages. \$13.50.

Concise Dictionary of Judaism, by Dagobert D. Runes. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1959. 237 pages. \$5.00. A handy guidebook of quick references in the field of Jewish history, religion, philosophy, and literature.

Studies in the Arab Theater and Cinema, by Jacob M. Landau. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958. 290 pages.

The Verb in Harari (South Ethiopic), by Wolf Leslau. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. 86 pages. \$1.75.

History, Archaeology, and Religion

Le Christ de l'Islam, by Michel Hayek. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1959. 286 pages.

Islam, An Introduction, by E. E. Calverley. Vol. 1. Cairo: American University of Cairo, 1958. 97 pages.

De la Plaine Pamphylie aux Lacs Pisidiens, by Xavier de Planhol. Paris: Librairie Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1958. 495 pages + diagrams and plates.

Political Leadership among Swat Pathans, by Fredrik Barth. London: University of London Press, 1959. 143 pages. 25s. An examination of the complex system which lies behind the apparent disorder of political relations in the Swat Valley of Pakistan.

Sex and Family in the Bible, by Raphael Patai. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1959. 282 pages. \$3.95. An anthropologist uses patterns of living still found in the Middle East to throw light on the world of the Bible.

FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt, by James Henry Breasted. New York: Harper and Brothers, September, 1959. \$1.95.

Islam and the Arabs, by Rom Landau. New York: Macmillan Company, July, 1959. Probably \$4.95. A survey of the history and culture of the Arabs.

The Middle East: An Introduction, by Sidney N. Fisher. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, August, 1959. \$8.75.

The Scepter of Egypt, by William C. Hayes. Vol. 11. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$15.00.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer

With contributions from: Ernest Dawn, Richard Ettinghausen, Sidney Glazer, R. S. Harrell, Louis A. Leopold, Bernard Lewis, M. Perlmann, C. Rabin, W. Sands.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab World, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Palestine and Zionism*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library, New York.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, The Middle East Journal, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

For list of periodicals reviewed, see page 351. For list of abbreviations, see page 354.

GEOGRAPHY

- 11677 CRESSEY, G. B. "The Shatt al-Arab basin." *M.E.J.* 12, No. 4 (1958) 448-460.
- 11678 DOUGLAS, WILLIAM O. "The station wagon odyssey: Bagdad to Istanbul." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 115 (Ja '59) 48-49. The trip included visits to Mosul, Tabriz, Erzurum, and Samsun.
- 11679 MELAMID, ALEXANDER. "The Russian-Iran boundary." *Geog. Rev.* 49 (Ja '59) 122-4. A review article covering the Russian-Iranian boundary protocol of 1937.
- 11680 ROWLATT, MARY. "An aspect of nineteenth century travel in Arab lands." *Arab World* 36 (Jl '58) 7-10. Discusses the type of traveler that has received no more than "a twig of laurel" in recognition of notable achievement—the maids and men-servants who shared their masters' adventures, sometimes in more difficult circumstances.
- 11683 HOOKHAM, H. "Tamburlaine: the great emir." *Hist. Today* 9 (Mr. '59) 151-9.
- 11684 KAFESOGU, IBRAHIM. "À propos du nom Turkmén." *Oriens* 11 (D '58) 146-50. In the older sources the Turkmens were also frequently called Oguz and the author offers a plausible explanation.
- 11685 LAUSHAURI, MENDIA. "The fifteen hundredth anniversary of Tbilisi." *Caucasian Rev.* 7 (1958) 7-19. In October 458 King Vakhtang Gorgasali of Iberia (East Georgia) founded Tiflis. A review of the history, cultural and economic life of the city.
- 11686 MINORSKY, V. "A new book on the Khazars." *Oriens* 11 (D '58) 122-45. Detailed discussion of some controversial points in Dunlop's *The history of the Jewish Khazars*.

HISTORY AND POLITICS (Modern)

- 11687 "Abu Dhabi—past and future." *Arab World* 38 (Ja '59) 21-4. Some notes on this largest of the shaykhdoms of Trucial Oman.
- 11688 "The Aden protectorate levies." *Arab World* 38 (Ja '59) 17-21. The history of these British troops predates World War I.
- 11689 "The Lebanese crisis in perspective." *World Today* 14 (S '58) 369-80. Account of the events preceding American military intervention in the summer of 1958.
- 11690 "The newspapers of Azerbaydzhan." *C. A. Rev.* 7, No. 1 (1959) 40-7. Examines the two leading dailies in the Soviet republic, which mirror the agricultural, industrial, and cultural development of the people.
- 11691 "Note sopra i partiti e l'attività politica nel Su-

- dan." *Oriente Mod.* 38 (N '58) 877-85. A comprehensive treatment of Sudanese politics during the period 1953-1958.
- 11692 "Persia under strain." *Round Table* 194 (Mr '59) 122-30. As a result of the withdrawal of Iraq from the Bagdad Pact, Persia has now become the keystone of the new arch in the Middle East. The article seeks to assess the strength and potential durability of the keystone.
- 11693 "The twenty-first congress of the CPSU and the tasks of oriental studies." (in Russian) *Problemy Vostoka* 1 (1959) 18-25. The tasks seem about the same as those set by the Twentieth Congress.
- 11694 AARONIAN, GARABED H. "Under the shadow of death." *Armenian Rev.* 11 (Ap '59) 69-76. From an autobiography. The author was drafted as an officer of the "Labor Battalions" of the Turkish army during World War I.
- 11695 ABSHIRE, DAVID M. "The naval battle of Navarino, 1827." *U. S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 85 (Ja '59) 92-7. Political and military account of this battle with Mehmet Ali and the Ottoman sultan against the combined British, French, and Russian squadrons.
- 11696 ARABIAN, GREGORY H. "An inquiry into the Turkish massacres of 1894-1897." *Armenian Rev.* 11 (Ap '59) 84-96. The author attributes the causes of the massacres of the Armenians to abuses by the government, demands for reform, and religious factors. The agents were Kurds, Turkish soldiers, and street mobs, each of which had their own motives.
- 11697 ASHFORD, DOUGLAS E. "Politics and violence in Morocco." *M.E.J.* 13, No. 1 (1959) 11-25. On the problems of integrating revolutionaries into a stable government.
- 11698 BERTIER, FRANCIS. "Réflexions sur la politique intérieure et extérieure de l'Egypte." *Orient* 3, no. 1 (1959) 31-40. Throughout Egyptian history foreign policy has generally served the cause of domestic policy. The article includes some interesting observations on Egyptian psychology.
- 11699 CAGLE, MALCOLM W. "The Gulf of Aqaba—trigger of conflict." *U. S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 85 (Ja '59) 75-81. Background, present status, and prospects.
- 11700 COLOMBE, MARCEL. "Panorama du trimestre." *Orient* 3, no. 1 (1959) 9-12. Ponders the implications of the newest and most violent manifestation of the old Iraqi-Egyptian quarrel, as it developed between December 1958 and March 1959.
- 11701 DANTSIG, G. M. and DJILENKO, V. I. "A forgotten episode from the history of Russo-Moroccan relations at the end of the 19th century." (in Russian) *Problemy Vostoka* 1 (1959) 86-93. The Sultan initiated negotiations for a trade treaty between Russia and Morocco. Relevant archival material is here published for the first time.
- 11702 DELESTRE, EMILE. "La République arabe unie face à l'Irak et au communisme." *Orient* 3, no. 1 (1959) 13-22. If Egypt is to serve as an effective barrier to the penetration of communism in the Middle East, President Nasir will have to abandon his ambition to unite the Arab world around himself. Will he do so? The author thinks not. The article is accompanied by a considerable number of source documents.
- 11703 EDMONDS, C. J. "Kurds and the revolution in Iraq." *M.E.J.* 13, No. 1 (1959) 1-10. An inquiry into the rôle of the Kurds in the new republican régime.
- 11704 ELLIS, ELLEN D. "Turkish nationalism in the postwar world." *Current Hist.* 36 (F '59) 86-91. Points up the progressive movement of Turkey "into line with the forces operating within and among the nations of the Western non-communist world."
- 11705 GANKOVSKII, Y. V. "Trade relations between Afghanistan and Russia in the second half of the 18th century." (in Russian) *Problemy Vostoka* 1 (1959) 142-3. Brief notes based on archival material.
- 11706 GOSNELL, H. F. "The 1958 elections in the Sudan." *M.E.J.* 12, No. 4 (1958) 409-417.
- 11707 HADDAD, GEORGE. "An 18th century chronicle of Damascus." *Islamic Rev.* 47 (Ap '59) 25-8. A valuable MS by Ahmad al-Budayri al-Hallâq, a barber with keen powers of observation, whose main concern was with the life of the people and social events rather than with political history.
- 11708 HADJIBEYLI, DJEIHUN. "Anti-Islamic propaganda in Azerbaidzhan." *Caucasian Rev.* 7 (1958) 20-65. The Soviets have never abandoned their strategy of destroying Islam, but they have been flexible in tactics, moderating their hatred when circumstances required.
- 11709 HARARI, MAURICE. "The dynamics of Lebanese nationalism." *Current Hist.* 36 (F '59) 97-101. Describes the regaining of a spirit of compromise and confidence as a result of a "religio-political equilibrium . . . but the threatening disruptive elements . . . have not been eliminated."
- 11710 ISSAWI, CHARLES. "The United Arab Republic." *Current Hist.* 36 (F '59) 65-9. The author believes that the Arab states will "coalesce around Egyptian leadership."
- 11711 JARGY, SIMON. "Realités libanaises." *Orient* 3, no. 1 (1959) 41-51. Whether or not Lebanon survives as an independent nation will depend largely on the will of the citizens of that country.
- 11712 KARCHA, R. "The status of popular education in the northern Caucasus." *Caucasian Rev.* 7 (1958) 110-24. Includes an examination of the national and linguistic policies of the Soviets.
- 11713 LEWIS, BERNARD. "Democracy in Turkey." *Middle East Aff.* 10 (Ja '59) 55-72. Turkish democracy—in its formal political manifestation in the press and parliament—has undoubtedly received a setback. However, at the man-on-the-street level, progress continues. All things considered, Turkey is far from having reverted to autocracy.
- 11714 MONTERRAT, MICHEL. "L'affaire de Mossoul." *Orient* 3, no. 1 (1959) 23-30. Traces the short-lived anti-Qasim uprising in March 1959, chiefly from Iraqi press accounts.
- 11715 MUHSINOVA, K. Z. "Peasant uprisings in the Bukhara khanate against the taxation yoke at the end of the 19th century." (in Russian) *Problemy Vostoka*

- 1 (1959) 94-9. Documents from the state archives of the Uzbek SSR indicate the nature of the taxes levied in the Denau vilayet.
- 11716 PATAI, RAPHAEL. "Nationalism in Jordan." *Current Hist.* 36 (F '59) 77-80. Describes the conflict between the appeal of Nasserism and emergent Jordanian nationalist sentiment.
- 11717 PERETZ, DON. "Democracy and the revolution in Egypt." *M.E.J.*, Vol. 13, no. 1 (1959) 26-40. Critical review of the course of the Egyptian régime, 1952-1958.
- 11718 PERIMANN, M. "In the shadow of 'Lunik'." *Mid. East. Aff.* 10 (Ja '59) 73-8. A review of Middle East events during the last quarter of 1958, which was marked by acute tension between Egypt and Iraq.
- 11719 PETROSYAN, Y. A. "Important publications of Turkish archival material." (in Russian) *Problemy Vostoka* 1 (1959) 158-9. Discusses the noted Turkish historian I. H. Uzunçarşili.
- 11720 PETROV, P. I. "The Bokhara muhtasib at the beginning of the 20th century." (in Russian) *Problemy Vostoka* 1 (1959) 139-42. Text of an edict by the emir defining the duties of this official.
- 11721 PRANGER, ROBERT J. "Currents in Iranian nationalism." *Current Hist.* 36 (F '59) 102-6. Pressed both by communism and Arab nationalism, Iran has sought to extricate itself by moving more closely toward the West and the non-Arab Muslims in the Middle East.
- 11722 RALEIGH, J. S. "Middle East politics: the past ten years." *Mid. East. Aff.* 10 (Ja '59) 3-24. Despite the title, the article deals almost exclusively with the Arab countries, laying major stress on the significance of Nasir's advent to power.
- 11723 SHPILKOVA, V. I. "Antimonarchist plot in Turkey in the 19th century." (in Russian) *Problemy Vostoka* 1 (1959) 100-4. The author considers the so-called Kuleli incident not a plot against the sultan as such (as Turkish historians do) but a "progressive" movement that failed because of lack of mass support.
- 11724 SPECTOR, IVAR. "Soviet foreign policy in the Arab world." *Current Hist.* 36 (Ja '59) 13-7. Points up Soviet exploitation of nationalism as a tool, using the recent Afro-Asian Conference of 1957-1958 and its permanent secretariat as an example.
- 11725 STRAUSS-HUPÉ, ROBERT. "The Middle East." *U. S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 85 (Ja '59) 22-9.
- 11726 TATLOCK, T. "The Ubykhs." *Caucasian Rev.* 7 (1958) 100-9. The Ubykhs were a Circassian people related to the Abkhazians of the present Abkhazian ASSR. The Soviets liquidated them for resisting the régime.
- 11727 TROUTBECK, JOHN. "The revolution in Iraq." *Current Hist.* 36 (F '59) 81-5. Discusses the problems facing the new government.
- 11728 TOYNBEE, ARNOLD. "The Arabs and the West." *Arab World* 38 (Ja '59) 9-12. Urges the West to promote Arab unity and thereby strengthen the bases of mutual economic interest.
- 11729 TWITCHELL, K. T. "Nationalism in Saudi Arabia." *Current Hist.* (F '59) 92-6. Describes Saudi Arabia's policy of "friendly intercourse with the leaders of the members of the Arab league . . . resistance to dominance by any foreign power, and . . . adherence to . . . Islam."
- 11730 WIET, GASTON. "L'emblème de la République arabe unie." *Orient* 3, no. 1 (1959) 55-62. Discussion of the eagle emblem used in official U. A. R. correspondence and on a recent postage stamp and the possibility that it may have been used by Saladdin.
- 11731 WILBER, DONALD. "Prospects for federation in the northern tier." *M.E.J.* 12, No. 4 (1958) 385-394.
- 11732 ZEIDNER, ROBERT. "Kurdish nationalism and the new Iraq government." *Mid. East. Aff.* 10 (Ja '59) 24-31. Writing before the relations between Egypt and Iraq became exacerbated early in 1959, the author contends that the Kurds remain antipathetic to Arab nationalism and efforts at greater unification.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS (General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources)

- 11733 AL-BAKRI, M. F. "Financing of the mining industry in the Egyptian province of the U. A. R." *L'Egypte Contemp.* 49 (O '58) 85-94. Exploitation of Egypt's mineral resources was undertaken in a systematic way only since the revolution of 1952.
- 11734 ALLOUNI, A. AZIZ. "The labor movement in Syria." *M.E.J.* 13, No. 1 (1959) 64-76. Legislation on labor and its workings, principally since 1945.
- 11735 AMIN, SAMIR. "Forces inflationnistes et forces déflationnistes dans l'économie égyptienne." *L'Egypte Contemp.* 49 (O '58) 5-36. Seeks to determine the responsibility for the sharp rise in prices since 1952.
- 11736 DE CANDOLE, E. A. V. "Development in Kuwait." *R.C.A.J.* 46 (Ja '59) 27-38. A strong defense of the integrity and competence of the Kuwaiti government.
- 11737 KRAÏEM, MOHD. "Civil Aviation in Tunisia." *I.C.A.O. Bulletin*, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (1959) 44-6. In three years, the formerly completely French administration has evolved into one 90% Tunisian in personnel.
- 11738 MERRYLEES, K. W. "Water problems in the Middle East." *R.C.A.J.* 46 (Ja '59) 39-45. Discusses underground water reserves and the problems involved in developing them.
- 11739 SAYIGH, YUSIF A. "Relations between labour and management in Iraq, the Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt." *Islamic Rev.* 47 (Mr '59) 31-4. These relations are personal rather than institutional due largely to attitudes carried over intact from the social realm into the economic.
- 11740 SCOTT-REID, DON. "The story of Iraq's railways." *Arab World* 38 (Ja '59) 25-8.
- 11741 VVEDENSKY, G. A. "The position of the Azerbaijani oil industry in the oil output of the USSR." *Caucasian Rev.* 7 (1958) 91-9. Oil is the main industry

of Azerbaijan, which ranks third in USSR production after the Tatar and Bashkir ASSR's.

- 11742 WEIGEND, GUIDO G. "An intercontinental tunnel at Gibraltar." *Geog. Rev.* 1 (Ja '59) 118-20.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

(General, population and ethnology, medicine and health, education, religion and law)

- 11743 "The feminist movement in Persia." *C. A. Rev.* 7 no. 1 (1959) 74-83. Draws most of the information from female characters in modern Persian prose literature.
- 11744 "Trends in education in central Asia." *C. A. Rev.* 7, no. 1 (1959) 14-20. Increasing emphasis is being placed on practical training.
- 11745 DE LA BASTIDE, HENRI. "Une semaine avec les écrivains ouzbeks." *Orient* 3, no. 1 (1959) 79-85. The author found Islam moribund in Tashkent, the situation being comparable with that in Istanbul and Tehran. Includes a list of the principal works of contemporary Uzbek literature.
- 11746 DEMEERSEMAN, A. "Réflexions sur l'étude de la personnalité de la Tunisie." *I.B.L.A.* 21, no. 4 (1958) 355-63. Examines the question of whether a nation like Tunisia has a "personality," decides that it does, and urges that it be studied in depth.
- 11747 MIGEOD, H. G. "Die Lütia." *J. Econ. and Soc. Hist. of the O.* 2 (Ja '59) 82-91. Assesses the role of these court entertainers in Persian society on the basis of writings of Western travelers.
- 11748 PIPES, RICHARD. "Demographic and ethnographic changes in Transcaucasia, 1897-1956." *M.E.J.* 13, No. 1 (1959) 41-63. Material from previous censuses as a preview of that of 1959.
- 11749 PRESTHUS, ROBERT V. "Behavior and bureaucracy in many cultures." *Public Adm. Rev.* 29 (winter '59) 25-35. Discusses the need of an "explicit synthesis between conceptual theory and empirical field research," illustrating his arguments with Morroe Berger's *Bureaucracy and society in modern Egypt*.
- 11750 QUINT, M. N. "The idea of progress in an Iraqi village." *M.E.J.* 12, No. 4 (1958) 369-384.
- 11751 SAYADI, S. "Aperçus sur le cinéma tunisien." *I.B.L.A.* 21, no. 4 (1958) 409-32.
- 11752 SERGEANT, R. B. "A metal padlock and keys from southern Arabia." *Man* 59 (Mr '59) 49. Description of an ingenious hand-made, ornamental lock. Illust.
- 11753 STIRLING, PAUL. "Religious changes in republican Turkey." *M.E.J.* 12, No. 4 (1958) 395-408.

QUR'ANIC STUDIES

- 11754 WEISWEILER, MAX. "Äbdu'lqāhir al-Curcānī's werk über die Unnachahmlichkeit des Korans." *Oriens* 11 (D '58) 77-121. Al-Jurjānī (ca. 471/1078) was interested mainly in the inimitability of Qur'anic language. In his *K. Dalā'il i'jāz al-Qur'ān* he contended that the important thing was not words as such (lafz) but their order or style (nazm).

ART

- 11755 ERDMANN, KURT. "Zum Vierbogenbau von Key Kubadiye." *Ankara Üniv. İlahiyat Fak. Yıllık Araştırmalar Derg.* 2 (1958) 93-5. The open four-arched kiosk near Kaisari, dated ca. 1224-1226, is the oldest example of this type in Rum-Seljuq architecture.
- 11756 WILKINSON, CHARLES K. "The kilns of Nishapur." *Bull. Metro. Museum of Art* 17, no. 9 (My '59) 235-40. Deals particularly with the mold-made wares of the 12th century made in this important pottery center of Khorasan (Iran) and explains the techniques used with the help of various excavated molds recovered by the Museum diggings of 1947.

LANGUAGE

- 11757 AFSHIN, F. D. "Demonstrative particles in the Turkic languages." (in Russian) *Izv. Akad. Nauk SSR*, otd. lit. i yaz. 17 (S '58) 417-34. This survey shows that the particles played a major role in the development of the demonstrative pronouns. Pronouns formed with these particles possess marked deictic and anaphoric significance, unlike the other demonstratives.
- 11758 LESLAU, WOLF. "Sidamo features in the south Ethiopic phonology." *J.A.O.S.* 79, no. 1 (Ja-Mr '59) 1-7. Cushitic (particularly Sidamo) consonants are weakened and have tended to destroy the phonetic integrity of the Ethiopic root.
- 11759 ABKHAZIAN, T. "Literature on Abkhazia and the Abkhazian-Abazinians." *Caucasian Rev.* 7 (1958) 125-43. Several hundred bibliographic references—arranged alphabetically by author—on this autonomous republic that forms part of the Georgian SSR.
- 11760 GRIGOR'YAN, K. N. "The correspondence between Academician I. Yu. Krachkovskii and V. Ya. Bryusov in connection with the Russian translation of Avetik Isaakyan's poem 'Abul Ala Maari'." (in Russian) *Izv. Akad. Nauk SSR*, otd. lit. i yaz. 17 (N '58) 547-54. Krachkovskii was offended by the distortions of the Arab poet's life that he found in Isaakyan's verse.
- 11761 KARIMULLIN, A. G. "Oriental materials in the University of Kazan." (in Russian) *Problemy Vostoka* 1 (1959) 153-7. The library contains about 10,000 MSS and 9,000 books in oriental languages, the most important of which are mentioned in the article.
- 11762 MIKIRTITCHIAN, LEVON. "Aksel Bakounts as the champion of the true concept of the popular bases of literature in Soviet Armenia." *Caucasian Rev.* 7 (1958) 66-90. Bakounts is a leading prose writer of the day.
- 11763 RITTER, HELLMUT. "Fariduddīn 'Attār." *Oriens* 11 (D '58) 1-76. Works, manuscripts, translations of the Persian mystic poet.
- 11764 URAI, G. "Works of Hungarian orientalists 1956-1957." (in Russian) *Problemy Vostoka* 1 (1959) 144-52. General survey, with a list of the main items.

BIOGRAPHY

- 11765 HÖRMANN, WOLFGANG. "Emil Gratzl." *Z. für Bibliothekswesen und Bibliographie* (Frankfurt a/M) 5, no. 4 (1958) 354-8. Obituary of the German orientalist, a former director of the Bavarian State Library and expert on Muslim bookbinding.

BOOK REVIEWS

- 11766 *British interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 84-6. (M. E. Rowlatt). "There are many useful books on the Middle East which present facts, but a book like this one which honestly interprets facts is rare and of a more significant use."
- 11767 *Egypt and the United Nations*. Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev. 53 (Mr '59) 206-12. (Ernst B. Haas). This report of a study group set up by the Egyptian Society of International law "is an undisguised nationalist diatribe."
- 11768 ADAMS, MICHEL. *Suez and after*. Mid. East. Aff. 10 (Ja '59) 81-2. (Emil Lengyel).
- 11769 AFNAN, SOHEIL M. *Avicenna, his life and works*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 75-6. "A sound introduction to the subject."
- 11770 ALLEN, W. E. D. and MURATOFF, P. *Caucasian battlefields*. Oriens 11 (D '58) 254-6. (V. Minorsky).
- 11771 ARBERRY, ARTHUR J. *Classical Persian literature*. M.E.J. 13, No. 1 (1959) 102-104 (Sidney Glazer).
- 11772 ARON, RAYMOND. *L'Algérie et la république*. Internat. Aff. 35 (Ap '59) 247. (Nevill Barbour).
- 11773 ARON, RAYMOND. *La tragédie algérienne*. Mid. East. Aff. 10 (Ja '59).
- 11774 BASISTOV, Y. and YANOVSKII, I. *Lands of the Near and Middle East* (in Russian). C. A. Rev. 7, No. 1 (1959) 97-9.
- 11775 BAUER, LEONHARD. *Deutsch-arabisches Wörterbuch der Umgangssprache in Palästina und im Libanon*, 2nd ed. Oriens 11 (D '58) 264-6. (Ch. Pellat).
- 11776 BOURDIEU, PIERRE. *Sociologie de l'Algérie*. Internat. Aff. 35 (Ap '59) 247. (Nevill Barbour). "Not merely a useful summary, but an original contribution to a complex subject."
- 11777 BULLARD, READER, ed. *The Middle East*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 87-8.
- 11778 BUSTANI, EMILE. *Doubts and dynamite: the Middle East today*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 86-7. (P. E. L. Fellowes). "Contains much of permanent value."
- 11779 CAROE, OLAF. *The Pathans*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 67-8. (G. E. Wheeler). The first comprehensive history of these people.
- 11780 CRESSWELL, K. A. C. *A short account of early Muslim architecture*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 89-90. (John H. Harvey).
- 11781 DAVER, BÜLENT. *Laicism in the Turkish republic* (in Turkish). Oriens 11 (D '58) 241. (N. Berkes). "A jurist's scholarly and fine contribution to the description of Turkish secularism."
- 11782 EDMONDS, C. J. *Kurds, Turks and Arabs*. M.E.J. 12, No. 4 (1958) 469-70 (Majid Khaduri). "... a real contribution to our knowledge of northern Iraq ..."
- 11783 ERDMANN, K. *Der orientalische Knopf-teppich*. Oriens 11 (D '58) 257-64. (R. Ettinghausen). A generally successful effort "to survey the historical development in broad strokes" rather than "to offer details and final results."
- 11784 ERGIN, OSMAN. *Ibn Sina bibliography* (in Turkish). Oriens 11 (D '58) 231-9. (Rudolf Sellheim).
- 11785 FINNIE, DAVID H. *Desert enterprise: the Middle East oil industry and its local environment*. Internat. Aff. 35 (Ap '59) 246. (S. H. Longrigg). "A short, sensible, readable book"; M.E.J. 12, No. 4 (1958) 466. (Angus Sinclair).
- 11786 FRYE, WILLIAM R. *A United Nation's peace force*. Mid. East. Aff. 10 (Ja '59) 81. (Leland M. Goodrich). The "best account so far" of the U. N. effort to handle the post-Suez crisis of 1956.
- 11787 GIBB, H. A. R., ed. and trans. *The travels of Ibn Battuta*. M.E.J. 12, No. 4 (1958) 464-466. (William Popper).
- 11788 GIBB, H. A. R. and BOWEN, HAROLD. *Islamic society and the West*. Oriens 11 (D '58) 252-3. (Bertold Spuler).
- 11789 HARRIS, GEORGE L., and others. *Jordan*. Internat. Aff. 35 (Ap '59) 249. (Elizabeth Monroe).
- 11790 HICKENBOTHAM, TOM. *Aden*. Internat. Aff. 35 (Ap '59) 249. (R. W. Bullard).
- 11791 HODGSON, MARSHALL G. S. *The order of assassins*. Oriens 11 (D '58) 279-80. (S. M. Stern). "A fundamental item in the literature on Ismā'ilism."
- 11792 HOLT, P. M. *The Mahdist state in the Sudan*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 97-8. (T. L. Tibawi). "A scholarly account of the background, rise and fall of the theocratic state which the Mahdi and his successor established and maintained in the Sudan."
- 11793 HUSAYNI, ISHĀQ MŪSA. *Azmat al-fikr al-'arabi*. M.E.J. 13, No. 1 97-98. (Harold W. Glidden).
- 11794 KONONOV, A. N., ed. *Shajara-yi Tarakim* (of Abu al-Ghāzī). *Problemy Vostoka* 1 (1959) 169-73. (Yu. E. Bregel' and E. N. Nadzhip). An important source for the early history of Turkmenistan.
- 11795 KÖRZHENSKII, N. L., ed. *The Uzbek SSR*. C. A. Rev. 7, No. 1 (1959) 47-52. Detailed summary of contents.
- 11796 KURAN, AHMED BEDEVI. *Revolutionary activities and the national struggle in the Ottoman empire* (in Turkish). Oriens 11 (D '58) 240. (N. Berkes). "A mine of information" on the Young Turks.
- 11797 LENGUEL, EMIL. *Egypt's role in world*

- affairs. Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 52 (D '58) 1203. (Carl J. Schneider).
- 11798 LERNER, DANIEL (and Lucille Pensner). *The passing of traditional society: modernizing the Middle East*. M.E.J. 13, No. 1 (1959) 99-101. (Malcolm N. Quint). "Essentially one must agree with the analysis of social change presented."
- 11799 LITTLE, TOM. *Egypt*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 73-4. (Ralph Stevenson). "A lucid exposition of the aims and aspirations of the Egyptian revolution."
- 11800 LOCKHART, LAWRENCE. *The fall of the Safawi dynasty*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 70-1. (W. E. D. Allen). "A detailed study and a brilliant synthesis."
- 11801 LONGGOOD, WILLIAM F. *Suez story*. Mid. East. Aff. 10 (Ja '59) 81-2. (Emil Lengyel).
- 11802 LONGRIGG, STEPHEN HEMSLEY. *Syrian and Lebanon under French mandate*. Internat. Aff. 35 (Ap '59) 247-8. (Kenneth Robinson). "A careful, learned, and scrupulously detached book, which is a contribution to the history of French rule overseas"; R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 82-3. (Harold Ingrams).
- 11803 LONGRIGG, STEPHEN HEMSLEY and STOAKES, FRANK. *Iraq*. Internat. Aff. 35 (Ap '59) 249-50. (John Troutbeck; R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 83).
- 11804 LUTHER, ERNEST W. *Ethiopia today*. Mid. East. Aff. 10 (Ja '59) 36. (L. A. Parcher). "Not only good reading, but . . . of particular value to prospective foreign investors and to those interested in trade with Ethiopia."
- 11805 MACLEAN, FITZROY. *A person from England: and other travellers to Turkestan*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 68-70. (Douglas Carruthers).
- 11806 MAGNUS, PHILIP. *Kitchener: portrait of an imperialist*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 71-3. (G. M. Routh). "An unbiased summary."
- 11807 MAHMUD, TAKI NAJIB. *Kburafat al-Mitafisiq*. M.E.J. 13, No. 1, (1959) 98. (George F. Hourani). ". . . a serious attempt to deal with problems of philosophy in a manner that is thoughtful, honest and modern."
- 11808 MAYER, L. A. *Islamic architects and their works*. Problemy Vostoka 1 (1959) 191-4. (L. S. Bretanitskii and A. V. Salamzade).
- 11809 MAYER, L. A. *Islamic astrolabists and their works*. Oriens 11 (D '58) 279. (J. Vernet).
- 11810 MAYER, L. A. *Mamluk costume*. Oriens 11 (D '58) 276-9. (Ernst Kuhnel).
- 11811 MCCARTHY, R. J. *Kitab al-tambid al-Baqillani*. M.E.J. 13, No. 1 (1959) 105-6. (George Makdisi). ". . . his patient and learned work will earn the gratitude of interested scholars. . . ."
- 11812 MORGAN, KENNETH W. *Islam: the straight path*. Oriente Mod. 38 (Jl '58) 662-3. (Francesco Gabrieli); R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 88-9. "Islam interpreted by Muslims"; M.E.J. 13, No. 1 (1959) 104-5. (A. A. A. Fyze).
- 11813 NADER, A. N. *Le système philosophique des Mu'tazila*. Oriens 11 (D '58) 314-8. (J. van Ess).
- 11814 NIKITINE, BASILE. *Les Kurdes*. Oriente Mod. 38 (Jl '58) 663-4. (Gianroberto Scarcia).
- 11815 PATAI, RAPHAEL. *The Kingdom of Jordan*. Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 52 (D '58) 1194. (George L. Grassmuck).
- 11816 PELLAT, CHARLES. *Introduction à l'arabe moderne*. Oriens 11 (D '58) 285-6. (Wolfdietrich Fischer).
- 11817 ROBINSON, B. W. *A descriptive catalogue of the Persian paintings in the Bodleian library*. Oriental Art (London) 5 (spring '59) 32. (Sofie Walzer).
- 11818 ROOLVINK, R. *Historical atlas of the Muslim peoples*. Geog. Rev. 49 (Ap '59) 289-90. (Marvin W. Mikesell); Bibliotheca Orientalis XVI, No. 1-2 (Ja-Mar. '59) 27-31. (C. A. O. van Nienwenhuijze).
- 11819 ROSENTHAL, E. I. J. *Political thoughts in medieval Islam*. M.E.J. 12, No. 4 (1958) 474-5. (Malcolm Kerr). ". . . dealing in a single volume with the most important traditional genres: the juristic theory of the Caliphate, the 'mirrors' literature of practical advice to rulers, philosophy, history, and the Muslim adaptations of Greek philosophy."
- 11820 SALEH, ZAKI. *Mesopotamia (Iraq) 1600-1914*. A study in British foreign affairs. Mid. East. Aff. 10 (Ja '59) 34-5. (C. J. Edmonds). "A painstakingly documented and skillfully integrated study."
- 11821 STARK, FREYA. *Alexander's path*. R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 74-5. (Harry Luke).
- 11822 THAYER, PHILIP W., ed. *Tensions in the Middle East*. Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 53 (Mr '59) 252-3. (George Lenczowski; R.C.A.J. 46 (Ja '59) 84).
- 11823 TOYNBEE, A. J. *East to West*. Oriente Mod. 38 (O '58) 874. (F. Gabrieli).
- 11824 VAN DER MEULEN, D. *The wells of Ibn Sa'ud*. Mid. East. Aff. 10 (Ja '59) 85-6. (Leonard M. Fanning).
- 11825 WINDER, R. BAYLY and ZIADEH, FARHAT J. *An introduction to modern Arabic*. Oriens 11 (D '58) 249-50. (Wolfdietrich Fischer). "Within its limitations . . . a very useful manual."

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- al-Abhath. Lebanon and Syria. £1 9; foreign, £1; single issue £1 2.50, 6s. *q* American Univ. of Beirut; agent: Dar al-Kitab, POB 1284, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Acta Orientalia. 60 forint. *irreg* Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Orientalisztikai Közlönyei, 2 V. Alkotmány-utca 21, Budapest, Hungary.
- al-Adib. Single issue £1 1. *m* al-Adib, B.P. 878, Beirut, Lebanon.
- African Affairs. £1 4s; single issue 5s. *q* Royal African Society, 18 Northumberland Ave., London, W.C.2.
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- L'Afrique et l'Asie. 800 fr. *q* I.A.C. 8, rue de Furstenberg, Paris 6e.
- American Historical Review. \$7.50; single issue \$2. *q* American Historical Association, Study Room 274, Library of Congress Annex, Washington 25, D. C.; single issues available from The Macmillan Co., 60 Fifth Ave., New York 11, N. Y.
- American Journal of Archaeology. \$10.00; no extra charge for foreign subscription. *q* Archaeological Institute of America, 5 Washington Square N, New York 3, N. Y.
- al-Andalus. 60 ptas.; single issue 30 ptas. *semi-ann* Secretario, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Cambio Internacional Serrano 117, Madrid, Spain.
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- Arab World. Town mbrs. £1 1s; country & overseas mbrs. 10s 6d. *q* Anglo-Arab Assn., 27 Eaton Place, London, S.W.1.
- Arabica. Fl. 26; fr. 2400. 3 issues per ann E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands; Librairie Orientale et Américaine G.P. Maison-neuve, 198, Blvd. St-Germain, Paris 7e.
- Archiv Orientalní. Kčs.100; single issue Kčs.25. *q* Československá akademie věd Orientalní ústav, Lázeňská 4, Praha III, Czechoslovakia.
- Armenian Review. \$6; single issue \$1.75. *q* Hairenik Association, Inc., 212 Stuart St., Boston 16, Mass.
- Ars Orientalis (formerly Ars Islamica). *irreg* Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington 25, D. C.
- Art Institute of Chicago Quarterly. \$1. *q* The Art Institute, Adams St. at Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill.
- Artibus Asiae. Sw. fr. 50, \$12; single issue \$3.50. *q* Prof. Alfred Salmons, Institute of Fine Arts, New York Univ., 17 E. 80th St., New York, N. Y.
- Asiatische Studien. Sw. fr. 18 *q* A. Francke, A. G. Verlag, Bern, Switzerland.
- Belleten. *q* Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, Turkey.
- Biblioteca Orientalis. \$9.50; single issue \$2. *bi-m* Dr. A. A. Kampman, ed., Noordeindeplein 4a, Leiden, The Netherlands.
- British Museum Quarterly. £1; single issue 5s 3d. *q* Trustees of the British Museum, Gt. Russell St. London, W.C.1.
- Bulletin of the City Art Museum of St. Louis. \$2, \$3 for two years; single issue 40¢, foreign, 75¢. *q* City Art Museum of St. Louis, Forest Park, St. Louis 5, Mo.
- Bulletin of the Cleveland Museum of Art. \$3; single issue 35¢. *m* (10 issues per ann) Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland 6, Ohio.
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- Bulletin des Etudes Arabes. *bi-m* 175 Chemin du Telemly, Algiers, Algeria.
- Bulletin de l'Institut du Desert Egyptien. By exchange or request. *semi-ann* M. Mirwally, Sec. Gen. de l'Institut du Desert Egyptien, Blvd. Sultan Hussein, Héliopolis, Egypt.
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- Bulletin of the Walters Art Gallery. \$1; single issue at Museum 10¢. *m* (Oct-May) Walters Art Gallery, Charles & Centre Sts., Baltimore 1, Md.
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- Cahiers de Tunisie (formerly Revue Tunisienne). 1000 fr; foreign, 1200 fr; single issue 400 fr. *q*

- L'Institut des Hautes Études de Tunisie, 2 rue de Souk-Ahras, Tunis, Tunisia.
- The Caucasian Review. Institute for the Study of the USSR. Augustenstrasse, 46, Munich, Germany.
- Central Asian Review. 30s; single issue 7s 6d. *q* Geoffrey Wheeler and David Footman, eds. 66 King's Road, London, S.W. 3.
- Commentary. U.S., \$5; foreign, \$6; single issue 50¢. *m* American Jewish Committee, 34 W. 33rd St., New York 1, N. Y.
- Current History. U.S., \$6; Can., \$6.25; elsewhere, \$6.50; single issue 50¢. *m* Events Publ. Co., 108-10 Walnut St., Philadelphia 6, Pa.
- L'Égypte Contemporaine. Egypt, £E 1.50; foreign, £1 14s; single issue £E 40, 9s. *q* Boite Postale 732, Cairo.
- L'Égypte Industrielle. Egypt, £E 1; foreign, £1 10s; single issue £E 15, 15s. *m* La Fédération Égyptienne de l'Industrie, Mahmoud Bayram, ed., 26a rue Cherif Pacha, Cairo.
- Ethnos. Swed. cr. 15; single issue Swed. cr. 4. *q* Statens Etnografiska Museum, Stockholm Ö, Sweden.
- Faenza. Italy, lire 1000; foreign, lire 1500; single issue lire 200, lire 300. *semi-ann* Direzione del Museo Internazionale delle Ceramiche, Faenza, Italy.
- Foreign Affairs. \$6; single issue \$1.50. *q* Council on Foreign Relations, 58 E. 68th St., New York 21, N. Y.
- Geographical Journal. £1 16s; single issue 8s 6d. *q* Royal Geographical Society, 1 Kensington Gore, London, S.W.7; agent: John Murray (Publ.), Ltd., 50 Albemarle St., London, W.1.
- Geographical Review. \$7.50; single issue \$2. *q* American Geographical Society, Broadway at 156th St., New York 32, N. Y.
- Hamizrah Hehadash. Israel, £1 4; foreign \$6; single issue £1, \$1.25. *q* Israel Oriental Society, Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, Israel.
- Héspéris. 2600 fr; single issue 1300 fr. *semi-ann* Secrétariat des Publications, Institut des Hautes-Études Marocaines, Rabat, Morocco; agent: Librairie Larose, 11 rue Victor-Cousin, Paris 5e.
- IBLA. Tunisia and France, 850 fr; foreign, 1000 fr; single issue 215 fr, 250 fr. *q* Institut des Belles-Lettres, 12 rue Jamaa el Haoua, Tunis, Tunisia.
- Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi. Faculty of Divinity, Ankara Univ., Cebeçi, Ankara, Turkey.
- Illustrated London News. UK, £5 18s 6d; U.S., (British Edition) \$18, (American Edition) \$16.50; single issue 3s, 35¢. *w* 1 New Oxford St., London, W.C.1; agent: International News Company, 131 Varick St., New York 13, N. Y.
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- Islamic Quarterly. 30s; single issue 7s 6d. *q* The Islamic Cultural Centre, Regent's Lodge, 146 Park Rd., London, N.W.8.
- Islamic Review. UK, £1 5s; U.S., \$3.75; single issue 2s 6d, 37¢. *m* Woking Muslim Mission & Literary Trust, Shah Jehan Mosque, Woking, Surrey, England; Moslem Society of USA, 870 Castro St., San Francisco, Calif.; The International Muslim Society, Inc., POB 37, Manhattanville, Station J, New York 27, N. Y.
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- Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunstsammlungen. DMW 24. *ann* Publ.: Dr. Ernst Hauswedell & Co. Verlag, Fontenay 4, Hamburg 36, Germany.
- Jewish Quarterly Review. \$6. *q* The Dropsie College, Broad & York Sts., Philadelphia 32, Pa.
- Journal of the American Oriental Society. \$8; libraries, \$7; single issue \$2. *q* American Oriental Society, 329 Sterling Memorial Library, New Haven, Conn.
- Journal Asiatique. *q* Société Asiatique, 1 rue de Seine, Paris 6e.
- Journal of Modern History. \$7.50; single issue \$2.25. *q* Univ. of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Ave., Chicago 37, Ill.
- Journal of Near Eastern Studies. \$6 in U.S. and Pan American Postal Union; postage added outside PanAm Postal Union; single issue \$1.75. *q* Dept. of Oriental Languages and Literatures, Univ.

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- Le Muséon. 300 Belg. fr. 2 double vols. per year Le Muséon, 9 Ave. des Hêtres, Héverlé-Louvain, Belgium.
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- New Times.* \$3.50 or 14s; single issue 10¢, 4d plus postage. *w* Moscow, USSR.
- Oriens. TL15; \$5. *semi-ann* Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research, c/o E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands; agent for U.S. & Can.: Prof. Dr. Eberhard, 604 Panoramic Way, Berkeley, Calif.
- Orient. *q* ed. Marcel Colombe, 114 Champs Elysées, Paris VIII.
- Orientalische Literatur Zeitung. *q* J. C. Hinrichs Verlag, Scherlstr. 2, (10B) Leipzig, C1, Germany.
- Oriente Moderno. \$8. *m* Istituto per l'Oriente, Viale Davide Lubin 2, Rome.
- Palestine Exploration Quarterly. £1 1s. *semi-ann* Palestine Exploration Fund, 2 Hinde St., Manchester Square, London, W.1.
- Politique Etrangère. 1800 fr; foreign, 2250 fr; single issue 330 fr. *bi-m* Centre d'Études de Politique Etrangère, 54 rue de Varenne, Paris 7e.
- Proceedings Royal Society of Historical Studies. *irrag* 18 Ave. du Baron Empain, Héliopolis, Egypt.
- Revue du Caire. Egypt, £E 2.25; foreign, 2000 fr; single issue £E .20, 200 fr. *m* 3 rue Dr. Ahmed Hamid Said, Cairo; Les Éditions des Cahiers du Sud, 28 rue du Four, Paris 6e.
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- Rocznik Orientalni. Warsaw, Poland.
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- Saeculum (Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte). DMW 24; single issue DMW 7. *q* Verlag Karl Alber, Johanniterstr. 4, Freiburg/Breisgau; V. Karl Alber, Freiburg-München, Germany.
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- Speculum. Free to mbrs.; subscr. \$7. *q* Mediaeval Academy of America, 1430 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge 38, Mass.
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- Tamuda. Spain & Span. Morocco, 100 ptas; foreign,

- \$4; single issue 60 ptas., \$2.50. *semi-ann* Delegación de Educación y Cultura, Tetuan, Spanish Morocco.
- Tarbiz. \$5. *q* Magnes Press, Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, Israel.
- U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. \$5; foreign, \$6; single issue 50¢. *m* Cdr. Roy de S. Horn, ed., U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md.
- Ural-Altaische Jahrbucher. DMW 40; single issue DMW 20. *semi-ann* Prof. Julius von Farkas, ed., Hospitalstr. 10, Göttingen; Publ.: Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, Germany.
- Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR.* \$8 or £2; single issue 80¢, 4s plus postage. *m* Moscow, USSR.
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- Die Welt des Islams. Gld. 25; \$6.60. *q* Prof. G. Jäschke, ed., (21a) Munster (Westf.), Tondernstr. 5, Germany; Publ.: E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands.
- Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. *irreg* Orientalisches Institut der Universität Wien, Hanuschgasse 3/II, Vienna I, Austria.
- World Today. UK, £1 5s; U.S., \$5; single issue 2s, 45¢. *m* Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, St. James's Square, London, S.W.1; 345 E. 46th St., New York 17, N. Y.
- Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft. *semi-ann* Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner GMBH, Wiesbaden, Germany.

ABBREVIATIONS

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|---|---|-------------------------------|
| A., Asian, Asiatic, asiatique | Mag., Magazine | Univ., University, université |
| Acad., Academy | Mid., Middle | Z., Zeitschrift, Zeitung |
| Aff., Affairs, affaires | Mod., Modern, moderno, etc. | |
| Afr., African, Afrique, etc. | Mus., Museum, musée | <i>Arabic</i> |
| Amer., American | Natl., National | K., Kitab, etc. |
| Archeol., Archaeological, archéologique | Nr., Near | Maj., Majallah, etc. |
| B., Bulletin | Numis., Numismatic, numismatique | <i>Russian, Polish, etc.</i> |
| C., Central | O., Oriental, oriente, etc. | |
| Cent., Century | Pal., Palestine | Akad., Akademii |
| Contemp., Contemporary, etc. | Phil., Philosophical | Fil., Filosofi |
| Cult., Culture | Philol., Philological, Philologique | Inst., Institut |
| D., Deutsch | Polit., Political, Politique | Ist., Istorii |
| Dept., Department | Proceed., Proceedings | Izvest., Izvestia |
| East., Eastern | Quart., Quarterly | Lit., Literaturi |
| Econ., Economic, économique | R., Royal | Orient., Orientalni |
| For., Foreign | Res., Research | Ser., Seriya |
| G., Gesellschaft | Rev., Review, revue | Sov., Sovetskoye |
| Geog., Geographical, géographique, etc. | Riv., Rivista | Uchon., Uchoniye |
| Gt. Brit., Great Britain | S., School | Vostok., Vostokovedenia |
| Hist., Historical, historique, etc. | Soc., Society, société | Yaz., Yazika |
| Illust., Illustrated | Stud., Studies | Zap., Zapiski |
| Inst., Institute | Trans., Transactions | <i>Turkish</i> |
| Internat., International | U.S., United States | Fak., Fakülte |
| J., Journal | USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics | Univ., Üniversite |
| L., Literature, etc. | | |
| M., Morgenländisch, etc. | | |

Readers' Commentary

The Journal welcomes comment from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in this column, preference being given to those which correct errors of fact, offer constructive criticism of an opinion expressed, or provide additional information on a topic discussed in the Journal's pages.

Dear Sir:

Writing from Riyadh to your issue of Winter 1958, Hajj St. J. B. Philby insists on the legal independence of 'the people of Oman' with respect to the Sultan of Muscat. It is remarkable, therefore, that he did not deal with the assertion of your British Contributor, to whose letter he was replying, that in 1952, when a Saudi armed party occupied the Būraini oasis, all the Omani tribal leaders, except Suleiman bin Himyar, either wrote to the Sultan or went to see him to enquire what he proposed to do. The Imam Mohammed asked the Sultan to lead the Omanis against the aggressor, and a force of 8,000 Omani tribesmen . . . gathered at Ibri to assist the Sultan's other forces in expelling the invaders. When the British Government, acting on the Sultan's behalf, negotiated with the Saudi Government for a peaceful settlement of this issue, the Imam wrote to the Sultan expressing his satisfaction that matters should be so handled. (Summer 1958, p. 367.)

However, the Saudi documents later captured by the British at Buraimi are stated (*New York Times*, 27 January 1956, p. 4) to reveal the Saudi Government (as also the Egyptians) as having been sending funds and arms to Shaikh Ghalib ibn Ali, encouraging him to make this Omani claim to independence a reality.

It follows from this that outside interference in the internal affairs of Oman did not come solely, or even initially, from the British; but, not for the first time, Mr. Philby has been at pains to present only the anti-British side of the picture.

GEORGE KIRK
11 Scott Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Sir:

Dr. Laurence Lockhart, in his letter published in your Winter 1959 issue, states that my book, *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics*, "is an extremely unreliable guide . . . as it is based far more on propaganda and bias than on facts." It is a pity that Dr. Lockhart, having made this biased propaganda statement, should have omitted to adduce any facts in support of it.

The passage in my book (quoted, by the way, rather naively by Mr. David Finnie in support of the AIOC's breaches of the D'Arcy Concession in its foreign personnel policy!) to which Dr. Lockhart takes exception makes four assertions: (a) that the D'Arcy Concession stipulated that the only foreigners employed should be "managers, engineers, master drillers and inspectors" (b) that the many thousand British and Indian staff went far beyond these limits (c) that British employees completely monopolised all posts above a certain grade (d) that this last fact made it extremely difficult for the Persian government to get any information to back its claims.

Before proceeding once again to prove these assertions (they are fully backed by the facts given in my book), it is worth pointing out, what Dr. Lockhart is careful to obscure, that the passage in question, though to a considerable extent also true of conditions under the 1933 Concession, was in fact referring to the original 1901 Concession. The last part of Dr. Lockhart's letter is therefore entirely irrelevant to his case. To return within the strict limits of his criticism:

(a) He does not attempt to contradict the first assertion, and indeed he could hardly do so, since the words in quotes are taken from the text of Article 12 of the Concession.

(b) Prior to 1931 the percentage of foreign employees was about 20%. (Even in 1935 foreign employees in Abadan numbered 1,929 out of 16,983 (11.4%) and in 1949 4,477 out of 55,970 (8%)—AIOC's own figures given in the ILO publication, *Labour Conditions in the Oil Industry in Iran*.) No oil company could usefully employ such a large proportion of "managers, engineers, master drillers and inspectors"! So difficult indeed had the AIOC found it to keep within these terms that it insisted that the equivalent clause in the 1933 Concession be worded very much more loosely, even though their intention was to *reduce* the proportion of foreign employees—at any rate in the lower grades.

(c) Once again reminding ourselves that we are considering the 1901 Concession, we discover that it was not until after the 1933 Concession that foreign employees were finally eliminated from the lowest grades (skilled and unskilled)—to be exact, in 1938. When we turn to the salaried grades, we find that even in 1935 there were only 495 salaried Iranians as against 919 salaried foreigners. One Iranian, late in the Company's history, succeeded in reaching the dizzy height of assistant general manager. But perhaps the best comment on Dr. Lockhart's claim that the AIOC was doing all it could to promote Iranians to the upper grades is provided by the following figures:

(i) Immediately before AIOC's departure:

	Foreign	Iranian
Graded	2,756	765
Non-graded	696	3,544
	3,452	4,309

(ii) After first year of Consortium operation:

	280	5,899
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Dr. Lockhart's tribute to the senior Iranian staff who took over from the British in 1951, though more than deserved, comes oddly from the spokesman for a company whose propaganda machine, in that year, was busy convincing the world that, if the British staff left, the result would be "explosion—and catastrophe!"

(d) One of the commonest complaints of the AIOC (Dr. Lockhart repeats it) was that the Iranian government and people were unaware of the facts. Of course we are not talking about the same facts, but if they had difficulty in getting hold of the facts that the AIOC wanted them to know, how much more was that true of those it was in the AIOC's interest to conceal. Dr. Lockhart's own summary of the sources of information available to the Iranian government before 1933 is hardly impressive—a monthly report (prepared by the Company), an "eminent chartered accountant on the spot" (himself associated with one of the AIOC's subsidiaries), and a welcome to Persian ministers and notables visiting the scene of the Company's operations. It is obvious that the information filtered out in this way could not compare with what was available to Company officials in managerial posts—all of whom at that time were British.

But of course Dr. Lockhart, if he will forgive me for saying so, is bound to feel somewhat sensitive on this point, for it was his unenviable task, in the years after the Second World War, to persuade the Iranian public of the righteousness of the AIOC's cause, and one could only sympathise with him in his sterling efforts to make bricks without straw.

L. P. ELWELL-SUTTON
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Al Wassa'il Fi Sh'rh al Shama'il, by Sultan Mulla Mohamed Aly el-Kari'. The author died in 1014, manuscript copied in 1008 H. Last sentence indicated that it is the original copy of the author.

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"Priorities of Action for Survival" (KENNETH IVERSON, Staff Member of the Draper Committee).

"Utility and Self-Will in the Middle East" (GEORGE KIRK, Harvard University).

"Middle East Economic Aspirations" (HOWARD PAGE, Vice President of the Standard Oil Company, New Jersey), and "country reports" on Iraq, the United Arab Republic, U.A.R.-Israel relations, Lebanon, North Africa, Turkey, Soviet area activities, and recent United Nations actions in the Middle East respectively, by:

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
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